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Chapter 1: Introduction to the free agency problem 
 
 
 
'Free will' is the conventional name of a topic that is  
best discussed without reference to the will. 
(G. Strawson 1998/2004, p. 1) 
 
[F]reiheit charakterisiert eine Seinsweise – die Art wie  
handelnde Personen im Raum der Gründe existieren.  
(Habermas 2006, p. 675) 
 
 
 
1.1 The Free Will Problem 
 
In what sense is this thesis an investigation into the concept of freedom? Let me start by 
defining what this thesis is not about. First of all, it is not an investigation of freedom in the 
social or political sense: I will not discuss concepts such as democracy, civil liberties, or 
individual rights. I am concerned with what is commonly known as the free will problem. 
More than being one particular question, this is rather a cluster of related philosophical 
puzzles that relate to our everyday conviction that we act according to our own freely taken 
decisions, and regarding what kind of status this conviction has in relation to a world of 
causally related events. 
 Both the volume of literature and the “thought density” surrounding this area are 
enormous and ever-increasing. It seems to be as popular a topic as ever, among philosophers 
as well as in other academic areas, notably the neurosciences. Thus, it might be too much to 
expect that I will go so far as to think any truly original thoughts. The best I can hope for is 
perhaps to combine what I consider are the best available thoughts on the subject in an 
original manner, and in doing so to shed some new light on this continually perplexing 
problem.  
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One of the first moves I would like to make to distinguish myself from the mainstream 
philosophical debate is to refrain from using the established free will terminology. I consider 
‘free will’ to be a somewhat artificial construct derived from the fundamental question of 
what it means to act freely. What I find problematic about this construct is that it creates a 
false image of ‘the will’ as a mental unit over and above our ability to act, to which we may – 
or may not – ascribe freedom. In contrast to this, I would like to emphasise free agency as 
characteristic for a mode of being, viz. an ability to make things happen in the world by acting 
according to reason. This is what I will later refer to as performative being.1 
Central to the concept of free agency is that it warrants the assigning of moral 
responsibility to agents. As among others Locke and Kant have argued, being free in the 
morally relevant sense has nothing to do with acting according to one’s changing inclinations 
and wishes. On the contrary, people who behave in such a way appear to be paradigmatically 
unfree. The word ‘will’ has ‘want’ as one of its basic meanings, whereas being free frequently 
shows itself in an ability to not do what I want, in the sense of postponing my immediate 
needs and acting according to (better) reason. According to Schopenhauer, I can do what I 
want, but it does not make sense to say that I can want what I want; at any given time I can 
only want what I in fact want.2 This is a truth with a modification, however, since the idea of 
choosing what to want has a clear and reasonable meaning, notably regarding so-called 
“higher-order wants”. A commonly used example is that of an alcoholic who may choose to 
disregard that she wants a drink in favour of her higher-order want to stay sober.  
A traditional view is that free agency is a weaker concept than free will, so that the 
defence of free agency does not amount to a robust concept of human freedom. According to 
such a view, acting freely simply means being unrestrained in a specific sense – whether from 
outer/physical or inner/mental forces or obstructions. Thus, if I am locked up in chains, my 
freedom of agency is severely diminished, whereas my will is as free as ever. Mental 
restrictions are more difficult. Addiction, obsession, agitation, extortion, ignorance – these are 
all factors affecting the rationality of my choices as well as the degree to which I am held 
responsible for my actions. An area of contention is whether these factors affect the freedom 
of my will or just diminish my range of free agency.  
To me, the distinction between a “strong” concept of free will and a “weaker” concept 
of free agency makes little sense. “The will” cannot be singled out as a particular unit in me 
                                                 
1 Cf. below, Ch. 5.9. I borrow the concept “performative being” from Albrecht Wellmer (cf. Wellmer 1991, p. 
183f.) 
2 Cf. Schopenhauer 1839, p. 542. 
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over and above my ability to form intentions and act according to these. And my ability to 
form intentions and act according to these is synonymous with my ability to act freely. 
Deciding how to relate to one’s various inclinations, forming intentions and so on are, as I see 
it, exactly the kind of rational processes that we carry out, and that we call actions. Therefore, 
I chose to talk about the free agency problem. 
“Building the will” is in itself a case of intentional agency (in the case of prior 
intentions) or a part of an action (in the case of intentions-in-actions).3 In this, I am always 
subjected to various physical and mental restraints and influences, and my freedom never 
amounts to more than a freedom to make decisions and act under given circumstances. “Free 
will”, viewed as the ability to make decisions under prevailing circumstances, cannot be 
analysed independently from our ability to make things happen in the world. Seen as a purely 
mental concept, the will can only be free in the negative sense of being unrestrained, not in 
the positive sense of acting according to reason and thus being responsible. What we are held 
responsible for are ultimately our actions and – among them – our deliberations, choices and 
decision-making processes. To turn the stronger-weaker distinction around, we could argue 
that a free will is not enough, but that it must be seen as a derivative component of our ability 
to act freely. 
 
 
1.2 The Kantian Problem 
 
The appeal of the philosophical problem area referred to above as “the free will problem” – 
and that I suggest be renamed “the free agency problem” – comes from the idea of a conflict 
between the freedom we subjectively experience and the world that we experience as 
functioning according to the laws of nature. Kant demonstrated an acute sense of this conflict 
in the Critique of Pure Reasons. He formulated the conflict as an antinomy, i.e. as two 
contradicting principles, both of which concern reality as we experience it. Thus, Kant points 
out that we are dealing with a major contradiction in our lives. We may try to dissolve the 
sheer contradiction – as Kant certainly does – but since the conflict between a subjective and 
an objective view of ourselves constitutes an important aspect of what it means to be a 
rational being, it will remain an area of tension in our lives.  
                                                 
3 On the distinction between prior intentions and intentions-in-action, cf. e.g. Searle 2001, p. 44f. 
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Albrecht Wellmer argues that a characteristic mark of philosophical activity is the 
clarification of concepts through the display of inherent contradictions and incoherence. This 
is not simply restricted to pure logical contradictions, but includes various forms of practically 
significant oppositions, dilemmas, and puzzles. The persuasive force of a philosophical 
position shows itself not least in its productive handling of such problems. As a classic 
example, Wellmer points to Kant’s antinomy chapter in the Transcendental Dialectics:  
 
[B]ei der dritten Antinomie etwa geht es – so interpretiere ich sie – um einen transzendental 
begründeten Widerstreit zwischen einer ’objektivierenden’ (naturalistischen) und einer ’performativen’ 
(normativen) Perspektive auf die geschichtliche Welt und auf uns selbst als Handelnde, einen 
Widerstreit, der sich zwar als ein Widerspruch auflösen, aber als ein praktisch und existentiell 
bedeutsamer und unvermeidlicher, sowohl in der Lebenswelt als auch in der Praxis der 
Sozialwissenschaften und des Rechts immer wieder sich meldender Widerstreit deshalb nicht beseitigen 
lässt, weil beide Perspektiven immer wieder ihr Recht gegeneinander geltend machen, ohne dass sie 
sich – so scheint es – ohne weiteres in einer umfassenden Perspektive friedlich miteinander vereinigen 
ließen. (Wellmer 2007, p. 230) 
 
Kant’s solution is in a specific sense compatibilistic in that it confirms the possibility of both 
freedom and determinism. However, as opposed to classic compatibilism à la Hume, he does 
not refute the contradiction by writing it off as merely apparent. The Kantian formulation of 
the problem points to a fundamental tension in our lives, due to the opposition between our 
different perspectives on and accesses to the world. In this way, Kant sheds light on the 
normative dimension of the freedom problem. The important aspect of the question of 
freedom is not the possibility of having no strings attached, but the ability to be bound by the 
right kind of strings, namely reasons by which we as autonomous beings bind ourselves. In 
the following, I will argue that to perform an action basically is to enter into a web of 
commitments, into what Robert Brandom (referring to Wilfred Sellars) calls a “normative 
space of reasons”.4 This irreducibly normative dimension is the fundament for the ascription 
of moral responsibility and for the characterisation of actions as free. 
The Kantian way of displaying the freedom problem remains of current interest. 
However, his solution is – as I will argue – dualistic in its representation of man as “citizen of 
two worlds”. One advantage with moving from a “free will problem” to a “free agency 
problem” is that the concept of rational agency is anti-dualistic at its core, in the sense that an 
action has both mental and physical properties. Furthermore, Kant does not bring up language 
                                                 
4 Cf. Brandom 1994 and Sellars 1997. Cf. below, Ch. 4. 
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as a precondition for rationality, thus of rational agency. In my thesis, I will argue that rational 
agency must in a specific sense be explained on the basis of communicative action. An 
adequate approach to human freedom must recognise intersubjective language as a condition 
for the possibility of free agency. 
 
 
1.3 The Perspectivity Problem  
 
At the core of the free agency problem lays the (intuitively tempting) idea that an 
objectivating view of the world can be made absolute or understood as overriding, and that 
our different subjective, partial views of the world may be regarded as subordinated to an 
“objective, universal truth”. According to Thomas Nagel, these ideas inevitably lead to 
paradoxes concerning our view of ourselves: 
 
We can act only from inside the world, but when we see ourselves from outside, the autonomy we 
experience from inside appears as an illusion, and we who are looking from outside, cannot act at all.   
(Nagel 1986, p. 120) 
 
Nagel draws the rather pessimistic conclusion that there can be no solving of this paradox, 
hence no solution to the problem of human freedom.  
Nagel distinguishes two aspects of the free agency problem; one having to do with our 
own freedom (the problem of autonomy) and one with the freedom of others (the problem of 
responsibility). Both problems boil down to the opposition between an internal and an 
external view on action, whether our own or the actions of others. Nagel sees the possibility 
of holding other people responsible as one that is available from within our internal 
perspective, but which we lose as soon as we view the actions of others “from outside”. 
Initially, though, it seems mysterious that we are able to assume an internal perspective 
concerning the actions of other people. Nagel seems to think that we infer by analogy: 
 
In acting we occupy the internal perspective, and we can occupy it sympathetically with regard to the 
actions of others. (Nagel 1986, p. 113, my italics) 
 
I think Wittgenstein’s critique of “the realist” applies to this formulation: It makes no sense to 
believe that other people have an “inner life” – in the sense of having it as a hypothesis – since 
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no conceivable experience would support or weaken this belief.5 However, if we regard 
intersubjective language as a condition of both our understanding of ourselves and of others 
as autonomous and responsible, the need for an inference by analogy disappears. Therefore, I 
propose to substitute the mentalistic distinction between an internal and an external 
perspective with a linguistic-pragmatic distinction between the expressive and the assertoric 
mode, or between the performative and the propositional part of speech acts in the Austin-
Searle-Habermasian sense.6 
According to Nagel, the reason we do not hold animals responsible is that we cannot 
assume their point of view. This might seem to be in line with Wittgenstein’s supposition that 
even if lions could speak, we would not be able to understand them.7 And we are certainly 
most inclined to judge those who are most like ourselves – as we correspondingly feel entitled 
to be judged by a “jury of equals”.  However, the analogy approach can hardly capture the 
true sense of this expression, since “equal” here means morally equal; not actually alike, but 
with the same rights and duties. And the analogy fails utterly when it comes to small children. 
Nagel seems to suggest that we refrain from judging them because we do not understand 
them:  
 
With regard to small children the possibilities of moral judgment are somewhat greater, but we still 
cannot project ourselves fully into their point of view in order to think about what they should do. 
(Nagel 1986, p. 121) 
 
Nagel thinks the same goes for e.g. mentally disturbed people or people under the influence of 
drugs: We cannot judge them, because they are “different from us”.8 However, when we – as 
Strawson puts it – “suspend our resentment”9 towards the actions of small children and the 
mentally ill, this is not because we do not understand them or because we regard them as too 
much unlike us. It is because we truly do not hold them responsible, since their rationality is 
(as yet – or temporarily) underdeveloped – or underachieving.  
Obviously, Nagel has a sound point. Holding each other responsible for our actions 
depends on our ability to assume the other party’s point of view. However, he seems to put 
the carriage before the horse. It is not because the animal, child or drug addict is too different 
from us that we cannot assume their point of view, but because they cannot assume the role of 
                                                 
5 Cf. Wittgenstein 1958, p. 48f. 
6 Cf. below, Ch. 6.3. 
7 Cf. Wittgenstein PU, p. 190. 
8 Cf. Op.cit. p. 122. 
9 Cf. Strawson 1974, p. 77. 
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full-fledged second persons for us.10 Holding someone responsible essentially presupposes 
co-subjectivity, and hence reciprocity. It is not because we see a resemblance between us and 
other individuals that we – by analogy or sympathy – hold them responsible. Rather, it is by 
holding each other responsible that we recognise each other as caught up in the same “web of 
commitments”, and come to see each other as co-subjects. We recognise each other as 
recognisers. Strictly speaking, we can only hold those responsible who in turn are able to hold 
us responsible. 
 Nagel correctly pins down the free agency problem as one having to do with the 
changing perspectives we assume towards actions. However, in the following I shall attempt 
to substitute Nagel’s “mentalist” internal-external distinction with a more refined linguistic-
pragmatic distinction between first-, second-, and (relative vs. absolute) third-person 
perspective, connected to the relationship between performative and propositional parts of 
speech acts. In this way, I hope to attain a more flexible conception of free agency, a 
conception allowing for transitions between the different perspectives that we may assume 
towards actions, thereby retaining a monistic concept of action.11 These changing 
perspectives are bound together through a system of indexical substitutions. Even objective 
propositions that render perspective-transcending truths about the world have a perspectival 
basis.12  
Nagel observes that the free agency problem arises when we push the objectivation of 
actions too far. In this sense, the problem is independent of determinism: Our actions seem no 
more free if regarded as the result of “indeterminist” quantum leaps than they do if regarded 
as conforming to strict causal laws of nature: 
  
In either case we cease to face the world and instead become parts of it. (Nagel 1986, p. 114) 
 
I will argue that the problem with many attempts to dissolve or untangle the free agency 
problem (including Nagel’s suggestion that “nothing approaching the truth has yet been said 
                                                 
10 Cf. below, Ch. 5.4. 
11 Which is what Nagel seeks as well, cf. Nagel 1986, p. 111. I think, however, that Nagel’s inner-outer 
metaphors regarding actions point to a wide spread challenge for the philosophical debate on the free agency 
problem. Metaphors are not harmless, i.e. not just illustrations of ready-made thoughts; they actually shape the 
way we think (cf. e.g. Riceur 1977). The inner/outer dichotomy belongs to a set of frequently used metaphors in 
philosophy (cf. my critique of Sebastian Rödl and Jürgen Habermas below, Ch. 4.4; Ch. 6.9). In my thesis I 
criticise this metaphor in general for suggesting a too strict dichotomy between a normative I-you-
communication and a descriptive third-person view of the world, and for lacking the flexibility necessary in 
order to perceive free actions as parts of the world, and to speak about other persons as free agents. 
12 Cf. Tugendhat 1976; cf. below, Ch. 6.4. 
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about this subject”13) is that they assume a too-strict dichotomy between the subjective and 
the objective, between the “internal” and the “external” perspective, or between (normative) 
participation and (scientistic) observation. An acceptable approach to the free agency problem 
should ensure that we are able to view subjects facing the world as parts of it. 
 
 
1.4 Free Agency: A fact of reason  
 
Thomas Nagel points out that the problem with a deterministic view of agency applies 
generally to all attempts to objectivate action. The problem is certainly one of perspective, but 
it cannot be solved simply by insisting that action must be viewed from an “inner” 
perspective. A purely “internal” view of agency would make it impossible to see free actions 
as parts of the world, and would thus lead either to dualism or to an insolvable dilemma à la 
Nagel.  
I think Nagel is right when he argues that our sense of being “the authors of our own 
actions” cannot really be seen as an intelligible belief, but something that somehow shows 
itself. 14 To put it in Kantian terms, free agency should be recognised as a “fact of reason”: 
 
Freiheit ist (…) die einzige unter allen Ideen der spekulativen Vernunft, wovon wir die Möglichkeit a 
priori wissen, ohne sie doch einzusehen, weil sie die Bedingung des moralischen Gesetzes ist, welches 
wir wissen. (Kant, KpV 5)15  
  
Kant’s point can be generalised. Free agency is not only a condition for realising the 
rationality of the categorical imperative, but a general condition of rationality, i.e. of being 
able to relate to reasons. Thus, free agency is not something that we can discover with the 
help of reason, but what constitutes reason.  
A fundamental element in the approach to free agency proposed in this thesis is an 
interventionist theory of causality. Von Wright and others have argued that our active 
interference in the natural course of events is what makes us capable of having a concept of 
                                                 
13 Cf. Nagel 1986, p. 137. 
14 Cf. Nagel 1986, p. 114. 
15 In a footnote, Kant adds that the relationship between freedom and the moral law can be specified further by 
seeing freedom as the ratio essendi of the moral law and the moral law as the ratio cognoscendi of freedom: 
“Denn, wäre nicht das moralische Gesetz in unserer Vernunft eher deutlich gedacht, so würden wir uns niemals 
berechtigt halten, so etwas, als Freiheit ist (ob diese gleich sich nicht widerspricht), anzunehmen. Wäre aber 
keine Freiheit, so würde das moralische Gesetz in uns gar nicht anzutreffen sein” (Loc.cit,  fn. 1). More on this 
below, Ch. 5.5. 
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causal relations as existing in the world.16 Action, not causality, is immediately given – 
although the two refer reciprocally to each other. Von Wright further argues in a Kantian 
manner that, once the fact of (rational) action is a given, we do not need an additional account 
of freedom. Freedom is already implied in the concept of action: 
 
[T]he concept of an action, the ascriptions of actions to an agent, belong to discourse in which ‘free 
will’ is taken for granted. (von Wright 1980, p. 78) 
 
Geert Keil formulates this thought by saying that the language of agency already implies a 
“massive metaphysics of freedom”17 Viewed in this way, our indomitable experience of being 
“the authors of our own actions” becomes the first step in the solution of the free agency 
problem instead of the mysterious ‘x’ to be explained. 
In keeping with this, I will not attempt to argue that the assumption of freedom is true, 
but rather that it is indispensable. In the following chapters, I will argue that reasoning – even 
about causal connections in the world – ultimately involves an implicit assumption by the 
rational subject of herself as a freely acting person. Hence, any attempt to refute free agency 
will inevitably run into pragmatic self-contradictions or performative inconsistencies.  
I will further argue that the indexicality of colloquial language, i.e. the possibility for 
perspectival multiplicity and change is a key to resolving the free agency problem. Instead of 
denying the possibility of objectivating action, I will argue that objectivated action can be 
seen as a bridge between freedom and nature in Kant’s sense – given a non-scientistic 
objectivation.18 A complete language equips us with the ability, not only to perform, but also 
to speak about free actions.19 This provides the desired transitions between “internal” and 
“external” in Nagel’s sense, between the performative and the propositional parts of speech 
acts, and between the normative and the descriptive – since objectivated actions essentially 
belong on both sides of the “gulf”. 
However, as Wellmer argues, although we may manage to dissolve the pure, logical 
contradiction between freedom and nature, the sense of a practical paradox will remain. The 
conflict will reappear every time we attempt to view ourselves “from the outside”. The inner 
tension within our colloquial language between the performative and the propositional parts 
                                                 
16 Cf. below, Ch. 3.3, 3.4. 
17 Cf. Keil 2000, p. 12; 2007, p. 89. 
18 Cf. Apel’s concept of “secondary objectivation” (Apel 1979, p. 173), cf. below, Ch. 6.7.  
19 In the “relative third person”, cf. below, Ch. 6.4; 6.5. 
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of our speech acts corresponds, it seems, to a fundamental contradiction within human 
existence. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
Ultimately, my formulation of the free agency problem and the main question of this thesis is 
this: How can we – practically and epistemologically – specify the ability that rational beings 
have to act freely, in the sense of making things happen in the world, as well as in the sense of 
holding each other responsible?20 
In the next chapter, Chapter 2: Kantian freedom – between mind and world, I will 
attempt to analyse the Kantian approach to free will in order to review the strengths as well as 
the weaknesses of this theory. I start out with an analysis of the third antinomy in the Critique 
of Pure Reasons, which constitutes the centre of Kant’s theory of freedom, whereupon I 
distinguish between his concepts of transcendental and practical freedom. Kant tries to solve 
the free agency problem by defending the possibility of a metaphysical space for freedom 
outside the realm of nature. I will argue that his theory, despite its subtleties, remains 
dualistic. 
 Hence, in Chapter 3: Action and causation – an equation with two unknowns, I 
approach the free agency problem from a different angle; namely by arguing that freedom is 
no “metaphysical possibility” for which we must make room, but rather a presupposition in 
the form of an analytical component of the concept of action. I start out by looking at the 
dispute in the philosophy of science known as the reasons vs. causes debate. Against this 
background I defend an interventionist account of the relationship between causality and 
agency and an assumption that if we can make room for a concept of intentional action in our 
world-view, there is no problem of free agency over and above this. An intentional action is, 
by conceptual necessity, a free action.  
Chapter 4: The normative approach to action builds on the concept of intentional 
agency suggested in Chapter 3, and aims at capturing the normative dimension of agency. I 
endorse an anti-reductionist approach to action, rationality, and normativity. This involves 
                                                 
20 More specifically, I see this as a positive formulation of the free agency problem. The negative side of the 
problem is what the world must be like in order not to contradict this ability. I largely steer clear of the negative 
side of the problem; however it is touched on in Chapter 6, in relation to the disagreement between 
compatibilists and libertarians in the philosophical free will/free agency debate. 
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understanding action as irreducibly normative, in the sense that it cannot be analysed as 
physical events caused by pro attitudes. I look into respectively Robert Brandom’s and 
Sebastian Rödl’s versions of a normative theory of rational agency.  
Chapter 5: The intersubjective basis of normativity takes Searle’s concept of a 
“circle of intentionality” as its point of departure, and argues that the basis of normativity is 
intersubjective language. The chapter ends with a discussion of whether normativity must be 
explicated on the basis of morality. 
In Chapter 6: Language and world: Two theses of unity, I attempt to work out 
some of the details of an anti-dualistic theory of free agency based on a pragmatic theory of 
language. More specifically, I look at how certain structural features of a complete language 
render possible an objectivation of action, thereby securing the necessary connection between 
a performative first-person perspective and objectified true-or-false propositions about the 
world. In this connection I apply Apel’s critique of “the alternative conception” – a form of 
conceptual dualism of explanation vs. understanding. I endorse Apel’s argument that we must 
emphasise the hermeneutic dimension “between” these two frames in order to avoid a 
dualistic conception of language as well as of actions and acting persons.  
In other words, I defend a thesis of the unity of language and of indexical expressions 
as a key to this unity. Further, I defend a thesis of the unity of world, by looking into and 
criticising Habermas’s differentiated world-view. I suggest the concepts of veritative and 
performative being as possible replacements for Habermas’s concepts of the objective, social 
and subjective world. In this way, I attempt to avoid a situation where the differentiation of 
possible relations between language (users) and the world collapses into dualism, as well as to 
display how different perspectives and relations to the world are integrated in a complete 
language.  
In Chapter 7: Freedom and first-person priority, I return to the starting block by 
looking at the traditional philosophical freedom debate and try to relate my approach to free 
agency to this debate. I start by pointing out the limits of possible objectivation of the 
performative perspective and that this perspective must be viewed as superior to observation. 
Further, I look at the debate between compatibilistic and libertarian defenders of free 
will/agency. This debate regards the relationship between freedom and determinism, i.e. the 
question if freedom of action depends on whether or not natural events are the result of 
deterministic laws of nature. Without concluding with a definite refutation of compatibilism, I 
point to certain inherent tensions within existing versions of this position, among others 
within Habermas’s attempt at a non-scientistic, anti-dualistic compatabilism.  
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The emphasis in this thesis lies, however, on a positive account of free agency – i.e. on 
freedom as a non-circumventable “fact of reason” – and not on a negative account in the sense 
of the limitations a robust concept of free agency might put on our conception of the world 
and the laws by which it is governed. 
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Chapter 2: Kantian freedom – between mind and world 
 
 
Ein jedes Wesen, das nicht anders als unter der Idee der Freiheit 
handeln kann, ist eben darum, in praktischer Rücksicht, wirklich frei. 
(Kant, GSM 448) 
 
Der Freiheitsbegriff bestimmt nichts in Ansehung der theoretischen  
Erkenntnis der Natur; der Naturbegriff eben sowohl nichts  
in Ansehung der praktische Gesetze der Freiheit. 
(Kant, KU 196) 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction: Freedom vs. nature  
 
In this chapter I discuss and criticise Kant’s theory of freedom as a starting point for my 
approach to the problem of free agency. In our everyday self-understanding we think of 
ourselves on the one hand as making decisions and acting upon them, and in this sense acting 
freely. On the other hand we tend to believe that everything happens as a causal effect of a 
preceding course of events. To the degree that I view my own actions as entering into the 
temporal chain of events, how can I at the same time think of them as the results of my free 
decisions? The metaphysical problem of free agency arises in the light of two coexisting, 
although apparently contradictory, interpretations of reality. 
I think one reason why Kant’s theory of freedom continues to be relevant is that it 
describes this clash in a forceful manner. The mainstream compatibilist chooses a non-
confrontational strategy, claiming that there is no real conflict between determinism and 
freedom, while the incompatibilist denies the possibility of free acts in the case of 
determinism. Kant agrees with the incompatibilist in maintaining that there is a contradiction 
between freedom and determinism, preserving the intuition that there is in fact a philosophical 
problem to be solved here. His final solution is, however, in a specific sense compatibilistic: 
Free agency is consistent with universal determinism, given that the two reign in respectively 
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a noumenal and a phenomenal world. Allen W. Wood refers to Norman Kretzmar, who likens 
this to saying  
 
that a married couple is compatible, but only as long as they live in separate houses. (Wood 1984, p. 75) 
 
It seems to me that Kant’s solution is more problematic than that. I don’t see a problem with a 
couple choosing to live in separate houses, but if the two never set foot in the same house it 
seems to be a matter of a pro forma marriage, in other words no marriage in the real sense of 
the word. I will argue that, in spite of all his efforts to avoid it, Kant’s solution remains 
dualistic. 
The main reason for the continuing relevance of Kant’s theory of freedom is his 
encirclement of the problem of freedom as one regarding rationality and normativity. Kant 
understands the debate on human freedom as having practical reason as its main topic. In this 
sense, he follows on John Locke, who establishes that freedom cannot possibly be seen as a 
capacity for ungoverned behaviour, but must be viewed as an ability to be governed by 
reason: 
 
If to break loose from the conduct of reason (…) be liberty, madmen and fools are the only freemen. 
(Locke 1690, 186, § 50) 
 
To Locke, and to Kant, being free is not the same as having “no strings attached.” Rather, it is 
a matter of being bound by the right kind of strings, viz. the “forceless force” of the principles 
of practical reason. Kant defines freedom as the ability to act according to reason.21 This 
definition points to an ability not to act according to our immediate wishes or motivations, but 
to suspend these or to distance ourselves from them on the grounds of better reasons. What 
distinguishes reasons from wishes is an inherent normative dimension, as Robert Brandom 
puts it: 
 
One of Kant’s great insights is that judgements and actions are to be distinguished from the responses of 
merely natural creatures by their distinctive normative status, as things we are in a distinctive sense 
responsible for. (Brandom 2000a, p. 33) 
 
                                                 
21 “Dieses Vermögen, stets nach Vernunft zu handeln”, cf. Kant’s Gesammelte Schrifte (Akademieausgabe) 
28.2,2; 1068 (Religionslehre Pölitz). 
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The normative dimension is established by practical reason: A good reason to act is a rational 
reason, and a rational reason is one we ought to act according to. 
The title of this chapter refers to a traditional philosophical opposition between the 
mind and the world. As a starting point it seems clear to me that a satisfactory concept of free 
agency must be securely tied to both of these concepts. Actions cannot just be considered 
mental entities, but must at the same time be recognised as entering into the world’s actual 
course of events. My initial suspicion is that, although Kant’s concept of freedom has a lot to 
offer when it comes to specifying the mental dimension of free actions, it is comparatively 
less suited to clarifying the “worldly” dimension of agency.  
Kant contrasts freedom with nature, a dichotomy apparently parallel with the mind-
world distinction, and places freedom in an “ideal world” different from the empirical world 
of phenomena. To what extent and in what way the two worlds are connected is, of course, a 
major topic of discussion among Kant’s interpreters. What I seek is, however, a conception of 
free agency that allows us to experience actions as entering into the very same world as other 
events, whether this is understood as an ontological, epistemic or moral demand. 
At the same time it seems unlikely that freedom can be proven in any empirical sense. 
An action’s characteristic of being free cannot be “observed”. It is therefore unclear in what 
sense we can take freedom to exist in the world. Certainly not in the same sense as we take 
objects like tables or mountains to exist. One might think that the difference is one between 
the “inner” and the “outer” realm, that while tables and mountains exist in the outer realm, we 
take the reality of freedom and joy, for instance, to be of an inner kind. I think, however, that 
the traditional distinction between “inner” and “outer” misses the target. If freedom could 
only be recognised “from the inside”, I would have a hard time recognising the acts of other 
subjects as free in the same sense as my own acts. The important distinctions are rather those 
between descriptive and normative, and between empirically observable and 
“acknowledgeable”. The existence of objects such as tables and mountains may be observed 
empirically, whereas the existence of freedom is something that may be acknowledged in me 
and in other subjects.22 Kant’s solution is more sophisticated than the psychologically 
oriented inner/outer distinction. The Kantian distinction between intelligible and sensible23 
                                                 
22 Cf. below, Ch. 4 on the normative theory of action. Later in the thesis, in Chapter 6, I attempt to formulate this 
in grammatical terms, by arguing that the decisive distinction lies not between first-person present tense and all 
other forms, but rather between first, second and relative third person on the one hand and absolute third person 
in the other hand (cf. Øfsti 1994, p. 182). 
23 Cf. e.g. KrV A 540f/B568f. 
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does nevertheless correspond to a certain degree with the inner/outer distinction, and this 
indicates, I believe, some of the problematic aspects of Kant’s theory of freedom.  
This chapter does of course not amount to a complete review of all aspects of Kant’s 
theory of freedom, not to speak of the tons of secondary literature on the subject. I have tried 
to give an overall picture, as well as to pick out certain elements that serve well as 
background for my approach to the free agency problem. I focus on the metaphysics of the 
problem, as expressed by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV). Kant’s moral theory, 
especially from the Groundwork (GMS) and the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV), will be 
touched upon to the extent that I find it relevant. I also comment upon certain elements from 
the Critique of Judgement (KU), concerning the attempt to bridge the “broad gulf that divides 
the supersensible from phenomena”.24  
I start out with an analysis of The Third Antinomy (2.2). The Third Antinomy 
constitutes the centre of the discussion on freedom in the KrV, as well as the basis for Kant’s 
subsequent treatments of the topic and, indeed, for his entire philosophy. As Henry Allison 
writes:  
 
It is virtually impossible to overestimate the importance of the Antinomy to Kant’s critical project. 
(Allison 2004, p. 357) 
 
Against this background I distinguish Kant’s theory of transcendental freedom, viz. the 
argument concerning the possibility of assuming freedom understood as a causality other than 
the causality of nature, from his theory of practical freedom, viz. his positive account of 
freedom in the sense of giving “practical proof” of its existence (2.3). In Chapter 2.4 I argue 
that, despite Kant’s efforts to the contrary, his theory of freedom remains dualistic. Finally, in 
Chapter 2.5 I evaluate certain elements of Kant’s theory of freedom concerning action and 
self-consciousness. 
 
 
2.2 The Third Antinomy  
 
Kant’s theory of free agency is an attempt to rescue the idea of freedom while at the same 
time maintaining that our actions are determined by natural causes. If our actions are causally 
determined like other events in nature, how can they at the same time be free in the morally 
                                                 
24 Cf. KU 195. 
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relevant sense, meaning that we are responsible for them? At the heart of the Kantian solution 
lies transcendental idealism, the separation of noumenon and phenomenon. Regarded as 
phenomena, actions are effects of our empirical character; they are events thoroughly 
determined by the causal laws of nature. The very same actions may, however, at the same 
time be regarded as noumena, resulting from of our intelligible character. 
A fundamental distinction in Kant’s philosophy is the one between Naturbegriff – the 
concept of nature – and Freiheitsbegriff – the concept of freedom. In his construction (KrV B 
472-480) and resolution (B 560-587) of The Third Antinomy – and throughout his philosophy 
– Kant attempts to hold two seemingly incompatible theses together: 1) Everything that 
happens, happens according to strict laws of nature, and 2) Man can act freely and rationally, 
and be held responsible for his deeds. Kant construes the Antinomy within the frames of the 
concept of nature, i.e. he tries to show that the Antinomy is generated from the concept of 
causation itself. The resolution, depending heavily on transcendental idealism and the 
distinction between noumena and phenomena, is an attempt to theoretically– although only 
negatively – provide the grounds for freedom. Kant’s construction of the Antinomy has been 
severely criticised, and I think rightfully so. However, even if we consider the construction as 
unsteady, this does not necessarily render an account of the relation between Naturbegriff and 
Freiheitsbegriff irrelevant, since freedom is given another – positive – foundation in other 
places in Kant’s work.25 In other words, Kant’s strategy for resolving the Antinomy does not 
necessarily lose its entire legitimacy even if the Antinomy as it stands must be reconsidered or 
even rejected. Furthermore, Kant’s theory serves as a point of departure, inspiration and guide 
for innumerable attempts to account for the relation between freedom and nature. In the 
following paragraphs I discuss the construction and resolution of The Third Antinomy in 
order to see what I might learn from it before entering into further inquiries into the concept 
of free agency. 
An antinomy (from anti-, against, and nomos, law) consists, in its literal sense, of two 
laws, maxims, principles or rules which, when applied, turn out to be contradictory. In a 
broader sense, it means a paradox or any two well-founded statements that conflict with one 
another, as in a constellation of a thesis and its antithesis. In the case of The Third Antinomy, 
the two statements in question are the following: 
  
 
 
                                                 
25 Cf. e.g. KpV 9; GMS 446ff. 
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Thesis 
Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the 
world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is 
also another causality, that of freedom. (KrV A 444/B 472) 
 
Antithesis 
There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature. (A 
445/B 473) 
 
These two statements and their respective proofs are set up against each other as 
contradictory. Both sides assume the validity within the realms of experience of a “causality 
of nature” (as confirmed in the Second Analogy). The question is whether it is also necessary, 
or permissible, to assume another type of causality, namely transcendental freedom, defined 
by Kant as “the power of beginning a state spontaneously [von selbst]”.26 The thesis confirms 
the need to appeal to a causality of freedom, whereas the antithesis denies both the need and 
the possibility of appealing to an alternative causality. As with the other antinomies, Kant’s 
method of approach is to allow each side to plead its case by demonstrating the impossibility 
of the alternative. The decisive argument by each side is that the opposing claim is 
contradictory. 
 The thesis appeals to the requirements for a complete explanation: In order to fully 
account for appearances, it is necessary to assume a causality of freedom in addition to the 
causality of nature. Otherwise we are saying that every state presupposes a preceding state, 
hence that there can be no completeness of the series of causes. But this conflicts with “the 
law of nature”, namely that everything that takes place has a cause that can be sufficiently 
determined a priori. Hence, if universalised, the assumption that causality of nature is the only 
kind of causality is self-contradictory. And because Kant treats causality of nature and 
causality of freedom as the only two types conceivable to us,27 he has now established the 
need to assume a causality of freedom. 
 Kant’s proof of the thesis has been severely criticised from many directions. A major 
question is why it should be considered unacceptable that the series of causes is interminable. 
The contradiction is supposedly generated by what Kant calls a “law of nature”, namely that 
“nothing takes place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori”.28 According to Henry 
                                                 
26 KrV A 533/B 561. 
27 Cf. KrV B 560. 
28 It should be noted that Kant’s terminology when it comes to the law(s) of nature is confusing. Geert Keil 
counts the concept of the “law(s) of nature” seven times in the proof of the thesis, of which five references are 
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Allison, the thesis is best understood as a polemic against Leibniz.29 The Leibnizian position 
is that every occurrence has a sufficient reason, meaning both that it has an antecedent cause 
and that it must have an ultimate explanation – although accessible only to God. Leibniz rules 
out the possibility of spontaneity, maintaining that even the divine will itself is determined 
(although not necessitated) by the divine intellect. The “law of nature” – that “nothing takes 
place without a cause sufficiently determined a priori” – is a formulation of this dual, 
Leibnizian requirement. The conflict arises thus between the demand that every explanans be 
in turn regarded as an explanandum (the “universalisability requirement”) and the demand 
that there be an ultimate explanans in which the series of explanations are grounded (the 
“completeness requirement”). The advocate of unrestricted causality insists on 
universalisability, and is thereby led to deny the completeness requirement. 
Allison analyses the “law of nature” as a requirement of ultimate intelligibility:30 The 
principle of sufficient reason means that we, in theory, must be able to complete any 
explanation to a point where our thought can rest. The thesis states that there is a conflict 
between the requirement for such an ultimate resting place for thought – for which no cause 
can be given – and the requirement for unrestricted causality. It seems, however, easy to avoid 
this conflict simply by denying Leibniz’ commitment to the principle of sufficient reason. 
Once we abandon Leibnizian metaphysics, it seems that we are free to reject the thesis  
 
on the grounds that it conflates the requirement for the causal explanation of an occurrence (produce a 
‘sufficient’ cause) with the requirement for the justification of a conclusion (produce a complete set of 
premises). (Allison 1990, p. 18) 
 
However, Allison points to a fundamental principle underlying the antinomical conflict, 
namely that reason itself demands a resting place for thought, a complete justification of every 
explanation, in Kant’s words: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
plural and two are singular. The predominant formulation is that “everything happens in accordance with the 
laws of nature”, where the laws in question presumably are the various empirical laws governing events in 
nature. The two references in the proof to a (singular) law of nature point, however, to the principle of causality 
itself, as proven in the second analogy; “everything that happens has a cause”. Kant obviously sees a tight 
connection between the different empirical laws of nature on the one hand and the principle of causality on the 
other. In the resolution of the antinomy he writes: “That all events in the sensible world stand in thoroughgoing 
connection in accordance with unchangeable laws of nature is an established principle of the Transcendental 
Analytic, and allows for no exception”. This shows that Kant understands the principle of causality as stating a 
connection according to unchangeable laws of nature. In other words he assumes the nomological character of 
causality without ever really arguing for it (cf. Keil 2000, p. 334ff.). 
29 Cf. Allison 1990,  p. 14 ff. 
30 Cf. Op. cit.,  p. 18. 
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[W]enn das Bedingte gegeben ist, so ist auch die ganze Summe der Bedingungen, mithin das 
schlechthin Unbedingte gegeben, wodurch jenes allein möglich war. (KrV A409/B436) 
 
From Kant’s point of view, the proponents of the antithesis are committed to this principle, 
but as the argument for the thesis shows, the principle rules out a complete explanation in 
terms of causal antecedents. 
Kant’s point is that this conflict is unsolvable, given the identification of appearances 
with things in themselves. Given transcendental realism, we necessarily construe the 
completeness requirement in a dogmatic manner. In other words, what Kant means to provide 
is not just a reductio of Leibniz’s argument, but of the understanding of causality presumed by 
any transcendental realist.  
The antithesis denies the possibility of an appeal to a causality of freedom, and 
maintains that everything happens in accordance with the laws of nature. The argument shows 
that the opposite assumption – that there is transcendental freedom – is contrary to the causal 
law and therefore cannot be encountered in any experience. This reflects the standpoint of the 
“pure empiricist”. The antithesis is generally conceived as less troublesome than the thesis. In 
fact, the denial of freedom seems to be consistent, given the identification of things in 
themselves with appearances, in Kant’s own wording:  
 
[S]ind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu retten. (KrV A 536/B 564) 
 
The only problem with the antithesis is that it sees the rejection of transcendental freedom in 
nature as equivalent to rejecting freedom altogether. When misunderstandings of 
transcendental realism are cleared up, the claim of the antithesis may be restricted to the quite 
correct assertion – according to Kant – that freedom is impossible within the realm of nature.  
 The aim of The Third Antinomy is to illustrate how transcendental realism fools us 
into thinking that there is a necessary conflict between exceptionless laws of nature on the one 
hand and transcendental freedom on the other. Given Kant’s transcendental idealism, 
however, he is able to argue that this conflict is only apparent. What his argument seems to be 
lacking is strong support for the dichotomy between transcendental realism and transcendental 
idealism, i.e. the assumption that given the rejection of the first we are forced to presume the 
second. Kant’s well-founded critique of the Leibnizian view on causality loses some of its 
force if it can be argued that his transcendental idealism is not the only alternative to 
transcendental realism. 
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Kant’s treatment of the antinomies of pure reason falls into two categories. The first 
two “mathematical” antinomies, concerning quantity and reality, he resolves by displaying a 
false presupposition common to them, namely the presupposition that the sensible world is a 
whole existing in itself. Given this premise, the conflicting claims (in the first Antinomy: that 
the world is unlimited vs. that it is limited in time and space) are genuine contradictions, of 
which only one can and must be true. When this presupposition is rejected, however, the 
apparent contradiction turns into a “dialectical opposition” between contraries, both of which 
are false. Kant intends the resolution of the mathematical antinomies to amount to an indirect 
proof of transcendental idealism.31 Since the resolution of The Third Antinomy depends on 
transcendental idealism, it is relevant to review this attempted proof. What Kant tries to 
establish is not only that transcendental idealism provides us with a key to the solution of the 
Antinomy, but that it is the indispensable key, without which one is bound to fall victim to the 
“euthanasia of pure reason”.32 Allison reformulates Kant’s decisive argument:  
 
Since transcendental realism necessarily assumes that the world is a whole existing in itself, it likewise 
must assume that it is either finite or infinite in the relevant respects. But the analysis of the 
Mathematical Antinomies (…) has shown that this world can be neither finite nor infinite. 
Consequently, both the conception of the world, which has been shown to be self-contradictory, and the 
transcendental realism underlying it must be rejected. Finally, given the dichotomy between 
transcendental realism and transcendental idealism, the negation of the former is logically equivalent to 
the affirmation of the former. In short, transcendental idealism is true. (Allison 2004, p. 391) 
  
Allison points out that Kant’s argument actually rests on an additional premise, namely the 
“principle of pure reason”, as presented in KrV A 307f./B 364f.:33 
 
[W]enn das Bedingte gegeben ist, so [ist] auch die ganze Reihe einander untergeordneter Bedingungen, 
die mithin selbst unbedingt ist, gegeben, (d.i. in dem Gegenstande und seiner Verknüpfung enthalten).  
 
Kant wants to show that the principle of pure reason, which seems indispensable to human 
reason, is in fact an illusion when interpreted from the viewpoint of transcendental realism. 
The principle forces us to consider the world as a whole. When it is combined with 
transcendental realism – the view that appearances are things in themselves – we get the self-
                                                 
31 Cf. KrV A 506f/B534f.; Allison 2004, p. 388ff. 
32 Cf. KrV A 407/B 434: ”..sich entweder einer skeptischen Hoffnungslosigkeit zu überlassen, oder einen 
dogmatischen Trotz anzunehmen (...). Beides ist der Tod einer gesunden Philosophie, wiewohl jener allenfalls 
noch die Euthanasie der reinen Vernunft genannt werden könnte”.  
33 Cf. KrV 409/B436, quoted above. 
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contradictory result presented in the resolution of the Mathematical Antinomies. Allison 
argues that transcendental idealism from this perspective should be seen as a therapeutic tool 
in dealing with cosmological problems, and not as the phenomenalistic dogma it is usually 
taken to be: 
 
[T]he transcendental distinction, which constitutes the heart of transcendental idealism, is a bit of meta-
philosophical therapy rather than a first-order metaphysical doctrine. (Allison 2004, p. 395) 
  
This rather Wittgensteinian reading34 agrees well with Kant’s attack on dogmatism. However, 
I think the textual support for Allison’s reading is weak. Kant clearly does not introduce 
transcendental idealism simply as a pragmatic device for dealing with philosophical problems, 
but as a true metaphysical doctrine.35 
In my view, Kant does not achieve his intended indirect proof of transcendental 
idealism through his treatment of the first two “mathematical” antinomies. As I argued above, 
Kant lacks strong support for his dichotomy between transcendental realism and 
transcendental idealism. Given that there are alternatives other than these two, it seems 
circular or question-begging to launch the resolution of the antinomies as a proof of 
transcendental idealism while at the same time using transcendental idealism as a pivotal step 
in the resolution. However, as long as transcendental idealism is not refuted, Kant may well 
have achieved his goal on the matter of transcendental freedom, namely to show that it cannot 
be disproved. 
If we return to the second pair of antinomies, the two “dynamical” antinomies, we see 
that Kant treats these differently from the “mathematical” ones, where the competing claims 
are both shown to be false. The assumption underlying the “dynamical” antinomies is that the 
competing claims are contradictory, and the resolution consists in showing that they really are 
compatible. In the case of The Third Antinomy, Kant tries to show that the competing claims 
– existence/non-existence of a causality other than that of nature – are subalternates rather 
than contraries. In other words, he allows for the possibility that both the thesis and the 
antithesis are correct: The thesis in asserting an intelligible, transcendentally free, first cause 
(outside of the realm of experience), and the antithesis in refuting such a cause (within 
experience).  
Kant’s strategy is to expose the dogmatism of pure empiricism. The pure empiricist 
infers improperly from the correct premise that all empirically cognisable causality must 
                                                 
34 Cf. e.g. Wittgenstein, PU §§ 133, 255. 
35 Cf. notably KrV A 369. 
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conform to the laws of nature, to the potentially false conclusion that all causality must 
conform to the same laws. Transcendental idealism provides a solution by creating the 
conceptual space needed to understand freedom as non-empirical causality. Whether or not 
this conceptual space is actually filled is something that cannot be established, at least not 
theoretically. This is why Kant denies having shown the reality of transcendental freedom, 
claiming only to have shown that freedom and nature are not necessarily in conflict with each 
other.36 
We may regard The Third Antinomy as a battle between reason and understanding, 
with the result being a draw. Reason demands an unconditioned foundation for a series of 
empirical causes; an absolute beginning. Understanding deems such a thing to be 
incomprehensible, since an event must be seen as caused by an antecedent state to be 
cognisable at all. Kant’s solution is to let understanding have its unbroken series of causes in 
the realm of phenomena, while allowing reason to find its resting place in the realm of 
noumena. 
 
 
2.3 Transcendental and practical freedom  
 
A frequently used terminology in the philosophical debate on freedom and determinism is that 
which categorises the debaters as either compatibilists or incompatibilists. Compatibilists hold 
that free agency and determinism are compatible. Our actions may be determined by natural 
causes and at the same time be free in the relevant sense, i.e. concerning moral norms and 
responsibility. Incompatibilists hold that if our actions are determined by natural causes, then 
free agency is an illusion. Kant’s theory of freedom does not fit neatly into this categorisation. 
His theory is that actions may be simultaneously free and causally determined. This does not, 
however, make him a compatibilist in the traditional sense. The mainstream compatibilistic 
strategy is to reject the existence of a true opposition between freedom and determinism, thus 
to deny that this constitutes a deep metaphysical problem.37 Kant, on the other hand, chooses 
the opposite strategy. He brings the conflict between freedom and determinism to its peak, 
whereupon he launches the solution that they are compatible only because man belongs to two 
                                                 
36 Cf. KrV A558/B 586. 
37 Cf. e.g. Hume 1739, part III. 
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worlds: One noumenal world in which he is a free, moral subject, and one phenomenal world 
in which he is a determined, natural object. Allen W. Wood says that Kant wants to show 
 
not only the compatibility of freedom and determinism, but also the compatibility of compatibilism and 
incompatablism. (Wood 1984, p. 74) 
 
Kant introduces a strict opposition between nature and freedom, but at the same time he 
insists that the contradiction between them is only apparent. 
A central distinction in Kant’s theory of freedom is the one between transcendental 
and practical freedom. Transcendental freedom is a purely metaphysical concept, equivalent 
to a particular form of causality, viz. the causality of freedom. It is defined as “the faculty of 
beginning a state spontaneously [von selbst]” (KrV A533/B561). Practical freedom is the 
same as free agency, and is what we ascribe to ourselves when we understand ourselves as 
being morally responsible (KrV A534/B562). Kant further distinguishes two concepts of 
practical freedom: Practical freedom in the negative sense is our capability of resisting 
sensuous desires. This capability belongs solely to human beings, whereas animals must 
always act according to their sensuous impulses. Practical freedom in the positive sense is the 
power to act morally, i.e. from a thoroughly non-sensuous, purely ideal motive (Loc.cit.). 
 In order to fully grasp Kant’s theory of freedom it is important to understand the 
connection between transcendental and practical freedom. It is not immediately clear how the 
cosmological concept of an alternative form of causality is connected with the morally 
relevant concept of free agency. In the Observation on the Thesis (Anmerkung zur Thesis, 
KrV A448/B476), Kant writes that the transcendental idea is included as an essential 
ingredient in the mainly empirical “psychological concept” (equivalent to what he later refers 
to as practical freedom). He localises the problem of freedom to its transcendental aspect, 
because admitting free agency necessarily means admitting “unconditioned causality”. We 
therefore have to argue the possibility of transcendental freedom in order to enable the 
possibility of free agency. In KrV A534/B562, Kant writes that the practical concept of 
freedom is based on the transcendental idea, and that “in the latter lies the real source of 
difficulty”. Allen W. Wood elaborates: 
 
The free will problem arises for Kant because he believes that practical freedom requires transcendental 
freedom and that there is no room in the causal mechanism of nature for a transcendentally free being. 
(…) Practical freedom requires that we be able to determine our actions entirely from within ourselves, 
through our own legislative reason. Natural causes, however, belong to an endless regressive chain in 
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which there is no spontaneous or first cause. We can think of ourselves as practically free, therefore, 
only by thinking of actions as subject to a transcendentally free cause lying outside nature. (Wood 1984, 
p. 77) 
 
According to Kant, the morally relevant concept of practical freedom depends on the 
possibility of a transcendentally free will. Once we have proven the possibility of  
“spontaneously beginning a state”, we have not only shown the possibility of a free act as the 
absolute first beginning in time, but also the possibility of attributing freedom to other acts 
entering into the world’s course of events. 
 The desired proof of transcendental freedom turns out to be unattainable, however. 
Kant never claims to have proven freedom in the theoretical sense; in fact he states clearly 
that such a proof is impossible. Instead he construes a metaphysical theory of freedom which, 
admittedly, cannot be shown to be correct, but which is allegedly impossible for the 
opponents of freedom to refute: 
 
Man muss wohl bemerken: dass wir hierdurch nicht die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit, als eines der 
Vermögen welche die Ursache von den Erscheinungen unserer Sinnenwelt enthalten, haben dartun 
wollen. Denn, außer dass dieses gar keine transzendentale Betrachtung, die bloß mit Begriffen zu tun 
hat, gewesen sein würde, so könnte es auch nicht gelingen, indem wir aus der Erfahrung niemals auf 
etwas, was gar nicht nach Erfahrungsgesetzen gedacht werden muss, schließen können (...) [D]ass Natur 
der Kausalität aus Freiheit wenigstens nicht widerstreite, das war das einzige, was wir leisten konnten, 
und woran es uns auch einzig und allein gelegen war. (KrV A558/B586) 
 
Allen W. Wood compares Kant’s task when it comes to freedom to the task of a defence 
attorney:  
 
[W]e may assume that freedom is innocent until proven guilty, [and] that the burden of proof lies on 
those who would undermine our moral consciousness by claiming that we are not free. (Wood 1984, p. 
83) 
 
Freedom is presupposed in our everyday morality, and so it should be the task of those 
attacking it to prove its non-existence. Geert Keil makes the same point in Handeln und 
Verursachen: 
 
Man kann zeigen, dass der Freiheit nichts entgegensteht, aber da nicht zu sehen ist, was als ein positiver 
Freiheitsbeweis zählen könnte, muss Freiheit, mit Kants Wort, postuliert werden. Das besagt nicht, dass 
sie eine ’Fiktion’ oder eine ’notwendige Illusion’ wäre, sondern drückt eben den Umstand aus, dass sie 
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nicht bewiesen – aus unabhängig gesicherten Prämissen deduziert – werden kann. Wenn es aber für 
etwas keinen Beweis gibt, liegt der Fehler bei demjenigen, der gleichwohl einen verlangt. (Keil 2000a, 
p. 472) 
 
Where no (deductive) proof is possible, or even thinkable, it is a mistake to ask for one.38 
In the first critique, in the solution of The Third Antinomy, Kant settles for a proof of 
the possibility of a causality of freedom. Hereby he attains a negative proof in the sense that 
nothing – transcendentally speaking – stands in the way of freedom. Not until the second 
critique does he launch a positive proof of freedom. Here, he argues that our rational cognition 
of the practical laws of freedom implies not only the possibility, but the actual existence of 
freedom. 
 
Der Begriff der Freiheit, so fern dessen Realität durch ein apodiktisches Gesetz der praktischen 
Vernunft bewiesen ist, macht nun den Schlussstein von dem ganzen Gebäude eines Systems der reinen, 
selbst der spekulativen, Vernunft aus, und alle andere Begriffe (die von Gott und Unsterblichkeit), 
welche, als bloße Ideen, in dieser ohne Haltung bleiben, schließen sich nun an ihn an, und bekommen 
mit ihm und durch ihn Bestand und objektive Realität, d.i. die Möglichkeit derselben wird dadurch 
bewiesen, dass Freiheit wirklich ist; denn diese Idee offenbaret sich durchs moralische Gesetz. 
Freiheit ist aber die einzige unter allen Ideen der spekulativen Vernunft, wovon wir die 
Möglichkeit a priori wissen, ohne sie doch einzusehen, weil sie die Bedingung des moralischen 
Gesetzes ist, welches wir wissen. (KpV 4f.) 
 
In the absence of a theoretical proof, he relies on a so-called “practical proof”. This is no 
proof in the empirical sense, but nevertheless a strong reason or – as Kant calls it – a “fact of 
reason”. Kant argues from the thesis that freedom must be presupposed, even if the reality of 
freedom remains unsettled from a theoretical point of view: 
 
Ein jedes Wesen, das nicht anders als unter der Idee der Freiheit handeln kann, ist eben darum, in 
praktischer Rücksicht, wirklich frei. (GMS 448) 
 
                                                 
38 One could argue that Keil here presupposes that proofs of the deductive kind are the only valid ones, without 
allowing for other possibilities, such as Apel’s figure of “Letztbegründung”. I will not discuss this further here, 
suffice it to say that Keil’s target here primarily seems to be the attempt to deny freedom because no deductive 
evidence may be given for it. 
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Since we are unable to act except under the idea of freedom, we are bound by the moral law 
whether or not it can be (theoretically) proven that we are free. In every practical respect we 
are, therefore, free. 
 This reminds us that Kant ties the conception of practical freedom tightly to the 
conception of morality: 
 
[E]in freier Wille und ein Wille unter sittlichen Gesetzen [ist] einerlei. (GSM 447) 
 
A widespread critique of Kant’s theory of freedom is that it only allows us to consider moral 
acts as free. Only actions motivated by practical reason are free, and necessarily in accordance 
with the moral law. Apparently, actions motivated (if only partly) by sensuous desires are 
necessitated by mechanisms of nature, hence unfree. This seems to lead into an absurdity, 
namely that we are morally responsible only for our good deeds, and that no one can be held 
responsible for immoral acts. Allan W. Wood argues that this problem is illusory, since Kant 
clearly states that although sensuous desires have an effect upon us, this does not mean that 
actions are determined by natural causes: 
 
Since our will is free, our heteronomous actions are performed from sensuous motives without being 
necessitated by them. (…) [W]e act as practically free beings, and hence are responsible for what we do. 
(Wood 1984 p. 78) 
 
Practical freedom consists in the capacity to act autonomously, although this power may be 
seldom exercised. Similarly, Henry Allison stresses that according to Kant, all human agency 
involves spontaneous self-determination, and is never simply determined: 
  
[E]ven desire-based or, as Kant later termed it, ‘heteronomous’ action involves the self-determination of 
the subject and, therefore, a ‘moment’ of spontaneity. (Allison 1990, p. 39) 
 
Actions may be induced by sensuous motives, but are not entirely determined by them. 
Spontaneity is a necessary ingredient, hence an act is never simply determined, but is always a 
result of self-determination. We find a key formulation of this principle in Religion within the 
Limits of Reason Alone, in what Allison calls the Incorporation Thesis:39 
 
                                                 
39 Cf. Allison 1990, p. 40. 
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[F]reedom of the will is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can determine the will to an 
action only insofar as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim. (Rel. 6: 24: 19) 
 
What constitutes free agency is not the character of our motives, but our ability to determine 
what motives to act upon. 
Christine Korsgaard is an innovative Kant interpreter who among other things argues 
that Kant’s principle of autonomy must be seen as the ultimate source of normativity.40 
However, she seems to have inherited the problem regarding the status of morally bad action. 
To Korsgaard, a good action is one that successfully constitutes the agent as a unified subject: 
 
‘[A]ction’ is an idea that admits of degrees. An action chosen in a way that more successfully unifies 
and integrates its agent is more authentically, more fully, an action, than one that does not. (Korsgaard 
2002, Lecture 1, p. 17)  
 
This seems to imply that an agent is to a larger degree morally responsible for those actions 
that are “successful” in Korsgaard’s sense. To me, Korsgaard comes close to committing what 
we might call a “Platonistic fallacy” here, in the sense that immorality and other “defects” are 
seen as “less real”. Normative evaluation is viewed as ontologically significant in the sense 
that certain things or phenomena, like rational actions, exist to the degree that they fulfil some 
normative standard. In that sense, Korsgaard seems to view normativity “through ontological 
spectacles”. This is quite different from the necessity of viewing reality “through normative 
spectacles”. In Chapter 4 below I argue that being subject to normative standards is a 
distinguishing mark of a rational action. But in the above quoted passage, Korsgaard seems to 
argue that the fulfilment of a certain normative standard is necessary for something to be 
viewed as a rational action. But what becomes of freedom if we cannot properly choose to do 
wrong? However, she shares Kant’s view that we are responsible for the incorporation of 
motives into our maxims, and in this sense we may be held morally responsible for our 
immoral actions, although these in themselves do not contribute to constituting us as free 
agents. 
 The freedom to be immoral is a perplexing issue. Moral rationalism seems to suggest 
that immoral behaviour must count as irrational. But in that case it cannot be viewed as free 
agency, but must be seen as caused by empirical incentives. However, Kant (and Korsgaard) 
clearly addresses the ability to carry out immoral deeds in full awareness of their offence 
                                                 
40 Cf. Korsgaard 1996; Cf. below, Ch. 4.8. 
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against the moral law. Kant calls such actions radical evil, and emphasises that these evil acts 
“muss aus der Freiheit entspringen” in order for us to be able to hold people responsible for 
their wrongdoings.41 Natural urges are in themselves morally neutral. But given the 
Incorporation Thesis, it is the wilful incorporation of such urges into one’s maxims – i.e. 
allowing them to take the motivating place of the moral law – that is blameworthy. 
 
 
2.4 Kantian dualism 
 
Kant’s theory of freedom entails in a certain sense a causal theory of action. Free acts are not 
uncaused, but rather are caused in a particular way, namely through what he calls the 
“causality of freedom”.42 Kant distinguishes two concepts of causality as the only two 
conceivable to us: 
 
Man kann sich nur zweierlei Kausalität in Ansehung dessen, was geschieht, denken, entweder nach der 
Natur, oder aus Freiheit. (KrV B 560) 
 
This seems to suggest that everything that happens is caused in either one or the other sense; 
an avalanche by the causality of nature, a greeting by the causality of freedom. However, 
actions too are caused in an empirical sense. What distinguishes an action, as opposed to other 
things happening, is that it is caused in a two-fold sense: Depending upon our perspective, we 
may see an act as empirically caused by preceding events (causality of nature) or as 
noumenally caused by the intelligible character (causality of freedom). It is important that 
Kant does not claim that we are victims of an illusion. It is not the case that it only appears to 
me that I am free, whereas I “really” am determined; or that it only appears to my neighbour 
or fellow philosopher that I am causally determined, whereas I “really” am free. It is an 
(empirical) fact that I am causally determined, and it is equally a fact (of reason) that I am 
free. 
The idea of freedom is something we actively attribute to ourselves and to other 
subjects.43 In doing this we remain aware that our actions have causal conditions, but we 
                                                 
41 Cf. Rel., B 24/A 22. 
42 Cf. e.g. KrV B 472. 
43 A problem with Kant’s transcendental-idealistic solution is, however, how we supposedly are able to single 
out the particular Erscheinungen with which we can pertinently associate the transcendental idea of freedom, cf. 
Øfsti 1976. 
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maintain that these conditions are only sufficient to explain our actions viewed as empirical 
appearances. In addition we must think of our actions as absolute beginnings in time, and of 
ourselves as freely initiating a causal series.  
This double concept of causality demands an account of the relation between the 
causality of freedom and that of nature. Kant’s solution to this problem involves separating 
the subject into its intelligible and empirical character. The intelligible character, he writes, is 
not given to us as an object of empirical recognition. Therefore, we can never be sure if – or 
to what extent – a given act is free: 
 
Die eigentliche Moralität der Handlungen (Verdienst und Schuld) bleibt uns daher, selbst die unseres 
eigenen Verhaltens, gänzlich verborgen (...) Wie viel (...) davon reine Wirkung der Freiheit, wie viel der 
bloßen Natur (...) zuzuschreiben sei, kann niemand ergründen, und daher auch nicht nach völliger 
Gerechtigkeit richten. (KrV, B 579 fn.; Cf. also GMS, 407) 
 
This limitation only applies to the epistemic perspective, however. This perspective can be 
contrasted with a practical perspective: One is what we can theoretically know; the other is 
the basis upon which we act. From the practical perspective we may hold an agent 
responsible. We do this even if we – as Kant does – assume psychological determinism, i.e. 
believe that human actions, regarded empirically, are caused by the empirical character of the 
agent: 
 
Ob man nun gleich die Handlung dadurch bestimmt zu sein glaubt: so tadelt man nichtdestoweniger den 
Täter, und zwar nicht wegen seines unglücklichen Naturells (...), denn man setzt voraus, man könne es 
gänzlich beiseite setzen, wie dieser beschaffen gewesen (...), als ob der Täter damit eine Reihe von 
Folgen ganz von selbst anhebe. (KrV, B 582f.) 
 
The explanation for this peculiarity is that the rationally acting subject in acting 
(performatively) knows himself to be a rationally acting subject, and thereby is conscious of 
his capacity to act according to the moral law:  
 
[D]ie Handlung wird seinem intelligiblen Charakter beigemessen, er hat jetzt, in dem Augenblicke, da 
er lügt, gänzlich Schuld; mithin war die Vernunft, unerachtet aller empirischen Bedingungen der Tat, 
völlig frei. (Loc.cit.) 
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Man is “citizen of two worlds”: To the extent that man and his actions appear empirically, he 
must be considered completely as subject to the causal laws applying to objects in the world 
of phenomena. Man can, however, conceive of himself as free and independent from this 
causality of nature, to the extent that he (performatively) conceives of himself as a source of 
spontaneity.  
 Kant’s theory says, in short, that one and the same act may be simultaneously free and 
causally determined, because we belong to two realms. A widespread interpretation of what it 
means to belong to two realms is that our existence can be viewed from two perspectives. 
This is known as the “two-aspect” interpretation. The alternative is a “two-object” or “two-
world” interpretation, which says that appearances and things in themselves constitute two 
ontologically distinct sets of entities.  
 I think there is considerable support for the “two-aspect” interpretation of Kant’s 
theory. However, even a “weak” dualism, viz. an aspect dualism, suffers from certain 
unsolvable dilemmas. The quote above, where Kant writes that we view the action “as if” 
(“als ob”) the actor initiates a series of events, is revealing in that respect. Kant’s 
transcendental idealism seems to entail that noumenal actions appear illusory as seen from the 
empirical world, while phenomenal actions become mere phantoms from the noumenal 
perspective. A standard objection to such a treatment of the question of free acts is that it 
leads to an unsolvable dilemma. In Allison’s wording: 
 
Either freedom is located in some timeless noumenal realm, in which case it may be reconciled with the 
causality of nature, but only at the cost of making the concept both virtually unintelligible and irrelevant 
to the understanding of human agency, or, alternatively, freedom is thought to make a difference in the 
world, in which case both the notion of its timeless, noumenal status and the unrestricted scope within 
nature of the causal principle must be abandoned. (Allison 1990, p. 2) 
 
In short, we seem to be forced to choose between a practically empty and a theoretically 
unacceptable reading of Kant’s theory. 
In the first critique, Kant establishes the possibility of freedom, in the second he 
claims to prove its actual existence. At the same time he presents a metaphysical model of a 
hierarchic relationship between freedom in the noumenal realm and the determinism 
prevailing in the phenomenal realm. According to this model, freedom reigns above 
determinism, since   
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[die] ganze Kette von Erscheinungen in Ansehung dessen, was nun immer das moralische Gesetz 
angehen kann, von der Spontaneität des Subjekts, als Dinge an sich selbst, abhängt, von deren 
Bestimmung sich gar keine physische Erklärung geben lässt. (KpV 178) 
 
Although the law of causality is universally valid within the phenomenal realm,  
 
the entire history of the phenomenal realm could be taken to reflect the free choice of a rational agent in 
the noumenal realm. (Guyer 1993, p. 29) 
 
Free agency cannot be seen as intervening at any particular moment in the history of the 
phenomenal world, but ultimately we may view the world as a whole as resulting from free 
agency. This fits well with the proof of the thesis in The Third Antinomy. At this stage of 
Kant’s philosophy, the relationship between the noumenal and the phenomenal seems quite 
clear. 
However, in the third critique, Kant challenges this relationship, speaking about a 
“broad gulf” separating freedom from nature: 
 
Der Freiheitsbegriff bestimmt nichts in Ansehung der theoretischen Erkenntnis der Natur; der 
Naturbegriff eben sowohl nichts in Ansehung der praktische Gesetze der Freiheit. (KU 195)  
 
Kant seeks a “bridge” over this gulf, and what he finds is the faculty of judgement: 
 
[D]ie Urteilskraft (…) gibt den vermittelnden Begriff zwischen den Naturbegriffen und dem 
Freiheitsbegriffe, der den Übergang von der reinen theoretischen zur reinen praktischen, von der 
Gesetzmäßigkeit nach der ersten zum Endzwecke nach der letzten möglich macht, in dem Begriffe einer 
Zweckmäßigkeit der Natur. (KU 196) 
 
At the core of the third critique is an attempt to unite the two worlds of man. Despite the 
solution of The Third Antinomy in the first critique and the practical proof in the second 
critique, Kant clearly does not consider the problem as solved.  
 Paul Guyer attempts to clarify the connection between nature and freedom in Kant’s 
philosophical system. He states that the unity between nature and freedom cannot be proven 
theoretically, but must be postulated.44 The connection must be realised within nature, since 
this is the arena for the activity of mankind. We must be able to see nature as a realm where 
freedom should have an influence: 
                                                 
44 Cf. Guyer 2005, p. 286ff. 
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[D]er Freiheitsbegriff soll den durch seine Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in der Sinnenwelt wirklich 
machen, und die Natur muss folglich auch so gedacht werden können, dass die Gesetzmäßigkeit ihrer 
Form wenigstens zur Möglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetze 
zusammenstimme. (KU, Einleitung II, 176) 
 
The unity of nature and freedom is secured through what Guyer refers to as “the concept of 
the highest good”; a morally necessary concept “for which God is the ground”.45 Guyer 
argues against a dualistic reading of Kant’s philosophy, but according to his interpretation, the 
“great gulf” separating nature and freedom can only be bridged by an appeal to God. This 
solution hardly agrees well with the “methodological atheism” of modern philosophy.  
 
 
2.5 Action and self-consciousness 
 
In the first critique, Kant defends the theoretical possibility of transcendental freedom, i.e. the 
possibility of a “metaphysical space” for freedom outside of the limits of theoretical reason. 
The concept of transcendental freedom is a metaphysical concept applying to everything in so 
far as everything may be viewed as noumenon and hence as independent of determining 
causes. Thus far, however, human freedom does not differ from “the freedom of a roasting-
jack”, which, once it is wound up, performs its motions of itself.46 The distinguishing mark of 
human beings is our self-consciousness, i.e. an ability to be aware of our freedom. This self-
awareness is out of reach for kitchen equipment as well as for other things and animals; thus 
only human beings (to our knowledge) are able to gain autonomy. Free agency is realised 
only when the agent incorporates his motives into the maxim of the act, an operation we are 
capable of thanks to “pure apperception”: 
 
[D]asjenige Selbstbewusstsein (…), was, indem es die Vorstellung Ich denke hervorbringt, die alle 
anderen muss begleiten können. (KrV B 132) 
 
                                                 
45 Cf. Guyer 2005 p. 293. 
46 “Freiheit eines Bratenwenders”, cf. KpV 174. 
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Self-consciousness is clearly an important element in any theory of free agency. However, we 
must bear in mind that the Kantian concepts of action and self-consciousness deviate from a 
modern understanding of the words. Wolfgang Becker argues that action is a fundamental 
concept in Kritik der reinen Vernunft, not least with regard to its role in explaining other 
central concepts, such as ‘judgement’ and ‘synthesis’. However, Kant’s epistemology cannot 
be considered to be a theory of action in a modern sense. Kant refers mainly to “acts of the 
understanding” – Verstandeshandlungen – e.g. the passing of a judgement. According to 
Becker, Kant’s concept of action remains 
 
hoffnungslos mentalistisch und allenfalls metaphorisch. (Becker 1987, p. 42) 
 
The Verstandeshandlungen of KrV are not actions in our sense of the word, but should rather 
be viewed as constitutive performances necessary for acting in a practical sense. They are 
“acts of pure thought” (cf. KrV B 81), thus non-empirical and not determined in time.47 
 This leads us to a well-known discussion in the Kant literature, concerning so-called 
“timeless acts”. It seems to follow from the Kantian theory of freedom that the only way to 
conceive of our actions as free is to regard them as outside and independent of the temporal 
flow of events, just like the reason they originate from: 
 
Denn da Vernunft selbst keine Erscheinung und gar keinen Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit unterworfen 
ist, so findet in ihr, selbst in Betreff ihrer Kausalität, keine Zeitfolge statt. (KrV B 581) 
  
When an action is considered in the flow of time, it falls under strict, empirical laws. Kant is a 
psychological determinist and holds that, given sufficient empirical knowledge, every human 
act can be predicted with certainty.48 Freedom is an aspect of an action only in so far as it is 
considered independently of its empirical qualities, i.e. as timeless: 
 
[I]ch bin in dem Zeitpunkt darin ich handle, niemals frei. (KpV 169, my italics).  
 
However, other passages pull in the opposite direction:  
                                                 
47 Cf. Becker 1987 p. 49f . Becker further criticises Kant for being unable to come up with a concept of action 
that is suitable for both his theoretical and his practical philosophy. Kant’s interest in the concept of action is 
primarily practical – it concerns how we may think about freedom without contradiction. However, the concept 
serves as a fundamental part of his epistemology as well, and so what Kant really needs is “ein 
Handlungsbegriff, der nicht schon vorwiegend oder gar ausschließlich an Problemen der praktischen Philosophie 
und der Ethik orientiert ist” (Becker 1987, p. 59). 
48 Cf. e.g. KrV B 578 and KpV 177. 
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 [E]r hat jetzt, in dem Augenblicke, da er lügt, gänzlich Schuld. (KrV B 583, my italics) 
 
In the latter quote, Kant points to the “fact of reason”; that an agent inescapably must consider 
himself as free in acting. But the question is: How can I view my action as free – and myself 
as responsible – if the outcome of my action is determined and could have been predicted 
prior to my decision? Kant famously argued that “ought implies can”,49 but it is not easy to 
see how this can apply to concrete actions. 
Allen Wood takes Kant to mean that while events in time follow a necessary order as 
determined by their empirical causes, the whole course of the world’s history is a result of the 
“timeless choice” of the free subject.50 The timeless, intelligible choice of the subject is the 
ultimate reason for everything that happens. He tries to rescue Kant from the most monstrous 
consequences of this interpretation – such as that I can be blamed for World War I – by 
stressing that I do not directly select a certain history of actions. My intelligible choice 
regards my empirical character and with it the “fundamental maxim” for my actions.  
 It seems to me that if Wood’s interpretation is coherent, then Kant’s conception of free 
agency is of little importance to a modern theory of action, since the subject matter seems to 
be a wholly different one. Henry Allison writes: 
 
[O]ur conception of our agency is obviously inseparable from our understanding of ourselves as 
temporal beings. How, then, could it be claimed that the conception of ourselves as timeless beings is 
somehow required in order to ‘model’ or regulate our ordinary understanding of ourselves as agents 
who act and decide in time? (Allison 1990, p. 47) 
 
Allison argues that while Wood’s interpretation lends strong support from Kant’s own choice 
of words in the Critiques, it is not in agreement with what he conceives as a central aspect of 
Kant’s theory, namely the above-quoted “Incorporation Thesis”. According to this principle, 
the agent must incorporate his motives into his maxims. Allison argues that this supports a 
reading that allows for the possibility of assigning a regulative function to the conception of 
an intelligible character without denying that actual actions take place in time. The 
Incorporation Thesis allows a (timeless) “moment of spontaneity” to enter into the motives of 
a temporal act. 
                                                 
49 Cf. e.g. KpV 54. 
50 Cf. Wood 1984 p. 89ff., and above, Ch. 2.4. 
 43
 Still, it seems to me that such an account remains far from our everyday understanding 
of agency. A relevant concept of free agency must imply that it is the actual carrying out of 
actions in time to which we ascribe freedom, for it is these actions we are held responsible for. 
Normally, we make our decisions based on the intention to achieve a more or less immediate 
effect. If Kant’s concept of rational choice is something completely different from our 
deliberations immediately prior to the act, then his theory is not what we ask for in a modern 
theory of action. 
Allison is clearly preoccupied with this problem, as the quote above illustrates, but he 
manages to find support for a more appropriate account of action elsewhere in the first 
critique. And obviously, different passages in Kant pull in different directions. However, 
given the central thesis of transcendental idealism, it seems that the causality of freedom can 
have no impact on particular, empirically recognisable actions carried out in the flow of 
time.51 In that case it becomes hard to see how actions in our sense of the word, i.e. making 
things happen in the world, can be recognised as free. 
Kant’s approach to agency is coloured by the methodological solipsism of his 
approach. By methodological solipsism I mean an understanding of human cognition as 
principally independent of intersubjectivity or of a community of language users.52 Kant’s 
philosophical system is construed within the bounds of a philosophy of mind, where a 
common language is not yet recognised as a condition of rationality and agency. Within these 
bounds it is hard to deliver a basis for acknowledging other people as capable of free agency. 
Kant obviously considered it possible to hold other people responsible, cf. again KrV B 583, 
where he writes that we rightfully blame another agent for a malicious lie 
  
als ob der Täter damit eine Reihe von Folgen ganz von selbst anhebe. 
 
However, there is a reason for his use of the phrase “as if”. The possibility of blaming another 
agent may not actually be open for Kant, since transcendental idealism seems to imply that 
the subject can recognise the actions of other people solely as phenomena. Free agency cannot 
be recognised “from the outside”, but it is hard to see what other access we may have to other 
people’s actions. Furthermore, questions of unity and plurality are inadmissible in the realm 
of noumena, this realm being logically prior to the categories. The question of whether free 
                                                 
51 One way to deal with this problem is to introduce a differentiated concept of time, as Peter Rohs does. He uses 
John McTaggard’s concepts of an A-series and B-series of time to distinguish between A-causality and B-
causality. Actions cannot be seen as subjected to B-causality, Rohs argues, since freedom is compatible only 
with A-causality (cf. Rohs 2003, p. 40 f.). 
52 Cf. Granum (Carson) 1999 and 2000. 
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subjects other than myself exist, is therefore – strictly speaking – devoid of meaning within 
the Kantian system.53  
Subjectivity is a fundamental topic in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant emphatically 
rejects the possibility of identifying a Cartesian thinking substance, i.e. a permanent, un-
compounded, individual subject of thought and experience, capable of existing independently 
of body or matter. The source of this illusion is, as Strawson puts it, that “the unity of 
experience is confused with the experience of unity”.54 Kant calls this the fallacy of 
paralogism, resulting in the metaphysical supposition that we may have knowledge about “the 
soul”.55 The unity of experience, an “I think”, which must (implicitly) accompany all my 
representations, is a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge.56 But this does not 
mean that we can experience a unity – such as an immaterial object – undertaking this 
synthesis. 
On the other hand, we need a positive connection between the transcendental subject 
for experience – the “I think”, which is not a concrete person, but an “extensionless point”57 – 
and the empirical subject viewed as an identifiable unit among other phenomena. Not least for 
the purpose of morality – our capability to “blame the agent” as well as the agent’s capability 
to defend herself – we need to justify a positive connection or “identity”. The concept of a 
causality of freedom may be seen as an attempt to solve this problem by stating that the 
subject of experience is an agent who produces changes in the world of experience through 
her actions. However, it seems to me that the problem remains at least partly unsolved if we 
are bound to either experience the action in the temporal flow of events, in Kant’s words: 
 
Daher kann keine gegebene Handlung (weil sie nur als Erscheinung wahrgenommen werden kann) 
schlechthin von selbst anfangen (KrV A 553/B 581), 
 
or to think of the action as the timeless product of the intelligible subject: 
 
In Ansehung des intelligiblen Charakters (…) gilt kein Vorher, oder Nachher, und jede Handlung, 
unangesehen des Zeitverhältnisses, darin sie mit anderen Erscheinungen steht, ist die unmittelbare 
Wirkung des intelligiblen Charakters der reinen Vernunft. (Loc.cit.) 
                                                 
53 To pursue this along the line of Alan Wood: That any one intelligible subject should be the cause, not only of 
its own empirical subject, but in addition of a complete natural history is only coherent given that there is no 
room for a plurality of subjects in the Kantian universe. Otherwise we would have the problem that every subject 
causes its own natural history, which would amount to an extreme relativism far from what Kant intended.  
54 Strawson 1966, p. 37. 
55 Cf. KrV B 399ff. 
56 Cf. KrV B 132. 
57 Cf. Wittgenstein, TLP 5.64. 
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 There is a thoroughgoing dichotomy in Kant’s philosophy: On the one hand we have the 
concepts of freedom and a timeless, noumenal realm – and on the other the concepts of 
nature, space-time and the phenomenal realm. Actions – in our modern sense of the word – do 
not fit neatly into either of the categories. 
In spite of the shortcomings of Kant’s theory of freedom, I strongly disagree with 
Jonathan Bennett, who judges it to be “worthless”.58 Kant’s theory is ground-breaking, not 
least for the reasons Bennett himself mentions, such as Kant’s ability to ask the right 
questions and 
  
his sensitivity and subtlety of response to conceptual pressures and tensions. (Op.cit. p. 108)  
 
Kant leads the way for later attempts to clarify the relation between the subject and the world 
by stressing that we must avoid the “Scylla” of rationalism as well as the “Charybdis” of 
empirical psychologism. 
What I would like to accentuate as a guiding line to any theory of free agency is the 
way Kant indicates a conceptual bond between freedom and the inescapable first-person 
perspective of a consciousness-in-acting: 
 
Ein jedes Wesen, das nicht anders als unter der Idee der Freiheit handeln kann, ist eben 
darum, in praktischer Rücksicht, wirklich frei. (GSM 448) 
 
Questions of freedom relate only to those of us who are aware of our own ability to act. To 
us, moreover, the presumption of freedom cannot be dodged.  
However, since Kant remains within the constraints of a philosophy of mind, there are 
certain consequences of this insight that he is unable to perceive. Therefore, I think that 
leaving the bounds of a methodic-solipsistic philosophy of mind and turning towards a 
pragmatic philosophy of language will help us on the way towards a more adequate 
understanding of free agency. 
To sum up this chapter, I see Kant’s problem as one of dualism, although he attempts 
to avoid it. The system of two worlds/realms/aspects blocks the possibility of understanding 
free agency as making things happen in the world. His concepts of freedom and free agency 
remain mentalistic. I think a crucial point is that free agency is not only recognised from the 
                                                 
58 Cf. Bennett 1984, p. 102. 
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“inside” (and cannot only be thus recognised). We recognise free agency in the actions of 
other people as well, which explains why we may rightfully “blame the agent”. Kant 
acknowledges this, but is unable to account for it within the limits of his philosophy of mind.  
I believe Kant is right in assuming that freedom of agency cannot be proven or refuted 
in any theoretical sense. This is because agency is not something we describe, but something 
we ascribe, as I will argue below.59 In the following chapter, I suggest a reversion of the 
Kantian order: Instead of starting out (negatively) with an examination of the metaphysical 
possibility of transcendental freedom, we may begin (positively) with the way we actually 
recognise (our own and other subjects’) actions as free. It is not a matter of identifying and/or 
describing an inner quality, but a matter of mutual recognition and acknowledgement. In the 
next chapter, I try to replace Kant’s attempt to analyse the concept of freedom as a counter-
concept to nature with an attempt to view freedom as an analytical component of the concept 
of rational agency. 
                                                 
59 Cf. below, Ch. 4.2. 
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Chapter 3: Action and causation – an equation with two unknowns 
 
 
The ‘freedom’ (…) of a man consists in the fact that he acts. 
(von Wright 1980, p. 78) 
  
[D]as Verhältnis zwischen Handlung und Kausalität [sei] als 
eine Gleichung mit zwei unbekannten zu behandeln. 
(Keil 2000a, p. 149) 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction: The external view on agency 
 
According to Thomas Nagel, the free agency problem arises whenever we attempt to view 
action from an objective or external standpoint.60 From this perspective it becomes difficult or 
impossible to recognise individual agents as sources of actions. Instead, all actions seem to be 
sucked up into the temporal flow of events that make up the world. Nagel points out that 
determinism is a common, but not the only possible outcome when action is seen from the 
external perspective: 
 
The essential source of the problem is a view of persons and their actions as part of the order of nature, 
causally determined or not. That conception, if pressed, leads to the feeling that we are not agents at all, 
that we are helpless and not responsible for what we do. Against this judgement the inner view of the 
agent rebels. (Nagel 1986, p. 110) 
 
In other words, any form of objectivism will produce this effect. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
Kant established the Third Antinomy based on the irreconcilability of freedom and universal 
determinism, but actually nothing depends on the presupposition of universal determinism. 
The “great gulf between nature and freedom” springs from the external standpoint itself. 
However, most of us share a view of people and their actions as a part of nature’s order – in 
this trivial sense we are all (or at least most of us are) naturalists. No world-view accepting 
                                                 
60 Cf. Nagel 1986, p. 110. 
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that actions are events and that every event has a cause can avoid the problem concerning the 
status of human action. In the words of Marcus Willaschek:  
 
Verhalten muss natürliche Ursachen haben, und so steht man trotz aller perspektivistischen 
Relativisierung immer noch vor der Frage, warum diese Ursache gerade zu einem solchen Verhalten 
geführt haben, das sich (…) durch die Wünsche und Überzeugungen des Handelnden begründen lässt. 
(Willaschek 1992, p. 143) 
 
Any objectivation of agency will produce the free agency problem in the sense that it alienates 
the agent from her own action. However, as Nagel assures us, the “inner view” of the agent 
rebels against such objectification. This will for the most part resolve any practical 
discomfort, whereas the theoretical free agency problem will continue to arise whenever we 
attempt to explain phenomena such as reasoning, language use, or decision making in an 
objectivistic manner, e.g. by indicating how they enter into a causal chain of events. In this 
chapter I will look at the dispute within theory of science over whether actions might be said 
to have reasons or causes (3.2), and Donald Davidson’s theory of action, which states that 
reasons are causes (3.3). From this point of departure I discuss the nature of causal relations 
(3.4), before I defend an interventionist account of the relation between causality and agency 
(3.5) in spite of certain difficulties when it comes to explaining “inner action” (3.6). Finally 
(3.7), I argue that the proposed concept of intentional action has the presupposition of 
freedom as one analytical component. This means that if we can make room for a concept of 
intentional action in our world-view, there is no free agency problem over and above this. An 
intentional action is, by conceptual necessity, a free action. In this I subscribe to Geert Keil’s 
vonwrightian statement, that 
 
bereits unsere gewöhnlichen Handlungsbeschreibungen eine massive Freiheitsmetaphysik implizieren. 
Wenn es ernst gemeint ist, dass Menschen Handlungsvermögen besitzen, gibt es nicht noch einmal ein 
separates Freiheitsproblem. (Keil 2000a, p. 12) 
 
That ordinary language implies freedom of agency does not amount to a theoretical proof of 
freedom. It does, however, as Keil argues, indicate why the demand for such a proof is both 
misplaced and misunderstood. 
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 3.2 The reasons vs. causes debate 
 
Attempts to theoretically explain action initiated the so-called reasons vs. causes debate in the 
modern theory of science. The central question of this controversy is whether actions may be 
said to have causes in the way that (other) natural phenomena do. The participants in the 
debate may be roughly divided into a “positivist camp”, which argues that all events, 
including actions, should be explained according to a common, scientific scheme, and a 
“humanist camp”, which argues that actions demand a totally different mode of understanding 
than (other) natural phenomena, and are better understood with reference to reasons than to 
causes.  
This debate peaked with the Hempel-Dray controversy in the 1960s, but reaches back 
at least into the first half of the nineteenth century, when Auguste Comte founded the 
positivist movement as a protest against speculative romanticism. In 1843, John Stuart Mill, 
in A System of Logic, formulated a view of the human sciences as “immature” compared to 
the natural sciences, a view that has enjoyed widespread support right up until the present 
day: 
 
The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of 
Physical Science, duly extended and generalised. (Mill 1843, p. XV) 
 
In the opposite camp, the hermeneutic theorists, notably Schleiermacher, defended the 
humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) as “scientific” in their own right. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, Willhelm Dilthey attempted to establish a methodological foundation for 
the “human sciences” (e.g. history, law, literary criticism) that showed them to be distinct 
from, but equally “scientific” (wissenschaftlich) as, the “natural sciences” (e.g. physics, 
chemistry). Dilthey’s work built on the distinction between explanation and understanding 
drawn by his colleague Johann Gustav Droysen. In the natural sciences, Droysen argued, we 
seek to explain phenomena in terms of cause and effect, or the general and the particular, 
whereas in the humanities we seek to understand phenomena in terms of relations between 
the part and the whole. The efforts of Schleiermacher, Droysen, Dilthey, and others 
established the humanities as theoretically and methodologically independent and separate 
from the natural sciences.  
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 In the wake of logical empiricism, the debate over the relationship between the 
humanities and social sciences on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other is once 
again ignited. The logical positivists (Neurath, Carnap, Morris) renewed Comte’s efforts to 
establish a unified science. In 1942, Carl G. Hempel published the article “The Function of 
General Laws in History”, launching a standard model for all scientific explanation, the 
deductive-nomological method. Karl Popper, although disagreeing with both Hempel and the 
logical positivists on certain matters, shared their ambition of developing a scientific method 
of explanation that would help the humanities and social sciences overcome their alleged 
methodological immaturity.  
 These were popular viewpoints in the philosophy of science in the 1940s and 50s, but 
were met with considerable opposition towards the 1960s. The year 1957 marks a turning 
point in the reasons vs. causes debate, when William Dray and G.E.M. Anscombe published 
their books Laws and Explanations in History and Intentions, followed by Peter Winch’s The 
Idea of a Social Science in 1958.61 These writers were all inspired by the late Wittgenstein, 
and pointed to a distinction between the language of natural science and the ordinary language 
necessary for imparting e.g. historical knowledge. Dray argued that the deductive-
nomological explanation model, which he referred to as the covering law model, cannot be of 
much use for the historian. This is due to the specific complexity (or “density”) of an historic 
event.  
As an illustration, Dray displayed how an attempt to formulate a law covering the 
outbreak of the First World War in 1914 is bound to be unsuccessful. Either such a law will 
be too simple, hence easy to falsify (“If an archduke of Austria is murdered, a world war will 
break out”); or it will be too vague, tautological or in any case methodologically uninteresting 
(“If an archduke of Austria is murdered in Sarajevo, and if the world is on the verge of war 
and a sudden murder will provoke this war, then the First World War will break out”); or 
again the law will be too specific, to a degree where there can be only one instantiation of it, 
namely the event we are trying to explain. (“If there is a tension between two countries, and if 
a murder of the regent occurs in the capital of one of the countries, and so on and so forth – 
                                                 
61 An important contribution was also made by Hans Skjervheim in his Objectivism and the Study of Man (1959), 
which was intended as a reply to the objectivistic ideals of Arne Næss’s Erkenntnis und Wissenschaftliches 
Verhalten (1936). Skjervheim stresses the non-circumventability of the participant’s first-person perspective, and 
may in that sense be seen as fronting similar ideas as Wittgenstein, whose Philosophical Investigation was 
concurrent with, but unknown to Skjervheim at the time. But Skjervheim’s contribution – notably in the essay 
“Participant and Observer” (originally 1957, cf. Skjervheim 1996) – might also be viewed as an early version of 
“normativism” à la Robert Brandom (cf. below, Ch.4). 
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counting everything happening from the Napoleonic Wars until the outbreak – then the First 
World War will break out.” Well and good, but we already knew that.) 
  Like the hermeneutic theorists before them, Dray, Winch, Anscombe and the other 
neowittgensteinians defended the human sciences as methodologically independent and 
separate from the natural sciences. The Logical Connection Argument (LCA) must be seen in 
this light, as an attempt to separate causes from reasons, thereby separating the explanation of 
natural phenomena from the understanding of intentional action. The LCA states that the 
connection between intentions and the actions rationalised through them is a logical or 
conceptual connection, unlike the contingent, empirical connection needed to constitute a 
cause-effect relationship. For the neowittgensteinians, this constituted a decisive argument 
against the causalist claim that intentional action has causes. 
Donald Davidson attacked the LCA on the grounds that a conceptual connection only 
holds between events under certain descriptions, whereas causal relations hold between the 
events themselves. Reasons are not opposed to, but identical with causes, Davidson argued.62 
Stating the rational reasons for an action is just one way of expressing the intentional attitudes 
causing a certain bodily movement. In the following section I will look more closely at this 
connection between action and causation. 
 
 
3.3 Action and causation 
 
An appropriate start to this subchapter would perhaps be to offer a definition of the concept of 
action. From there I could proceed with examining how this concept is connected to the 
phenomenon of causation. However, this is not an obvious route. It seems that we might as 
well turn the table and try to develop a notion of action from the concept of causation. Geert 
Keil describes the attempt to explicate the relationship between causation and action as trying 
to solve an equation with two unknowns.63 
Let us rather start out with an intuitive distinction between what merely happens – and 
the things people do, between events and actions. What distinguishes human actions from 
mere happenings? According to Davidson and the proponents of a causal theory of action, 
actions are events of a specific type. All events are caused and can be explained as 
                                                 
62 I.e. reasons “in themselves” (on the “metaphysical” level) – not as linguistically articulated, understandable 
reasons (cf. below, Ch. 3.4).  
63 Cf. Keil 2000a, p. 3. 
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instantiations of natural laws. What distinguishes actions from other events is that we can also 
describe them as intentional, i.e. they may be viewed as caused and rationalised by reasons: 
 
If an event is an action, then (…) under some description it is intentional. (Davidson 1980, p. 61)                                        
 
This means that a piece of human behaviour can be described as an intentional action if it can 
be rationally justified by identifying certain attitudes that causally explain the behaviour.  The 
causal theory defines and explains action through certain intentional attitudes, typically 
consisting of a so-called belief-desire pair: 1) a pro attitude, typically a desire, towards 
something, and 2) a belief that a certain action will lead to the desired goal.  
Davidson’s famous 1963 essay “Actions, Reasons and Causes” marked another 
turning point in the reasons vs. causes debate, with its devastating attack on the LCA 
argument and the identification of reasons and causes. The causal theory of action, however, 
pretty soon stood in need of clarification. For an action to be caused by a belief-desire pair, it 
is not sufficient that the agent has the right belief and desire, and that the corresponding act 
follows. The action has to be caused in the right way, as Davidson added in a later essay: 
 
[N]ot just any causal connection between rationalizing attitudes and a wanted effect suffices to 
guarantee that producing the wanted effect was intentional. The causal chain must follow the right sort 
of route. (Davidson 1980, p. 78) 
 
The paradigmatic case of a causal chain following ‘the wrong sort of route’ is a so-called 
deviant causal chain: A man wishes to kill another man. He brings the gun to his shoulder, 
takes aim, when the idea of killing the other man makes him nervous and causes his finger to 
twitch. The gun fires and kills the victim. Although the movement of the finger was caused by 
intentional states of the agent, in this case it was not caused in the right way. We might 
specify what has gone wrong by recollecting the distinction between what we do and what 
merely happens to us. In this case, although the agent has the appropriate attitudes, the 
movement of the finger is something that merely happens to him. The agent remains passively 
engaged in his own behaviour, rather than actively engaged. Actually, “agent” seems 
altogether to be a misnomer in cases like this.  
But consider a slightly different example: A man wishes to kill another man. He aims 
and shoots, misses horribly, but his shot startles a bunch of wild hogs, which run wild and 
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trample the victim to his death.64 In this case the man deserves the title ‘agent’, since he 
performs an intentional action; he pulls the trigger. And it is this very action that, although by 
indirect means, leads to the fulfilment of his intention. Still, the agent didn’t intend it to 
happen this way.65 
 The basic problem with these counterexamples is that the very same belief-desire pair 
that explains the deviant causal chain would also explain the genuine action. In these cases, 
therefore, the belief-desire pair may not be used to distinguish an action from a mere 
happening. Being able to track the causal history of an event back to the triggering intentional 
attitudes of an agent is not sufficient to identify the event as an action. 
The causal theory of action states that an action is a bodily movement caused by 
certain intentional attitudes of the agent. Deviant causal chains challenge this statement, as 
they show that the same intentional attitudes may also cause events that are clearly not 
actions. But what exactly do deviant causal chains deviate from? Geert Keil discusses this 
thoroughly in Handeln und Verursachen (2000), and concludes that the question can only be 
answered ex post actu.66 It is impossible to specify in advance what it takes to fulfil the 
conditions that satisfactorily define an action; this can only be judged in retrospect. The 
reason is simply that real life is more “dense” than our anticipation of a certain course of 
events, and so 
 
weichen abweichende Kausalketten von demjenigen kontrafaktischen Lauf der Dinge ab, der der 
retrospektiven Präzisierung der eigenen Handlungsabsicht durch den Handelnden entsprochen hätte. 
(Keil 2000a, p. 102) 
 
What a deviant causal chain reveals is that the definition of action offered by the causal theory 
is insufficient. Hence, as it has yet to come up with a satisfactory determination of what it 
means to “cause in the right way”, the causal theory of action is incapable of giving sufficient 
conditions for the identification of an event as “intentionally doing H”.67 
The causal theory draws a distinct picture of the relation between intentions and 
actions, but without accounting properly for the active role of the agent. Agent causality has 
                                                 
64 This example is borrowed from Keil 2000a, p. 74, but is originally from Daniel Bennett. 
65 Deviant causal chains highlight how (moral and legal) responsibility is attached to intentions as well as to 
action. In court, both the spastic and the horrible shot would (or at least should) be acquitted of murder, as their 
intention-in-action failed to achieve its condition of satisfaction. They could, on the other hand, be committed 
both for attempted murder – because of their intention-in-action (the trying to shoot their victim), and for 
conspiracy to murder – because of their prior intention (For the distinction between intention-in-action and prior 
intention, cf. Searle 2001, p. 45). 
66 Keil 2000a, p. 100f. 
67 Cf. Keil 2000a, p. 112. 
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been a recurring proposal as a way of securing the active role of the agent that is involved in 
our concept of intentional action.68 Kant’s “causality through freedom” is the archetype of 
agent causality. In Kant’s view, the model of causal connection between two events is 
unsuitable when it comes to free agency. In addition to the natural causal connection that 
prevails between events, a separate type of connection is introduced; a connection holding not 
between events, but literally between agent and event. Roderick Chisholm notoriously 
defended a similar, “strong” version of agent causality, but there are other, more moderate 
ways of suggesting that the causal contribution of the agent is not reducible to event 
causation. Marcus Willaschek argues that the causal role of the agent does not replace 
“ordinary” event causality, but enters into the picture as a further factor necessary to explain 
behaviour, over and above the agent’s beliefs and desires. He argues that having certain 
intentional attitudes is not enough, since only some of these attitudes – depending on the 
influence of the agent – will become causes of behaviour:  
 
[T]he causal role of the person consists in her influence on which of her beliefs and desires will be 
causally effective. (Willaschek 1998, p. 179) 
 
Willaschek bases a strong, Kantian defence of autonomy on the idea that agents may choose 
to acknowledge or reject certain motives as entering into their “space of practical reason”.69 
This “rational integration of a person’s motives” is what makes up a person’s character, the 
sought-for “extra” causal factor in addition to intentional attitudes.  
The modern concept of cause, however, is not the multiple, Aristotelian one, but has 
the limited meaning of causa efficiens, a triggering cause. A cause explains a change in a 
condition, i.e. why something happened at this particular moment in time. Introducing the 
character of the agent as a causal factor cannot, in my view, get clear of what Geert Keil calls 
“Broad’s datedness objection”:70 
 
The acting person existed before her action took place, and she will live on afterwards. For this reason 
she cannot be, in a literal sense, the triggering cause of any occurrence. (Keil 2007a, p. 22) 
 
                                                 
68 Cf. Willachek 1998, p. 177f.  
69 Op.cit. p. 189. Willaschek’s argument may be interpreted as a version of what Henry Allison calls Kant’s 
“Incorporation Thesis”, cf. above, Ch. 2.3. 
70 Named after Charlie Broad, cf. Broad 1952. 
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Causal relations exist between events, understood as changes in time,71 while the character of 
an agent is of a more constant kind and must be regarded as an entity of a different category. 
Willachek deserves credit for highlighting the Kantian aspect of an agent’s character as an 
important factor in analysing and explaining behaviour. And clearly, the character is decisive 
for what motives we allow to enter into our “space of reason”. However, it seems superfluous 
as well as misleading to qualify the relation between an agent’s character and her own 
motives as a causal connection. This does not imply that causal relations are not involved in 
the shaping of our character, only that these relations may be explicated solely in terms of 
“ordinary” event causality.  
 
 
3.4 The nature of a causal relation 
 
The reasons vs. causes debate dealt with whether intentional agency may be explained in 
terms of causality or not. The nature and epistemological status of the causal relation was 
more or less left undiscussed throughout this debate. That is, the nomological character of 
causal connections was largely taken for granted by both sides of the debate – while the 
central question was whether the connection between intentions and actions may be said to be 
of a causal kind. Davidson denied the existence of laws of nature governing intentional 
actions,72 a view that won widespread support. With the exception of Paul Churchland, few 
have attempted to formulate strict laws of action since Davidson presented his Principle of the 
Anomalism of the Mental. At the same time he presumed the possibility of causal connections 
between mental and physical events, e.g. intentions and actions (the Principle of Causal 
Interaction), and argued that wherever there is causality, there are strict, deterministic laws 
(the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality).  
Davidson balances these principles by drawing a line between two levels: Causal laws 
hold strict and exceptionless reign over the metaphysical level of events “in themselves”, i.e. 
events regarded as concrete entities with an extension in space and time,73 and regarded as 
neutral with respect to the possible descriptions they may be subsumed under. At the 
explanatory level, however – where the same events are described in a non-physical language 
– “lawlessness” prevails. Davidson assumes a token-token identity between mental and 
                                                 
71 Cf. Davidson 1980, p. 161f. and Keil 2000a, p. 168. 
72 Cf. Davidson 1980, p. 208. 
73 Or, as Davidson would perhaps prefer to put it, with a specific position in the world’s “causal chain”. 
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physical events: A mental event (regarded as a singular token) is identical with some physical 
event (token). This is a non-reductive theory in accordance with the principle of the 
anomalism of the mental. In order to formulate psychophysical laws, on the other hand, we 
would have to assume a type-type identity between mental events of type A and physical 
events of type B, which would imply that it would be possible to perform a reduction of 
mental events to physical ones. 
Deviant causal chains turned out to be a crux for the causal theory of action, and 
refuelled an old question of what causal relations really are and how we recognise them. Why 
do I perceive my persistent tapping on the keyboard as the cause of letters popping up on my 
screen, instead of comprehending the two events simply as concurrent? According to Hume, 
an event A is the cause of another event B iff B follows immediately upon A and iff every 
event of type A is followed by an event of type B. The bonfire causes the water in the kettle to 
boil, since each time a kettle of water is placed over the fire, it will be brought to boil 
(provided that it is heated for long enough, there is sufficient fire etc.). However, Hume 
denied any necessary connection between cause and effect, blaming our idea of such a 
connection on habit, a feature of the human psyche supplying us with the (subjective) 
expectation that certain types of events are followed by certain other types of events. John 
Stuart Mill pointed out that Hume’s analysis, known as the regularity theory of causality, was 
too weak to capture the essence of the matter.74 If two events are to be seen as cause and 
effect relative to each other, it is not enough that actual events of type A are consistently 
connected to actual events of type B. Night and day do in fact always follow each other, but it 
is not unthinkable that a situation could arise where night continued infinitely. Consequently 
we do not understand the phenomena of day and night as causally connected. For something 
to be recognised as a causal connection, it must be seen as a necessary connection in one 
sense or another: Not only did event A actually follow upon event B, but it had to follow 
given the initial conditions. The challenge is to explain this necessity, and it is among the 
attempted answers to this challenge that we find Kant’s analysis of causality (of nature) as a 
condition for the possibility of experience, i.e. as an a priori category of reason.  
A prevailing view since the 1960s is that we must separate between the meaning of 
causal statements and their truth conditions. This distinction has been the basis of different 
attempts to explain causality, whether in terms of necessary conditions (Reichenbach), INUS-
conditions (Mackie), or by use of counterfactual conditionals (Lewis). However, the nature of 
                                                 
74 A further point against Hume: His psychological explanation, like the “conditioning” of Pavlov’s dogs, 
actually presupposes causality. 
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causal connections seems to defy a final and satisfactory determination. This prompted some 
philosophers, prominently Bertrand Russell, to suggest rejecting the concept of causality 
altogether. Why not ditch the idea, not least since a “mature” science seems to do just fine 
without it: 
 
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone 
age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm. (Russell 
1913, p. 171) 
 
Against Russell’s view it may be argued that even if “the law of causality” (whatever that 
is)75 has no place in modern science, and even if the notion of cause disappears from the 
language of physics as science develops, 
 
the fact remains that causal thinking, as such, has not been exorcised from science – and that therefore 
the philosophical problems about causation continue to be central to the philosophy of science. (von 
Wright 1971, p. 37) 
 
The concept of causality remains relevant to and controversial in philosophy, along with the 
debate over how a causal connection is to be understood. In the centre of the discussion we 
find the much disputed Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality. Geert Keil 
argues against this principle in Handeln und Verursachen (2000), by performing a reductio ad 
absurdum of causal laws.76 What Keil attempts to show, in short, is that the ceteris paribus-
clause necessary to render a causal law true must be interpreted as an indexical phrase, 
thereby limiting the scope of the law to applying to “this instance, here, now”. But a law that 
can only have one instantiation is no law in the ordinary sense of the word. He stresses, 
however, that the alternative to strict causal laws is not to perceive the world as a total mess: 
 
Es steht nicht Chaos gegen Ordnung, es stehen nichstrikte, störbare Regularitäten gegen ausnahmslose, 
und die Behauptung lautet, dass die ersteren für die Einheit der Erfahrung genügen müssen. (Keil 
2000a, p. 350)  
 
                                                 
75 Cf. Von Wright 1971, p. 35, Keil 2000a, p. 166f. 
76 Cf. Keil 2000a, p. 234. 
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Keil proposes, in other words, that we put up with a “causality without strict laws”.77  More 
generally, however, he links the concept of causality to our ability to make things happen. 
This way of thinking is rooted in the interventionist theory of von Wright’s Explanation and 
Understanding (1971), as well as in the counterfactual analysis of causality by his 
contemporary David Lewis.78 Keil ties these theories together, basing our concept of causality 
in our capability of counterfactual reasoning, i.e. our ability to do otherwise. The 
interventionist account of causality will be the topic for the next section. 
 
 
3.5 Making things happen – and making sure they don’t 
 
Throughout the reasons vs. causes debate, as well as according to the causal theorists of 
action, the existence of causal relations between events in the world was largely taken for 
granted. The question has been whether intentional action should be understood as 
instantiations of such causal relations, or as somehow “beyond” causality – at least in 
surpassing ordinary event causality. Like the causal theory of action, the interventionist theory 
of causality seeks to clarify the relationship between action and causality. What von Wright 
basically does, however, is to reverse the relationship between the two. Instead of asking how 
causality can be used to explain action, he illustrates how intentional action is a necessary 
element in the explication of causal relations: 
 
[T]he idea of a causal or nomic relationship can be said to depend on the concept of action. (von Wright 
1971, p. 72) 
 
                                                 
77 Without delving too far into this debate, it seems to me that although Keil’s critique against the nomological 
character of causality is well-founded, it certainly seems to be the case that we expect – and perhaps even have to 
expect – exceptionlessness from (at least some of) the laws of nature, including (some) laws of succession that 
specifically are under attack by Keil. Keil argues that causality cannot be explained through general laws of 
nature – for that, the world is “too dense”. However, the question remains: What are physicists then aiming for, 
and according to what principle do they distinguish between mere disturbances and interruptions of the 
experiment (the oscilloscope tipped over, a bird snatched the falling object) and grave deviations leading to 
theoretical reconsiderations. Wellmer argues that a disturbance does not qualify as a falsification until it is 
brought under experimental control, i.e. is reproducible (cf. Wellmer 1967). The reaction to deviations in 
experimental research is in any case not “Oh, well, it didn’t work out well this time”, but rather that either 
something has gone wrong with the experiment or the measuring of values, or that we must adjust certain law(s), 
principle(s), or initial conditions at the basis of the experiment. 
78 Cf. David Lewis, “Counterfactuals” and “Causality” (both 1973), reprinted in Lewis 1986. 
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What we have primary access to, von Wright says, is our own ability to do things. By doing 
something, we bring something about, and this relation forms a crucial precondition for our 
conception of causal relations. Thus: 
 
[W]e cannot understand causation, nor the distinction between nomic connections and accidental 
uniformities of nature, without resorting to ideas about doing things and intentionally interfering with 
the course of nature. (von Wright 1971, p. 65f.) 
 
Von Wright might be said to move from a causal theory of action to an agency theory of 
causality.79 This is proposed as a general theory of causality in nature. Far from proposing a 
theory of agent causation, i.e. a separate species of causality unique to intentional action, he 
introduces a general account of event causation that is derived from our conception of 
ourselves as agents: 
 
To say that we cause effects is not to say that agents are causes. It means that we do things which then 
as causes produce effects. (von Wright 1971, p. 69) 
 
Our understanding of a causal relation involves counterfactuals, von Wright continues, which 
brings to mind Mill’s old critique against Hume that causal relations go beyond mere 
regularities. To understand an event as the cause of another event involves more than seeing 
them as following each other on a regular basis. It involves assuming that had the first event 
not happened, the second would not have happened either. Von Wright puts it thus: 
 
The assumption (hypothesis) that the concomitance of p and q has a nomic character contains more than 
just the assumption that their togetherness is invariable. It also contains the counterfactual assumption 
that on occasions when p, in fact, was not the case q would have accompanied it, had p been the case. 
(von Wright 1971, p. 72) 
 
But how do we justify counterfactual assumptions? As von Wright points out, it is logically 
impossible to verify individual counterfactuals. The world consists of everything that is the 
case, leaving no room for a certain verification of what would have or could have been the 
case. However, through our ability to interfere with the way of the world, we can come very 
close: 
 
                                                 
79 Cf. Keil 2007a, p. 20. 
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Assume that p is a state of affairs which, on some occasions at least, we can produce or suppress ‘at 
will’. This presupposes that there are occasions on which p is not already there and, we feel confident, 
will not come to be (on the next occasion), unless we produce it. Assume there is such an occasion and 
that we produce p. We are then confident that had we not done this, the next occasion would have been 
one when p was not there. But in fact it is one when p is there. If then q too is there, we should regard 
this as a confirmation of the counterfactual condition which we could have affirmed had we not 
produced p, viz. that had p which was not there been there q would have been there too. (von Wright 
1971, p. 71f) 
 
It is along this route that von Wright connects causality with action. Our direct experience 
with making things happen – as well as making sure some things do not happen – is the road 
to cognition of causal connections. Geert Keil comments that this counterfactual element 
departs radically from empiricism: 
 
What would have been the case is not part of the observable world. Interventionism demonstrates where 
science has to go beyond mere observation, and has to take agency and experimentation seriously. (Keil 
2007a, p. 24) 
 
Von Wright himself dubs his approach an experimentalist notion of causality, as it is based on 
how we, as agents, can manipulate our surroundings: 
  
It is established that there is a causal connection between p and q when we have satisfied ourselves that, 
by manipulating the one factor, we can achieve or bring it about that the other is, or is not, there. We 
usually satisfy ourselves as to this by making experiments. (von Wright 1971, p. 72) 
 
An interventionist or experimentalist approach to causality offers a solution to Hume’s 
infamous problem, concerning how “one event follows another, but we never can observe any 
tie between them”.80 Pace Hume, it is not a matter of observing such a tie, but rather of 
pulling it – and sometimes abstaining from pulling it. Action, and forbearance, the “passive 
counterpart to action,81 allow us to explore the tie between causes and effects, whether as a 
basis for articulating causal laws or non-strict, disturbable regularities.82 
                                                 
80 Cf. Hume 1748, Section VII, Part II. 
81 Cf. von Wright 1971, p. 90. 
82 Cf. Keil 2007a p. 25f. Von Wright’s interventionist theory is guided by an attempt to establish exceptionless 
laws of nature, whereas Geert Keil denies the existence of such laws. However, Keil’s approach is still “von 
Wrightean in spirit” (cf. Keil 2007a, p. 32), in the sense that it supports the assumption of “a conceptual link 
between agency and freedom” (ibid.). 
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Finally in this paragraph I will consider two problematic features of the interventionist 
theory of causality. The first is the accusation of circularity, which has been raised from 
several quarters: How can we deduce a general conception of causality from the way 
intentional action brings about (i.e. causes) changes in the world without already having 
access to a general concept of causality? A second and – as I will attempt to show – connected 
accusation against this version of interventionism is that it is a case of anthropomorphism, in 
the sense that reality is being interpreted exclusively in terms of human experience.83  
As regards the first accusation, von Wright himself admits to a certain circularity in 
the argumentation: 
 
No proof can decide, I think, which is the more basic concept, action or causation. One way of disputing 
my position would be to maintain that action cannot be understood unless causation is already 
intelligible. I shall not deny that this view too could be sustained by weighty arguments. (von Wright 
1971, p. 74) 
 
The notion of bringing about is vital to von Wright’s explication of causality, and this notion 
clearly has causal connotations. The question which of the two concepts – action or causation 
– has explicative primacy seems hard to answer conclusively. Geert Keil blames this on the 
fact that we are dealing with “basic concepts of our descriptive metaphysics”.84 Such basic 
concepts are in general connected with each other through mutual implications – Keil 
mentions “time” and “change” as another example of two concepts linked together this way. It 
must be possible, Keil argues, to allow for the introduction of basic, metaphysical concepts in 
constellations without being accused of circularity: 
 
Bei Zirkeln, die offenkundig unvermeidlich sind, muss es sich um hermeneutische handeln. (Keil 
2000a, p. 415) 
 
And hermeneutic circles he adds, quoting Heidegger, we should not seek to escape, but to 
enter in the right way.85 
                                                 
83 James Woodward’s Making Things Happen (2003) is an example of an interventionist theory of causality 
which defines intervention without reference to free human agency, and in this way attempts to avoid 
accusations of anthropomorphism. However, Woodward does relate causation to experimentation and 
counterfactuals. These are both concepts which, as far as I can understand, are conceptually linked to intentional 
agency. 
84 Cf. Keil 2000a, p. 415. 
85 Loc.cit. Cf. Sein und Zeit § 32. 
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 Keil concludes that neither of the concepts may be seen as primary to the other. 
However, to me it seems intuitively tempting to analyse the conceptual interdependence 
further, breaking it down to: 
 
1) The ontological priority of causality: The existence of causal relations between events 
in the world must be conceived of as prior to and independent of intentional agency, 
and;  
2) The epistemological priority of agency: Our knowledge of causal relations is 
secondary to, and dependent upon agency, i.e. our ability to intentionally interfere 
with a course of events.86 
 
What status the concepts are given depends upon other basic assumptions from different 
philosophical viewpoints. Habermas has argued that naturalists tend to focus on ontological 
questions.87 Accordingly, they will perhaps tend to assign a more basic status to causal 
relations. On the other hand, more Kantian or pragmatically minded philosophers will tend to 
focus on how we as intentional agents are actively involved in the cognition of the world. 
Conceptual interdependence is supported by the etymological connections between the 
concepts of cause and action.88 The notion of cause has its heritage in the language of law and 
justice, a circumstance that several authors – among them Russell and Quine – saw as an 
incentive to banish the concept from science altogether.89 Causality certainly has 
anthropomorphist connotations, in the sense that it involves interpreting a natural series of 
events in terms of intentional action, e.g. characterising the cause as “producing” or “bringing 
about” the effect, causal powers as “operating” in the world, etc. However, I guess that none 
of the authors mentioned here would deny that experimentation has a central role in the 
attaining of scientific knowledge. And experimentation arguably has assumptions about 
causal connections as its basis. Russell may be right that scientific laws move away from the 
language of causality; as a matter of fact, scientific language in general moves away from 
ordinary language. Nonetheless, I would argue that science depends upon ordinary language 
                                                 
86 Cf. my discussion of Habermas’ division of ontological and epistemological priority below, Ch. 6.6. 
87 Cf. Habermas 2006, p. 688; Cf. below, Ch. 7.1. 
88 Cf. among others von Wright, cf. 1971, p. 64f. 
89 Cf. Russell 1913, Quine 1974. 
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as a starting point, in the sense that certain basic questions must be formulated in ordinary 
language in order for science to get started.90 
The interdependency between causality and action can be analysed according to 
ontological and epistemological priority, all within the limits of an interventionist theory. 
However, what I see as a challenge for the interventionist account of causation, a challenge 
that it inherits from the causal theory of action, is how to explain the relation between action 
and bodily movement. 
 
 
3.6 Action and bodily movement 
 
“An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outwards criteria”, reads Wittgenstein’s famous slogan 
from the Philosophical Investigations (§ 580). In connection with actions this means that we 
ascribe intentions, beliefs, and desires on the basis of the bodily movements of the agent. At 
the same time, my intentions are accessible to me in a way that they are to no one else; they 
are, in a certain sense, private. An appropriate answer to the question of what an action is 
should account for both of these features. 
 The causal theory of action takes good care of the “outer criteria”, in defining action as 
a bodily movement which according to some descriptions is intentional. Davidson argues that 
all actions may be redescribed as “primitive actions”, revealing their true identity as 
  
mere movements of the body – these are all the actions there are. We never do more than move our 
bodies: the rest is up to nature. (Davidson 1980, p. 59) 
 
What deviant causal chains bring to light, however, is that the causal theory of action is 
unable to account for the second aspect of action, the “privileged access”91 or “first-person 
perspective”, which distinguishes the action as mine. Geert Keil defends the causal theory to 
the degree that whenever an action takes place, a bodily movement is involved, not as 
                                                 
90 Furthermore, the theoretical statements of physics – and e.g. neuroscience – have to be embedded in ordinary 
language in the sense of the performative-propositional double structure of speech (cf. e.g. Habermas 1976, p. 
334, cf. below, Ch. 6.6): The scientific propositional content must be stated, argued, maintained, challenged, 
criticised, denied, affirmed, questioned, etc. – and these are all performative verbs of colloquial language. 
91 The well-established phrase “privileged access” has misleading connotations, as it indicates that the difference 
between my access to my own intentions and to other people’s intentions is that I ‘observe’ my own intentions 
from a better or more favourable position. Actually, “privileged access” is not based on criteria at all, but 
consists simply in having a first-person perspective, cf. below, Ch. 6. 
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something that is identical with the action, but as its substrate.92 This does not require actions 
to be a subclass of events, however: 
 
Was der Klasse der Ereignisse angehört, ist nicht die Handlung, sondern ihr Substrat. Auch wenn 
jedesmal eine Körperbewegung – und a forteriori ein Ereignis – stattfindet, wenn jemand handelt: In 
der kausalistischen Handlungsdefinition fällt der Umstand unter den Tisch, dass Handlungen vollzogen 
oder ausgeführt werden. (Keil 2000a, p. 143) 
 
To preserve the aspect that actions are carried out, Keil suggests that we give up the 
essentialist “An action is…” and replace it with “An action takes place when…”93  
  “Every time I move my arm, my arm moves”, Wittgenstein commented in The Brown 
Book, regarding the peculiarity that action always seems to involve bodily movement. Causal 
theories of action and agency theories of causality share the view that action necessarily 
involves bodily movement. However, a category of action that does not fit neatly into this 
picture is “inner action”, including activities such as contemplating, mental calculation, and so 
forth. Von Wright solves this problem by defining acts without an outer aspect as not 
belonging to the concept of action.94 Still, it seems odd that an activity such as the mental 
solving of a chess puzzle, which undoubtedly is intentionally carried out, should not be 
counted as an action. In the article “Inneres Handeln”, Marcus Willaschek attempts to develop 
a concept of action broad enough to allow for inner action, defined as  
 
diejenigen Vorgänge (…), die unter einen Handlungstyp fallen, dessen Ausführung kein 
charakteristisches (…) körperliches Verhalten involviert. (Willaschek 1992, p. 132)  
  
Willaschek defines action by three necessary, but insufficient conditions: 
1) It can not be something merely happening to the agent, it must “originate with 
herself”;95  
2) It must be rationalisable in light of the agent’s beliefs and desires; and, 
3) It must be causally related (in “the right way”, i.e. not through a deviant causal chain) 
to the beliefs and desires of the agent. 
 
                                                 
92 I.e. identical in the Davidsonian sense of token-token identity. 
93 Cf. Keil 2000a,  p. 142. 
94 Cf. Von Wright 1971, p. 87. 
95 “von ihr selbst ausgeht”, ibid. p. 140. 
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He thus avoids using bodily movements as a defining feature of action. However, for the 
definition to work, we must be able to pick out an action from something merely happening to 
the agent. It turns out to be hard to analyse the way in which an agent can acknowledge that 
an inner action “originates with herself”. This leads Willaschek to suggest the following 
foremost distinction between inner and outer action: 
 
[D]ass nämlich innere Handlungen von niemandem außer dem Handelnden selbst unmittelbar 
beobachtet werden können. (Op.cit., p. 149) 
 
Against this I would argue that actions – whether inner or outer – may never be “immediately 
observed” by the agent herself. An action is carried out – or performed – from a first-person 
perspective, and can only be observed from another perspective, whether by other agents or 
the person herself, ex post actu.   
Wittgenstein’s anti-mentalistic demand for “outer criteria” suggests that the conceptual 
tie between bodily movements and action must be preserved, even in the cases where bodily 
movements only take place within the brain.96 However, the dependence between actions and 
bodily movements should be formulated in a way that does not imply that the agent always in 
some way “carries out” a bodily movement. When I walk, it seems appropriate to say that I 
intend a physical course of events to happen. On the other hand, if what I do is to concentrate 
on my chess puzzle, the movements that take place in my brain, or for that matter the 
wrinkling of my forehead, are not relevant to or in any way a part of my intention. 
 
 
3.7 Free agency – a pleonasm 
 
In Norwegian, the term for the main concept discussed throughout this chapter is handling, 
and the German word is Handlung. The etymological source of these words is the word hand, 
which already suggests that what we are talking about is human action. After all, only 
humans, or very human-like animals, have hands. The English term action (from the Latin 
noun actio) is more general, referring to all sorts of activities, of which human action is a 
subcategory. Intentional action, in turn, is a subcategory of human action, a term that in some 
                                                 
96 Wittgenstein’s demand is connected with the learnability of psychological predicates such as the pain 
predicate, and thus with the Private Language Argument, cf. below Ch. 5.3. It can therefore be argued that “inner 
action” must be viewed as parasitic upon directly observable behaviour, in the sense that a situation where “inner 
actions” were the only ones carried out would be unthinkable. 
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uses includes also unintentional behaviour such as sneezing and seizures; in short, everything 
we do. Handling/Handlung, however, is not fitting for everything we do, but is more clearly 
restricted to the things we do intentionally, whether with a prior intention or with an intention-
in-action. In that sense the Norwegian/German term fits better to this problem area. However, 
in this context, when discussing freedom of agency, I am of course referring to the narrower 
sense of the term action.  
In his essay “Freedom”, Thomas Nagel distinguishes “three problems about action”:97 
One general, metaphysical problem of the nature of agency, one problem of autonomy 
(focusing on my own freedom) and one problem of responsibility (focusing on the freedom of 
other people): 
 
We may act without being free, and we may doubt the freedom of others without doubting that they act. 
What undermines the sense of freedom doesn’t automatically undermine agency. (Nagel 1986, p. 111) 
 
I have argued that the first two problems collapse into one. If we consider freedom as an 
analytical implication of the concept of intentional action, an account of intentional agency is 
tantamount to an account of free agency. In von Wright’s words: 
 
[T]he concept of an action, the ascriptions of action to an agent, belong to discourse in which ’free will’ 
is taken for granted. (von Wright 1980, p. 78) 
 
In other words, the concept of free agency constitutes a pleonasm, an excessive use of words 
in order to describe a phenomenon or express an idea.  
In line with Wittgensteinian anti-mentalism, I have argued that we ascribe intentional 
action on the basis of “outer criteria.” This means that – notwithstanding the first-person 
perspective through which the agent in a certain sense is “privileged” with regards to her own 
intentions – both the intentions and the actions are (and must be) intersubjectively accessible 
to other agents. In other words: I always already recognise myself as able to act intentionally, 
and I can equally ascribe this ability to others. This means that Nagel’s three problems merge 
into one, concerning the nature and epistemology of intentional agency. 
 Nevertheless, the fact remains that we may be fooled in each individual case: What 
appears to be an action on the basis of all “outer criteria” may turn out to be nothing but a 
neurological phenomenon, like a twitch of the finger. When we assume that a person has 
                                                 
97 Cf. Nagel 1986, p. 110f. 
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acted intentionally, we ascribe certain qualifications to the person, notably the ability to think 
rationally about a certain course of events and make a decision. It appears that such an 
assumption is not based on observation and experimentation alone, but has a distinctive 
normative character. The normative aspect of the concept of action will be the topic for the 
next chapter. 
Throughout this chapter I have to a large extent avoided the discussion as to whether 
causality is nomological or not, i.e. if the connections between causes and effects can be 
formulated as strict laws or should be perceived merely as non-strict regularities. The reason 
is that I do not find this to be of decisive importance to the main topic of the chapter, namely 
the explanatory relationship between action and causality. In recollection of Thomas Nagel’s 
point from the beginning of this chapter, I think the question of causal determination is a 
subsidiary part of the free agency problem.98 This problem arises, according to Nagel, 
whenever we attempt to “view action from an objective or external standpoint.”99 Therefore, 
in my attempt to dissolve the free agency problem, I continue my investigation of a non-
objectivistic concept of action in the following chapter. 
                                                 
98 Although, as I will argue below, determinism in at least some of its forms seems to create an additional 
problem in this debate – cf. below, Ch. 7.2, 7.3. 
99 Nagel 1986, p.110. 
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Chapter 4: A normative approach to action 
 
 
[T]he normative question is one that arises in the heat of action. 
(Korsgaard 1996, p. 91) 
 
Indem man etwas tut, antwortet man auf die ethische Frage. 
(Rödl 1998, p. 53) 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: Action and normativity 
 
Norms and rules are important in the life of a language user. That norms and rules can be 
obeyed or broken belongs to the very essence of these concepts, as Wittgenstein has pointed 
out.100 According to a common view, the distinctions between right and wrong, correct or 
incorrect, true or false do not apply outside the domain of rational agency. Our actions are 
judged as more or less right, good, or fitting, as opposed to natural courses of events. 
According to this view, we cannot reasonably make a claim about a stone that it shouldn’t roll 
or that it ought to have taken a different route. If a stone rolling down a hill turns out to 
deviate from the route we anticipated for it, this would either mean that our calculations were 
wrong, or that we are wrong about the laws of physics. The stone is never to blame. On the 
other hand, when actions deviate from a given set of behavioural rules, this does not 
necessarily render the norms invalid: It may be that the agent, not the rule, is wrong. 
 In this chapter I take as my point of departure that a distinctive feature of being a 
language user and a rational agent is to be subject to normative standards. Through 
presentations of what Robert Brandom and Sebastian Rödl have written about this topic, I 
attempt to give an account of normativity as a distinguishing feature of rational agency. I 
follow Brandom and Rödl in seeing non-verbal intentional actions as parallel to assertions. 
Therefore, since the normativity of language use is well explored, I attempt to examine 
                                                 
100 Cf. e.g. PU § 202. 
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rational agency from this angle. A non-verbal action and an assertion both have a normative 
status, i.e. they may be judged as right or wrong, and both are expressions of normative 
attitudes.101  
 In the following section (4.2), I pursue what a normative approach to action means. I 
contrast it with another view, viz. that of action as production, and attempt to analyse these 
two approaches as two traditional lines of thinking about agency. In 4.3, I explore a 
contemporary example of a normative approach to action, namely Robert Brandom’s. Another 
current writer on normativity and action – with many similarities to Brandom – is Sebastian 
Rödl, whose ideas I examine in 4.4. 
 
 
4.2 Action as production vs. action as expression 
 
Normativity is arguably a distinguishing mark of the mental; of concepts and of mental 
properties and abilities. These concepts, properties and abilities are expressed through a 
normative practice, or as Rödl puts it: 
  
Geistiger Gehalt ist normative Praxis. (Rödl 2000, p. 762) 
 
Understanding mental content as essentially expressed in intentional states and acts that have 
a normative status is an approach reminiscent of Wittgenstein in his later works. Robert 
Brandom describes Wittgenstein’s approach as the linguistic explication of an essentially 
Kantian point, namely that 
 
to take what we do as judging and acting is to treat it as subject to certain kinds of assessments as to its 
correctness: truth (corresponding to the world) and success (corresponding to the intention). (Brandom 
1994, p. 13) 
 
Saying that someone has performed an intentional action is not simply to assert that certain 
movements have taken place in the world. It is not a pure description, but involves a 
normative element.  
In the following I propose that agency is to be understood as a normative concept, in 
the sense that being an agent is equivalent to being bound by norms. Another way to state this 
                                                 
101 Cf. e.g. Brandom 1994, p. 229ff., and Rödl 2000, p. 767 and 1998, Ch.3. 
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point is to say that agency, and agents, belong within the “space of reasons”. Wilfrid Sellars 
introduces the concept of a logical space of reasons in order to illustrate how knowledge is a 
fundamentally normative concept: 
 
[I]n characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description 
of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to 
justify what one says. (Sellars 1956, p. 76) 
 
John McDowell stresses that Sellars’ point extends beyond the concept of knowledge to the 
general relationship between mind and world: 
 
[T]hough Sellars here speaks of knowledge in particular, that is just to stress one application of the 
thought that a normative context is necessary for the idea of being in touch with the world at all. 
(McDowell 1996, p. xiv) 
 
Being in touch with the world means that the world somehow “opens up” to the subject. More 
specifically, it means that a normative space opens up between the subject and the world. 
Experience, in the Kantian understanding, involves making judgements, i.e. experiencing 
something as something. This way of being in touch with the world involves two “directions 
of fit” in John Searle’s sense: When the subject has an experience, her intention adjusts to the 
world (mind-to-world direction of fit), and when she acts intentionally, the world is adjusted 
according to the intention of the subject (world-to-mind direction of fit).102  
Sellars’s account constitutes the basis of Robert Brandom’s conception of the 
normativity of action: 
 
The normative (…) approach to intention and action is rooted in Sellars’s discussion of the giving and 
asking for reasons for action. (Brandom 1994, p. 263)  
 
According to this basically Kantian approach, to be an agent is to have beliefs you take to be 
true, for which you are responsible, and upon which you act. To have a belief is the same as to 
be committed to the truth of a proposition, and to be responsive to reasons for or against this 
belief. Thus, to act is to be bound by reasons.103 In the words of Saul Kripke: 
 
                                                 
102 Cf. Searle 1983, 96f. 
103 Cf. Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Akademieausgabe) 28.2,2; 1068 (Religionslehre Pölitz), cf. above, Ch. 2.1. 
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The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive. (Kripke 1982, p. 
37)104  
 
The “Kantian approach” may be contrasted with a more “Humean approach”, which we can 
recognise in Donald Davidson’s causal theory of action, as one example. From this 
perspective, pro attitudes such as preferences and desires are seen as basic, and as the ultimate 
motivation for action. Norms governing rational action are instrumental, in the sense that their 
authority stems from these pro attitudes. Brandom’s project is a reversion of this approach, in 
the sense that pro attitudes are seen as derived from rationality, which in turn is considered 
basic:  
 
The concepts of desire and preference are (…) demoted from their position of privilege, and take their 
place as having a derivative and provincial sort of normative authority. Endorsement and commitment 
are at the centre of rational agency – as of rationality in general – and inclination enters only insofar as 
rational agents must bring inclination in the train of rational propriety, not the other way around. 
(Brandom 2000a, p. 31) 
 
Brandom’s anti-reductionist approach to agency means understanding actions as irreducibly 
normative, in the sense that they cannot be analysed as physical events caused by pro 
attitudes. 
One alternative to a normative theory of action is the view that action is production. 
Viewing action as production means judging and valuing the action according to its outcome. 
The following quote by John Stuart Mill may serve as a classic example of one version of this 
approach: 
 
All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their 
whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. (Mill, Utilitarianism, § 20) 
 
Utilitarians defend productive success – the bringing about of results – as the ultimate and 
unquestionable parameter for the judgement of action. Considerations of what we ought to do 
are seen as ultimately founded in the (potential or realised) productive success the action in 
question may have. This suggests that an action can be identified as an action using strictly 
descriptive criteria, such as the achievement of some external end (which in turn, of course, 
may be normatively evaluated). In contrast, a normative theory of action maintains that 
                                                 
104 Cf. Wellmer 2008, p. 111, and Brandom 1994, p. 656, fn. 10. 
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identifying something as an intentional action is – independently of the actual outcome of the 
action – to ascribe it a normative status. 
 The alternative to viewing action as production is a conception going back to 
Antiquity, stating that action is essentially different from production, in the sense that 
 
while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end. (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics VI. 5, 1140b5) 
 
Actions are qualified, according to Aristotle, not as successful or flawed relating to whether 
they meet or fail to meet some external end, but as more or less good in themselves. Aristotle 
distinguishes between poiesis, “things made”, and praxis, “actions done”: the former is 
production that is judged according to rules of art, with the corresponding virtue of techne; 
while the latter is deliberative and discursive, belonging to ethical and political life, with the 
corresponding virtue of phronesis.  
 The modern concept of action covers a broad range, from ethical and political deeds to 
those we perform in the pursuit of technical or artistic goals. And of course, when using this 
modern concept, it makes perfect sense to speak of an action’s goal, in the sense that we do 
certain things in order to achieve something else. However, the Aristotelian distinction 
between poiesis and praxis is useful in the attempt to specify in what way the concept of 
action is related to the concepts of rationality and normativity. An action may have certain 
results, but I claim that it is not identified (as to its type, regarding what it is) with relation to 
its outcome in the way production is, but rather according to its intention. Compare the 
following propositions: 
  
Lisa sneezes at the house of cards, and it collapses. 
 Selma puffs at the house of cards, and it collapses. 
 
These two sceneries have the same outcome, but our immediate assumption is that only one of 
the propositions describes an action. We do not confirm that an action has taken place on the 
basis of whether or not certain results are attained, but on the basis of a (more or less well-
founded) normative ascription of rational intention. Two more propositions:  
  
The girls are whispering. 
The trees are whispering. 
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 Without further context, we understand only one of these propositions as the ascription of 
action, and the other one as describing something in a poetic or metaphoric way. We assume 
that only the girls, and not the trees, are rational.105 
 Having a mind, or certain mental capacities, is a conceptual part of being an agent. 
And the mental is typically expressed in rational actions, for example through speech acts. 
We may distinguish between two traditional ways of explicating the concept of action:  
 
(1) A descriptive concept of action: Action viewed as the production of results. 
(2) A normative concept of action: Action viewed as the expression of rationality. 
  
To view action as the production of results is a widespread way of looking at actions that 
reaches far beyond the example of utilitarianism mentioned above. We recognise it 
throughout the Hume-Davidsonian tradition previously mentioned, where action is seen as 
caused by motivating preferences and desires (pro attitudes). The causal theory of action 
analyses individual actions as events caused by other (mental) events – pro attitudes – which 
in turn causes other (mental or physical) events. Against this, in Chapter 3, I argued that what 
belongs to the causal nexus is bodily movement constituting the substrate of the action, while 
the action itself belongs to a different frame of reference. 
Although a normative concept of action may be traced back to Antiquity, it is the 
Enlightenment’s focus on the performances of the human mind that is the real source of any 
modern theory of the normativity of action. The preoccupation with mental acts – among 
rationalists and empiricists alike – prepares the ground for what Robert Brandom calls Kant’s 
“normative turn”.106 Kant brings a normative conception of intentionality to light, as opposed 
to the descriptive approach of his immediate predecessors. Descartes regards having a mind, 
i.e. having mental representations, as a property that some things in the world exhibit, while 
others do not. Brandom points out that Kant draws the line differently: 
 
For Kant the important line is not that separating the mental and the material as two matter-of-factually 
different kinds of stuff. It is rather that separating what is subject to certain kinds of normative 
assessment and what is not. (Brandom 1994, p. 9) 
 
                                                 
105 In some contexts, e.g. reading a certain type of fiction such as The Lord of the Rings, our interpretation would 
of course be different. 
106 Cf. Brandom 2002, p. 21. 
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Kant thinks of rational beings as performers of a specifically conceptual activity. To 
Brandom, one of Kant’s most decisive contributions to contemporary philosophy is his 
introduction of the idea that rationality (and intentionality) is distinguished, not by certain 
descriptive marks, but by its normative character: 
 
One of Kant’s master ideas is that what distinguishes thinkers and agents from merely natural creatures 
is our susceptibility to certain kinds of normative appraisal. Judgments and actions essentially involve 
commitments as to how things are or are to be. Because they can be assessed according to their 
correctness (truth/error, success/failure), we are in a distinctive sense responsible for what we believe 
and do. (Brandom 2002, p. 21) 
 
The epoch-making insight that Brandom attributes to Kant is the understanding of judgements 
and actions in terms of the way in which we are responsible for them. Concepts, to Kant, are 
not a special group of entities distinguished by certain descriptive criteria. He understands 
concepts as being rules, i.e. specifying how something ought to be done. The normative 
significance of being in an intentional state – e.g. thinking something – or of performing an 
intentional action lies in its constituting the undertaking (or acquiring) of an obligation or 
commitment. 
Following Kant, actions and judgements may be viewed as expressions of practical and 
theoretical rationality respectively. Actions and judgements are the sort of things for which 
reasons can be given and asked for. Both belong, in the words of Wilfred Sellars, within “the 
space of reasons”. Kant ties normative statuses to normative attitudes: 
 
[R]ules get their normative force, come to govern our doings, only in virtue of our own attitudes. One is 
genuinely responsible only for that for which one takes responsibility; one is genuinely committed only 
to that to which one has committed oneself. (Op.cit., p. 219) 
  
In other words: Rules exist only to the degree that our practice of committing ourselves exists. 
Brandom points further, however, to Hegel’s critique of Kantian normativity. To Hegel, 
what remains mysterious in Kant’s conception is how we can have access to concepts, rules 
and norms in the first place. Hegel brings in the concept of reciprocal recognition to account 
for the accessibility of determinate norms to which we may commit ourselves: 
 
Hegel’s idea is that the determinacy of the content of what you have committed yourself to – the part 
that is not up to you in the way that whether you commit yourself to it is up to you – is secured by the 
attitudes of others, to whom one has at least implicitly granted that authority. His thought is that the 
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only way to get the requisite distance from my acknowledgements (my attitudes, which makes the norm 
binding on me in the first place) while retaining the sort of authority over my commitments that the 
Rousseau-Kant tradition insists on, is to have the norms administered by someone else. I commit 
myself, but then they hold me to it. (Op.cit., p. 220)  
 
To Hegel, reciprocal recognition gives normativity a definite form. The strength of Hegel’s 
approach is that normativity becomes “socialised”, and thereby acquires a definite discursive 
character. However, Brandom points out, the Hegelian system suffers from certain inner 
tensions, notably the status of Geist or Spirit as it is at the same time irreducibly social as well 
as all-embracing, with nothing “outside” of it.107 
While Hegel’s contribution on top of the original Kantian normative turn is a social 
turn, Heidegger and Wittgenstein contribute with a linguistic-pragmatic turn in order to 
concretise the view of normativity as socially established. Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as a 
genuinely linguistic form of existence and Wittgenstein’s approach to language as norm-
governed behaviour constitute a conception of norms as being necessarily linguistically 
founded. Brandom comments on why Wittgenstein should be seen as someone who carries on 
and develops further Kant’s normative turn: 
 
The starting point of [Wittgenstein’s] investigations is the insight that our ordinary understanding of 
states and acts of meaning, understanding, intending, or believing something is an understanding of 
them as states and acts that commit or oblige us to act and think in various ways (…) To understand or 
grasp such a meaning is to be able to distinguish correct from incorrect uses (…) This is one way of 
developing and extending Kant’s point that to take what we do as judging and acting is to treat it as 
subject to certain kinds of assessments as to its correctness. (Brandom 1994, p. 13f.)  
 
Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein thus developed the basis for Brandom’s normative 
theory of language and action, a theory that we will now examine more closely. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 Cf. Brandom 2002, p. 227ff. Audun Øfsti (2002) addresses a problem that may be related, cf. p. 104, fn 16: 
“Hegel hat m.E. ein ernstes Problem mit dem Versuch, gegen das Kantischen Sollen das Ideale als substanzieller 
Gesellschaftlicher Zustand zu denken. Er redet ja zuweilen [in Enz. § 513], als ob die strukturalistische 
Komplementarität zwischen System (‘langue’) und Inhalt (‘parole’) letzlich überschritten werden sollte, wie 
etwa in einem Kunstwerk, das ‘seine eigene Sprache’ ist”. 
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 4.3 Playing the game: Brandom on rational agency 
 
Robert Brandom’s highly influential book Making it Explicit (1994) offers an innovative 
account of language and action. As sketched above, Brandom inherits a view of rationality 
from Kant and Hegel, and a view of language and mind from Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Frege, 
and American pragmatism, particularly Wilfred Sellars. These lay the foundation for 
Brandom’s rationalistic, pragmatistic and expressivistic theory, where normative status is seen 
as the defining characteristic of linguistic behaviour, and of rational agency in general:  
 
The practices that confer propositional and other sorts of conceptual content implicitly contain norms 
concerning how it is correct to use expressions, under what circumstances it is appropriate to perform 
various speech acts, and what the appropriate consequences of such performances are. (Brandom 1994, 
p. xiii) 
 
The treatment of concepts as norms, and of rational action as normative, is a fundamentally 
Kantian heritage. Kant introduces a normative view of judgements and actions by 
distinguishing them as the sort of things we offer reasons for. It is in this “rationalistic” spirit 
that Brandom presents his discursive view on action: 
 
Giving and asking for reasons for actions is possible only in the context of practices of giving and 
asking for reasons generally – that is, of practices of making and defending claims or judgments. For 
giving a reason is always expressing a judgment: making a claim. So practical reasoning requires the 
availability of beliefs (doxastic commitments) as premises. (Brandom 1994, p. 81) 
 
Action is assimilated to judgement and understood as the application of concepts. Concepts, 
in turn, are understood as rules determining what commitments agents and knowers undertake 
by their acts and propositions. 
Brandom calls his approach to language inferentialism, as it explains concept use 
primarily in terms of inferential articulation. Inferentialism is contrasted to 
representationalism, the traditional approach in the philosophy of language.108 According to 
the representationalist approach to language, the meaning of an expression must be explained 
                                                 
108 Cf. Brandom 1994, p. xvi: “This semantic explanatory strategy, which takes inference as its basic concept, 
contrasts with one that has been dominant since the Enlightenment, which takes representation as its basic 
concept”. 
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in terms of what it represents. In contrast, the inferentialist approach explains the meaning of 
an expression in terms of its role in inferential relations within language. 
Brandom presents inferentialism as a broadening of the scope of representationalism. 
His aim is not to deny the representational dimension of language – it seems obvious that our 
propositions, what we say and think, are about something – but to point out that this 
dimension is best understood in light of a superior social dimension: 
 
The context within which concern with what is thought and talked about arises is the assessment of how 
the judgments of one individual can serve as reasons for another. (Brandom 2000a, p. 159) 
 
In Making it Explicit, Brandom develops an idiom with which he can discuss not only 
language and meaning, but more broadly, action and rationality. The context of the discussion 
is normative pragmatics, a view of language and action as ineliminably normative 
phenomena: 
 
No attempt is made to eliminate, in favour of nonnormative or naturalistic vocabulary, the normative 
vocabulary employed in specifying the practices that are the use of a language. Interpreting states, 
performances, and expressions as semantically or intentionally contentful is understood as attributing to 
their occurrence an ineliminably normative pragmatic significance. (Brandom 1994, p. xiii) 
 
The normative dimension of linguistic practice is seen as irreducible, but not as inexplicable. 
Making explicit what is already implicit in our practices is rather a key to the whole 
endeavour, as the title of Brandom’s main work suggests. Linguistic norms are explicated in 
terms of how speech acts affect the commitments (and entitlements to those commitments) of 
the agents involved.  
A lesson Brandom learns from Sellars is that all propositions, even seemingly non-
inferential reports like “The ball is red,” must be inferentially articulated in order to 
distinguish genuine concept use from the “mere reliable responsiveness” exhibited by 
automatic machinery like thermostats or noninferential reporters like parrots.109 By uttering 
the sentence “The ball is red”, I commit myself, not only to this particular propositional 
content but, by inference, to a number of further judgements like “The ball is coloured” and 
“Red is a colour.” 
Discursive commitments are essentially inferentially articulated, and they stand in 
inferential relation to each other: Certain things count as evidence for them; they involve 
                                                 
109 Cf. Brandom 1994, p. 5. On the responsiveness of parrots, cf. Wittgenstein, PU § 346. 
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certain further commitments; they are incompatible with certain other commitments, and so 
on. Being rational is thus identified with being a participant in a complex game: 
 
The overall idea is that the rationality that qualifies us as sapients (and not merely sentients) can be 
identified with being a player in the social, implicitly normative game of offering and assessing, 
producing and consuming, reasons. (Brandom 2000a, p. 81)  
 
In line with this, discursive practice is understood as the social practice of giving and asking 
for reasons or, as Brandom calls it, deontic scorekeeping:110 
 
Competent linguistic practitioners keep track of their own and each other’s commitments and 
entitlements. They are (we are) deontic scorekeepers. Speech acts, paradigmatically assertions, alter the 
deontic score, they change what commitments and entitlements it is appropriate to attribute, not only to 
the one producing the speech act, but also to those to whom it is addressed. (Brandom 1994, p. 142) 
 
In this way, the inferentialist approach explores how reasons are derived through discursive 
scorekeeping. This is also the key to explaining the objectivity of concepts. Brandom 
separates two species of discursive commitment:  
 
1) Cognitive/doxastic commitments: “Takings-true” – acknowledging such a 
commitment is the same as having a belief. 
2) Practical commitments/commitments to act: “Makings-true” – acknowledging such 
a commitment is the same as having an intention. 
 
An action may thus be defined as the appropriate response to the acknowledgement of a 
practical commitment.111  
The distinction between practical and doxastic commitments brings us back to the 
analogy between agency and perception.112 Practical commitments form the basis of actions, 
                                                 
110 Cf. e.g. Brandom 1994, p. 141ff. The scorekeeping metaphor is drawn from baseball, and alludes to the 
Wittgensteinian concept of language games. A problem with the game metaphor, I think, is that it does not 
capture the superiority of the phenomenon language. When playing games, we can always step out of the game 
and consult the rules, take a break (think of cricket) or whatever. What Brandom calls “the normative game of 
offering and assessing, producing and consuming, reasons” (cf. Brandom 2000, p. 81) is, however, the core 
aspect of being a subject, and not something we can step in and out of, cf. Wellmer 2002, p. 117: “[D]as Problem 
im Fall des Wortes ‘Sprache’ [stellt] sich ganz anders als im Fall des Wortes ‘Spiel’. Denn während man sagen 
kann, dass sich unter den Spielen kein besonderes Spiel auszeichnen lässt, das die Bedingung der Möglichkeit 
aller anderen Spiele ist, so können wir doch sagen, dass nur jemand, der sprechen kann – der das Sprachspiel 
beherrscht –, zu dem innovativen Spiel mit den Worten ’Sprache’ und ’Spiel’ imstande ist”. 
111 Cf. Brandom 2000, p. 84. 
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whereas doxastic commitments arise from observations. Brandom views action and 
perception as discursive exit and entry transitions – according to the way they contribute to 
“changing the score” of a discourse: 
 
1) Perception: Discursive entry transition – changing the score by acknowledging 
certain commitments.  
2) Action: Discursive exit transition – changing the score by bringing about certain 
states of affairs. 
 
Rational agency can thus be defined as “playing the game of giving and asking for reasons”.  
Participation in this game is what separates sapients from sentients: 
 
[We are] the ones capable of judgment and action. Not only do we respond differentially to environing 
stimuli, we respond by forming perceptual judgments. Not only do we produce behavior, we perform 
actions. (Brandom 1994, p. 8) 
 
Brandom accentuates our capacity to acknowledge and act according to practical 
commitments. By adopting a discursive approach to action, he places intentionality within the 
limits of a specifically linguistic social practice. Agency is understood in terms of linguistic 
practice rather than the other way around. Brandom seeks thereby to provide a largely Kantian 
account of the will as a rational faculty. This leads him to explore the normative dimension of 
action with the analogy between practical and doxastic commitment, while the causal 
dimension is explained by the analogy between discursive entry transitions in perception and 
discursive exit transitions in action. These analogies makes Brandom suggest that  
 
the rational will can be understood as no more philosophically mysterious than our capacity to notice 
barns or red things. (Brandom 1994, p. 233)  
 
Brandom’s normative pragmatics ties many of the central topics of this thesis together. 
Intentional action is explored in light of normativity, rationality, and intersubjective language. 
In one sentence: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
112 Searle also bases his theory of intentionality on an analogy between perception (mind-to-world direction of 
fit) and action (world-to mind direction of fit), cf. table on p. 97 in Searle 1983. 
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We are rational creatures exactly insofar as our acknowledgement of discursive commitments makes a 
difference to what we go on to do. (Op.cit., p. 271)  
 
Brandom understands language as essentially intersubjective – a view I will examine more 
closely in the next chapter.113 Inferentialism means that propositions have meaning by virtue 
of their inferential articulation, i.e. through their role in “the social, implicitly normative 
game” of giving and asking for reasons.  
 
 
4.4 Answering the ethical question:  Rödl on rational agency  
 
In his book on self-reference and normativity (Selbstbezug und Normativität, 1998), Sebastian 
Rödl deals in an original way with the familiar philosophical problem area of self-reference 
and self-consciousness. He picks up the thread from authors such as Wittgenstein, Tugendhat, 
Castaneda, and Perry, and tries to clarify the ways in which the acting and thinking subject 
can refer to itself by using the term “I”.  
Like Brandom, Rödl defends a view of action as irreducibly normative. And like 
Brandom, he operates with a strong parallel between “taking true” and “making true”, i.e. 
between beliefs and actions. Rödl equates acting rationally with “answering the ethical 
question”. The ethical question can be formulated thus: “What should I do?” and is seen as 
parallel to the epistemological question “What should I believe?”  
Rödl points to the logical connection between action and justification: 
 
Wenn man etwas tut, kann man es rechtfertigen. Das ‘kann’ hat hier seine logische Bedeutung. Handeln 
und Rechtfertigen passen begrifflich zusammen. Handlungen fallen in die richtige Kategorie, um 
gerechtfertigt zu werden. Daraus folgt zwar nicht, dass man sein Handeln de facto immer rechtfertigen 
kann. Dass man das nicht kann, ist aber (…) aus logischen Gründen die Ausnahme. Ich spreche dabei 
aus der Perspektive auf das je eigene Handeln. (Rödl 1998, p. 59)114 
 
Rödl pinpoints the relation between self-consciousness and normativity on the one hand and 
rational agency on the other as a reciprocal dependence between self-reference (“I”) and the 
concept of action: 
 
                                                 
113 Cf. below, Ch. 5.3, 5.4. 
114 Cf. Wittgenstein, PU § 345. 
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Der bewusste Selbstbezug konstituiert sich im Handeln, und man handelt wesentlich in der ‘ich’-
Perspektive. (Op.cit., p. 62) 
 
To Rödl, an irreducibly normative aspect of action is displayed by this relation:  
 
Handlungen schreibt man sich irreduzibel normative zu. Normativ: Dass ich etwas tue, hat für mich die 
normative Bedeutung, dass ich es darin als das bejahe, was ich tun soll. Indem ich sage, was ich tue, 
sage ich, was (für mich, hier und jetzt) zu tun richtig ist. Ich charakterisiere mich normativ. – 
Irreduzibel: Ich kann aus der Aussage ‘Ich tue dies’ ihren normativen Sinn – dass ich darin auf die 
ethische Frage antworte – nicht herauslösen. Ich kann keinen Anteil ihres Gehalts isolieren. Denn ich 
habe keine deskriptive Perspektive auf mein eigenes Handeln. Ich kann mich auf das, was ich tue, nicht 
neutral beziehen, so, dass hinsichtlich der Frage ‘Was soll ich tun?’ nichts entschieden wird. (Loc.cit.) 
 
Rödl approach to self-reference is to a large extent based on Ernst Tugendhat’s critique in 
Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie, directed against traditional theories of 
meaning as “aboutness”.115 In this connection, Tugendhat discusses the relation between self-
consciousness, consciousness in action and consciousness of objects. He refers to a comment 
by Kant, stating that concepts like totality and eternity are comprehensible only on the basis 
of a concept of successive action. This is why, for Kant, a concept of synthetic action – the 
synthesis of a multiple according to rules – constitutes the basis for the understanding of 
consciousness in general, or at least of the cognition of objects, which is the consciousness 
that Kant calls experience.116 Tugendhat continues: 
 
Nun ist das Bewusstsein, das jemand von seinem Handeln hat und d.h. von der Regel, die er in seinem 
Handeln befolgt, wiederum nicht das Bewusstsein eines Gegenstandes. Kant hat also nicht nur auch 
Bewusstseinsweisen berücksichtigt, die nicht gegenständlich sind; vielmehr wurde für ihn ein 
bestimmtes nichtgegenständliches Bewusstsein – ein Handlungsbewusstsein – konstitutiv für das 
Bewusstsein von Gegenständen. (Tugendhat 1976, p. 83) 
 
However, Tugendhat adds, Kant remains oriented towards objectual consciousness. The only 
consciousness in action that Kant speaks of is the kind that is constitutive for the 
consciousness of objects and their relations in space and time. He does not attempt to develop 
this into a general theory of consciousness in action.117  
                                                 
115 “Gegenstandstheorie der Bedeutung”, cf. Tugendhat 1976, p. 83. 
116 Cf. KrV, B 103. 
117 Cf. above, Ch. 2.5, and Wolfgang Becker’s article, ”Zum Handlungsbegriff in Kants theoretischer 
Philosophie”, (1987). 
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According to Tugendhat, Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit is the first attempt to liberate the 
understanding of consciousness from its traditional orientation towards objects. A tactical 
move of Heidegger’s is to replace the concept of consciousness with a more connotation-free 
concept, “Ersclossenheit”, in order to free himself from his teacher Husserl’s idea of 
consciousness as intentionally directed towards objects. What Heidegger attempts is to show 
that self-consciousness should not be seen as a version of object consciousness. He 
distinguishes Dasein as a form of being that is constantly involved in self-interpretation.118 
Normative self-reference is placed at the very core of human existence: 
  
Dasein ist Seiendes, das sich in seinem Sein verstehend zu diesem Sein verhält.  
(Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, § 12) 
 
In Selbstbewusstsein und Selbstbestimmung (1979) Tugendhat explores a concept of 
“Sichzusichverhaltens”. His examination of how self-consciousness is expressed in language 
is, despite critical distance, inspired by Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and its thematic focus on 
the “meaning of being” [“Sinn von Sein”].119 It is in this context that Rödl sees the concept of 
action as constitutive for self-consciousness. Being a subject simply is to act and to be 
conscious in acting: 
 
Subjektivität konstituiert sich im Handeln. Handeln ist nicht etwas, das ein Subjekt auch noch kann, 
keine Möglichkeit, die ein Subjekt auch noch hat, sondern: Als Subjekt dasein heißt handeln. (Rödl 
1998,  p. 64) 
 
This normative approach to self-consciousness and action is contrasted with what Rödl calls 
the metaphysical perspective, defined as a “view from the side” on one’s own thinking and 
justification:120 
 
                                                 
118 As Charles Taylor points out, such self-interpretation involves self-evaluation, in particular what he calls 
strong evaluation, “where we evaluate, that is, consider good/bad, desirable/despicable, our desires themselves” 
(Taylor 1985, p. 65). Strong evaluation is what shows itself in our ability to condemn an act despite our 
motivation to do it. Taylor argues further that an intersubjective language is constitutive for our existence as self-
interpreting and -evaluating animals (cf. op.cit. p. 68ff.). 
119 Cf. Tugendhat 1979, 8. Vorlesung. “Meaning” is here understood ambiguously. When we speak of the 
meaning of actions and people we are not just talking about the reference of a word, but more generally about the 
question: What is the purpose (of this action, of this work of art, of my life)? This is particularly clear when it 
comes to human existence: “Das Leben eines Menschen ist der Gesamtzusammenhang seines Handelns. Daher 
fragen wir auch beim Leben eines Menschen, insbesondere beim eigenen Leben – und hier mit einer besonderen 
Betroffenheit – nach seinem Sinn: ist etwas damit bezweckt, bzw. was ist es, was ich selbst damit will?”  
(Tugendhat 1979, p. 168) 
120 Cf. Rödl 1998, p. 153.  
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‘Metaphysisch’ nenne ich den Standpunkt, auf dem man steht, wenn man sein Meinen und 
Rechtfertigen von der Seite anschaut. Es ist der Standpunkt, auf dem man nicht im Rechtfertigen 
Zugang zur Wirklichkeit hat, sondern sein Rechtfertigen an der Wirklichkeit misst. (Op.cit., p. 153) 
  
This “side perspective” is equivalent to Thomas Nagel’s “view from nowhere”,121 within 
which any self-reference is a reference to “the objective I”. The ultimate ideal is to overcome 
all “I”-talk. Knowledge expressed by the use of indexical expressions is regarded as defective. 
Husserl’s “ideal speech” and Quine’s “canonic notation” are examples of index-free 
languages brought forward as metaphysical ideals. Against this, Rödl argues that the idea of a 
perspective-free, subject-free knowledge is senseless:  
 
Der Bezug auf sich als an einem bestimmten Ort ist ein unabtrennbarer Teil des Begriffs eines 
räumlichen Gegenstands. (…) Die Vorstellung eines perspektivlosen Erkennens ist in sich sinnwidrig. 
Was als Bedingung ausgegeben wird, unter der das Erkennen ideal ist, ist eine Bedingung, unter [der] es 
unmöglich ist. (Op.cit. p. 164) 
 
To ascribe perceptual knowledge to myself involves placing myself in a certain position in 
relation to the characterised object; thus perception and spatial positioning are inseparable. 
This means that when I refer to myself, I necessarily refer to a spatial being, a Heideggerian 
“Leib”: 
 
Meine Identität als erfahrende Wesen und meine Identität als räumliches Wesen können nicht 
auseinanderfallen, weil der normative Zusammenhang meiner sinnlichen Erfahrung die Kontinuität 
meines Lebensweges im Raum einschließt. (Op.cit. p. 152)122  
 
Like Brandom, Rödl contrasts his own normative theory of meaning with a metaphysical 
theory of meaning as representation. According to a common version of the latter theory, to 
think something is to be in a certain mental state, which according to certain laws or 
regularities of nature, results from other states.123 The relation between the thought ‘that p’ 
and the fact that p is reduced to a statistic or causal relation, hence not recognised as a 
conceptual relation. In this way, Rödl argues, the relationship between truth and justification 
is dissolved in such a way that all truth talk ultimately becomes senseless. 
                                                 
121 Cf. Rödl 1998, p. 160. 
122 Although Rödl here presents a sound critique against e.g. Nagel, it is imperative to also maintain Tugendhat’s 
(and Brandom’s) point, that we do have access to index-free, objective sentences – although these are necessarily 
rooted in a plurality of perspectives. Cf. below, Ch. 6.4. 
123 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is an example of an alternative representationalist theory, where the truth conditions 
of a representation are different from its causal conditions. 
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We ascribe opinions, reasons, and perceptions to ourselves normatively. When I 
ascribe a belief to myself in propositions like “I believe that p”, I do not internally point to 
certain mental states within myself.124 Similarly, when ascribing an action to myself, I do not 
rationally justify this by internally pointing to certain mental states, e.g. impressions or 
intentions, that have caused it. I ascribe an action to myself from a normative “I”- perspective. 
Action and belief are the two dimensions of normative self-reference. I normatively ascribe 
actions and beliefs to myself – as opposed to descriptively reporting them. Rödl calls this the 
“inner perspective”: 
 
Man bezieht sich auf das eigene Meinen und Handeln nicht deskriptiv, nicht so, dass man es feststellt, 
konstatiert und darüber berichtet. Meinungen und Handlungen schreibt man sich normativ zu. Und 
dieser Bezug auf ein Sollen ist das, was eine Perspektive zur Innenperspektive macht, was bewussten 
Selbstbezug und Subjektivität konstituiert. (Op.cit. p. 49) 
 
According to the causal theory of action, behaviour can be described as intentional action if it 
can be rationally justified by pointing to certain attitudes. As argued above, in Chapter 3, this 
approach is unable to account for the circumstance that actions are carried out.125 Rödl puts 
heavy emphasis on this performative aspect, the “carrying out”, singling this out as our 
particular form of life, the way we relate to our own existence: 
 
Ein Haus (…) ist so da, dass es steht, ein Tier so, dass  es lebt, ein Mench aber so, dass er seine Existenz 
vollzieht. Wenn wir sagen, wie ein Mench seine Existenz vollzieht, sprechen wir nicht über 
Eigenschaften und Zustände, sondern darüber, wie er da ist. (Op.cit., p. 77) 
 
Charles Taylor described human beings as self-interpreting animals. This self-interpretation is 
not something external to the human being, but its defining characteristic. To Rödl, this is the 
core of the normative perspective: 
 
Indem ich mich zu meinem Sein verhalte, betrachte ich nicht mein Sein, ich vollziehe es. Das 
Selbstverhältnis im menschlichen Sein ist kein theoretisches, sondern ein praktisches Selbstverhältnis. 
(Loc.cit.) 
 
The error of determinism, according to Rödl, is that it fails to acknowledge that the meaning 
of the terms “can” and “possible” changes depending on whether one adopts an assertoric 
                                                 
124 Cf. Wittgenstein, PU II, x. 
125 Cf. above, Ch. 3.6; cf. Keil 2000a, p. 143: “In der kausalistischen Handlungsdefinition fällt der Umstand 
unter den Tisch, daβ Handlungen vollzogen oder ausgeführt werden”. 
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[feststellenden] or a performative [vollziehenden] perspective. “This or that can happen” 
means that I don’t know what will happen (from an assertoric perspective). “I can do this or 
that” means that I exist in such a way that I take a stand on, and decide about, my own being 
(from a performative perspective). It is the latter, the performative aspect of human existence 
that we discuss under the heading “free agency”: 
 
Das kann man auch so ausdrücken, dass dieses Sein frei ist. Dabei bezeichnet ’frei’ keine Eigenschaft 
des menschlichen Seins, sondern seine Struktur als Vollziehen. (Op.cit., p. 79)126 
  
According to Rödl’s account, the question of whether one can scientifically prove the 
existence of human action is a grammatical confusion, on a level with questions such as 
whether machines can think. 
 Rödl makes extensive use of the inner-outer metaphor in his approach to the 
normative. Our attitudes towards our own actions and beliefs belong, as we have seen, to the 
“inner perspective”. However, this seemingly dualistic approach is countered through his 
critique of what he calls the “Cartesian fallacy”; the presupposition that the I is not a part of 
the world.127 Rödl diagnoses the Cartesian fallacy in its undisguised versions, such as in 
Thomas Nagel’s, and in more hidden versions such as those presented by Tugendhat and 
Strawson. It reveals itself as the underlying premise of recognising the corporeality of the 
subject by way of recognising other bodies. Rödl repudiates this fallacy in a Kantian 
manner,128 by arguing that an ability to refer to objects in space already implies placing 
oneself in a spatial relation to such objects: 
 
Die Idee des Raumes hat keinen Gehalt unabhängig von der Idee der eigenen Position im Raum. 
(Op.cit. p. 48) 
 
Subjects – both oneself and others – can only be referred to as embodied, as “Leib”. In this 
way Rödl stays clear of the crudest charges of dualism. Nevertheless a certain dualistic 
tendency seems to linger in the way he postulates watertight compartments between the 
performative and the assertoric perspective: 
  
                                                 
126 Cf. Wellmer 1991, p. 181: “[D]as Sein des sprachlichen Sinns, der Freiheit, der Wahrheit, der Vernunft [ist] 
ein performatives Sein […], ein Sein, das sich erst in der performativen Einstellung sprachlich 
kommunizierender Subjekte konstituiert und nur in ihr sich erhält” – cf. below, Ch. 6.9. 
127 Cf. Rödl 1998, p. 35ff 
128 Cf. e.g. Kant: “Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume” (1768) and “Was heißt: 
Sich im Denken orientieren” (1786) (Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademieausgabe Bd. II and Bd. VIII). 
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In der konstatierenden Perspektive lässt sich Freiheit nicht thematisieren. (Op.cit. p. 79)129 
 
Rödl argues that the subject of freedom belongs solely within the “performing perspective” of 
“carrying out”, and cannot be looked at from an assertoric perspective. This suggests that 
freedom can only be recognised from the first-person perspective. But in that case Rödl, like 
Kant, faces a “methodological-solipsistic” problem regarding how the freedom of other 
subjects can be recognised.130 
 On the other hand, Rödl argues that my subjectivity is given to me only to the degree 
that other subjects are equally given to me.131 This is Rödl’s version of the Intersubjectivity 
Thesis, which will be presented in some of its versions in the next chapter.132 Like 
Wittgenstein, Rödl bases this thesis on the demand for independent linguistic standards. 
Whether there are other subjects is not a puzzle for me to solve from the assertoric 
perspective, but something I recognise simply by being a subject myself: 
 
Und deshalb sollte man nicht sagen, ich erkenne, dass jemand ein Subjekt ist. Angemessener ist es zu 
sagen, dass ich ihn als Subjekt anerkenne. (Op.cit. p. 268) 
 
This should clear Rödl from the charge of methodological solipsism. However, it seems to me 
that he to a certain degree underplays the possibility of transitions between what is part of, 
and what is the limit of experience, in the sense that free agency is not only recognized in 
direct I-you communication, but also ascribed to other subjects who we speak about. This is 
an insight that is not captured by the inner-outer metaphor, but comes into vision through a 
closer examination of the grammatical structure of ordinary language. Wittgenstein’s 
paragraphs on the special “infallible” expression in the first person present tense, Searle and 
Habermas’s theory of the performative-propositional double structure of speech, and 
Tugendhat’s display of a system of interchangeable expressions are among the ways of 
bringing the possibilities of transitions between a performative first-person perspective and 
other perspectives into sight. This topic will be treated in Chapter 6.  
Before moving in that direction, however, I will take a closer look at some underlying 
elements of a normative approach to action. In Chapter 5, I take Searle’s concept of a “circle 
                                                 
129 Cf. below Ch. 7.3; cf. Habermas 2006, p. 671: “Für den Beobachter ist die Frage, ob die Person auch anders 
hätte handeln können, kein Thema”. 
130 Cf. above, Ch. 2.5. 
131 Cf. Rödl 1998, p. 268f. 
132 Cf. below, Ch. 5.3. 
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of intentionality” as my point of departure from which to look at the relationship between 
normativity and intersubjectivity. 
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Chapter 5: The intersubjective basis of normativity 
 
 
Die logische Geltung von Argumenten kann nicht überprüft werden, 
ohne im Prinzip eine Gemeinschaft von Denkern vorauszusetzen, die zur 
intersubjektiven Verständigung und Konsensusbildung befähigt sind. 
(Apel 1973, p. 399) 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction: Understanding normativity 
 
In Chapter 4, I argued that a distinctive feature of being a language user and a rational agent is 
to be subject to normative standards. I will follow up this argument here, by arguing that the 
use of language presupposes a community of language users, in other words that all language 
is intersubjective. The “logical space of reasons” (Sellars) is a space that opens up between a 
plurality of rational subjects and the world. Karl-Otto Apel’s phrase “Verständigung über 
etwas” expresses the complementarity between understanding and agreement: An 
observational subject-object relation is only attainable for subjects within a community of 
language users, who are able to reach an agreement between them on questions of true and 
false, right and wrong. 
 A further question I pursue in this chapter is whether it is possible to view the 
“normative space of reasons” as a purely logical space, or whether morality must somehow be 
viewed as fundamental to understanding. According to Kant, a “people of devils” – a 
community where no one is bound by ethical norms or morality – may be capable of acting 
rationally, in the sense of establishing a good political order, “if only they have 
intelligence”.133 However, if epistemic normativity must be explicated on the basis of the 
moral law - as Kant in other passages comes close to suggesting - this scenario seems to 
                                                 
133 Cf. Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Akademienausgabe) Bd. VIII; p. 366 (“Zum ewigen Frieden”). 
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become an impossible one, or at least would have to be viewed as a borderline case of 
rationality. 
I begin by looking at what Searle calls “the circle of intentionality”, thereby trying to 
encircle the way concepts such as mind, normativity, and intersubjectivity stand in relation to 
each other (5.2). In this section, I also comment on how a normative approach to language and 
agency confronts the ideals of analytic naturalism. In 5.3, the thesis of the intersubjectivity of 
language is examined in its different versions, prompting a closer look at the role of the 
second person (5.4). The chapter ends with a discussion of the sources of normativity, and 
specifically the relationship between epistemic normativity and morality (5.5). 
 
 
5.2 Will the circle be unbroken? – Searle on intentionality and normativity 
 
Intentionality, in its minimal sense of directedness, may be seen as a feature common to all 
living creatures as well as to a great deal of complex machinery. Examining such 
intentionality in its various forms and expressions constitutes substantial and interesting fields 
of study; think of the similarities and differences between intentional states in different life-
forms, or the similarities and differences between “live” intentionality and the form we find in 
robots. However, in this particular inquiry, the focus is on intentionality in the sense of 
discursive practice, the propositional kind that has been labelled by Robert Brandom “the 
fanciest sort of intentionality”.134 The aim of such an inquiry is, as he reminds us, not to deny 
or diminish the relevance or value of lower grades of intentionality. Rather: 
 
The aim is to understand ourselves as judgers and agents. (Brandom 1994, p. 7) 
 
Higher-grade intentionality is the common denominator for several of the key concepts of this 
thesis: Freedom, rational agency, mind, language, and intersubjectivity. These are 
phenomena, capacities, or qualities that are co-instantiated in human beings. The concepts can 
only to a limited degree be explicated independently of each other. We could say that they 
must be explicated holistically. This holism can be expressed with reference to what John 
Searle has called “the circle of Intentionality”: 
 
Any attempt to characterize Intentionality must inevitably use Intentional notions. (Searle 1979, p. 90) 
                                                 
134 Cf. Brandom 1994, p. 7. 
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 Searle has further stated that intentionality has a normative structure.135 This is in line with 
John McDowell’s thesis of the normative relation between mind and world: 
 
To make sense of the idea of a mental state’s or episode’s being directed towards the world, in the way 
which, say, a belief or judgement is, we need to put the state or episode in a normative context. 
(McDowell 1994 p. xi) 
 
Searle seems to diagnose intentionality and normativity as constituents of a hermeneutic circle 
– one that we should not attempt to break, but rather to enter in the right way in order to allow 
the concepts to clarify each other.136 However, he himself has apparently made several 
attempts to break the circularity that he diagnosed as inevitable. In Intentionality (1983), he 
makes the following programmatic comment, connecting intentionality to an altogether 
different kind of circularity: 
 
[C]onsciousness and Intentionality are as much a part of human biology as digestion or the circulation 
of the blood. (Searle 1983, p. ix)  
 
In Rationality in Action (2001), Searle elaborates on how intentionality and normativity 
should be viewed as entirely biological phenomena, since animals are as bound by it as 
human agents: 
 
[I]f you think about matters from the point of view of sweaty biological beasts like ourselves, 
normativity is pretty much everywhere (…) If an animal has a belief, the belief is subject to the norms 
of truth, rationality, and consistency. If an animal has intentions, those intentions can succeed or fail 
(…) From the point of view of the animal, there is no escape from normativity. The bare representation 
of an is gives the animal an ought. (Searle 2001, p. 182f.)  
 
Searle has argued (against among others Daniel Dennett137) that all conscious creatures are 
capable of what he calls intrinsic intentionality. Intrinsic intentionality is the distinguishing 
mark of conscious states, and is contrasted with the derived intentionality of other things, such 
as sentences. Only conscious minds are capable of intrinsic intentionality, whereas e.g. 
complex computers or robots only possess intentionality derived from the intrinsic 
                                                 
135 Cf. Searle 2001, p. 182. 
136 Cf. above, Ch. 3.5. 
137 Cf. Searle 1990. 
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intentionality of conscious minds. Conscious states are, according to Searle, distinguished by 
their “first-person ontology”.138 To Searle, the thesis of first-person ontology serves as a 
safeguard against objective, scientific reductions of consciousness, so as to steer clear of the 
Scylla of materialism. At the same time, however, he maintains that consciousness must be 
regarded as a completely natural, biological phenomenon, and thus attempts to avoid the 
Charybdis of dualism. However, it is not clear to me how Searle intends to solve the mind-
body problem simply by insisting that the mind is both irreducibly subjective and a biological 
phenomenon. He must somehow show how these two facts come together. 
In Selbstbezug und Normativität, Sebastian Rödl criticises Searle’s concept of intrinsic 
intentionality, and identifies it as an instance of what he calls “Cartesian ontology”. Searle’s 
argument for the irreducibility of a first-person perspective is based on the idea that being in a 
certain mental state is something to which I have a direct access. My mental states are 
transparent to me – as opposed to the mental states of others. Rödl argues that this way of 
thinking ultimately leaves Searle defenceless against solipsism as well as scepticism. Since 
the intrinsically intentional states of other people can be experienced only indirectly by me, I 
must base my assumptions on an inference by analogy; from my own “inner life” to the 
existence of other people’s “inner life”. However, no facts or experiences can count as 
evidence or even as support for such an assumption, hence the ascription of mental states to 
other subjects is meaningless. The idea of intrinsic intentional states also suggests that my 
access to reality through e.g. visual experience can somehow be justified. However: 
 
Die Vorstellung, ich müsste begründen oder sonstwie ausweisen, dass ich im visuellen Erleben Zugang 
zur Wirklichkeit habe, dass ich also wirklich sehe, ist leer. Die Selbstzuschreibung visueller Eindrücke 
hat einen irreduzibel normativen Sinn. Visuelle Eindrücke vermitteln als solche Erkenntnis. Das ist aber 
unvereinbar mit der Idee, der Gehalt solcher Eindrücke sei durch innere Natur bestimmt, sie seien 
intrinsisch intentionale Zustände. (Rödl 1998, p. 245) 
 
In his 1994 article “Searle, Leibniz and ‘The First Person’”, Audun Øfsti points out 
that Searle, despite his brilliant observations on the first-person perspective in some contexts, 
paradoxically seems to fall back on an objectivist outlook in others. Øfsti’s point of departure 
is a passage in Searle’s Intentionality, where he presents Leibniz’s argument in Monadologie 
(§ 17), saying that if we could enter into a “thinking, feeling and perceiving” machine as we 
enter into a mill, we still would not find anything by which to explain perception. Searle 
                                                 
138 Cf. Searle 1998, p. 52. 
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accuses Leibniz of “proving too much”; the same could be said about water, he claims, since 
“the behaviour of H2O molecules can never explain the liquidity of water”.139 Øfsti argues 
that Searle overlooks Leibniz’s sound point. This does not, as Searle seems to suggest, 
concern the incompleteness of our scientific methods. Rather, it concerns the “non-
circumventability” of the first-person perspective in the sense that this can never be accounted 
for from an “external”, third-person perspective: 
 
Searle’s attempt to illustrate the relationship between physical and mental, ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ (third 
person and first person) remains within the frame of a third person perspective, as a matter of speaking 
of ‘it’ on different levels, without having recourse to the first person. (Øfsti 1994, p. 687) 140 
 
Searle appears to show a similar neglect of the first-person perspective in a recent debate with 
Habermas. While Habermas argues that the “language game of responsible agency” requires a 
participant’s perspective and thus cannot be completely replaced by an objectivistic “language 
game of neuroscience”141, Searle counters that the two language games “give different levels 
of descriptions of the same system”.142 To this it can be replied that a characteristic mark of 
the participating perspective is that it is not a description of a state of affairs.143 
Although Searle emphasises the irreducibility of the first person, he seems to – at least 
partly – misconstrue this in an objectivistic sense. To me it seems that Searle fails to 
appreciate the “infrastructure” necessary in order to establish a first-person perspective. Being 
intentionally directed at something is not sufficient to constitute a genuine first-person 
perspective. In Chapter 6, I will argue that a first-person perspective is possible only within a 
                                                 
139 Cf. Searle 1983, p. 268. 
140 Øfsti also compliments Searle’s anti-dualist efforts. According to Øfsti, however, a certain dualism is 
appropriate, just not the troublesome dualism within the world that Searle attacks: “The fundamental dualism 
(which is perhaps not so troublesome after all, when seen in the proper light) is the dualism between the world 
(as a whole) and (the) ‘we’ living in it, that is once more the dualism between ‘the first person’ and ‘the third 
person’ (the world)” (op.cit, p. 686). In the adjoining footnotes, Øfsti elaborates on how the meaning of 
psychological verb phrases necessarily has two roots, and that both a first-person perspective and a third-person 
perspective are necessary elements of a complete language. I will come back to this decisive argument in 
Chapter 6. The term dualism seems, however, to point in the wrong direction here, since what Øfsti wants to 
display is a necessary unity of language in the form of a system involving declination between first and third 
person, i.e. transitions between different perspectives, cf. Øfsti 2002, p. 126, fn. 46: “Der Preis der Dualismus 
darf nicht bezahlt werden. Oder besser: Der Dualismus zerstört ja auch auf seiner Weise den entscheidenden 
Punkt (durch ‘Entspannung’)”. On the problem of avoiding dualism, cf. below, Ch. 6 and 7. 
141 Cf. Habermas 2007a; cf. below, Ch. 7.1. 
142 Cf. Searle 2007, p. 69. 
143 Cf. also Habermas’ reply to Searle in Habermas 2007, p. 89ff. 
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full-fledged language where propositional content can be maintained through different 
speakers’ perspectives.144 
Robert Brandom differentiates between sapience and sentience: 
 
Sentience is what we share with non-verbal animals such as cats – the capacity to be aware in the sense 
of being awake. Sentience, which so far as our understanding yet reaches is an exclusively biological 
phenomenon, is in turn to be distinguished from the mere reliable differential responsiveness we 
sentients share with artifacts such as thermostats and land mines. Sapience concerns understanding or 
intelligence, rather than irritability or arousal. One is treating something as sapient insofar as one 
explains its behavior by attributing to it intentional states such as belief and desire as constituting 
reasons for that behavior. (Brandom 1994, p. 5) 
 
John Haugeland, Brandom’s Pittsburgh colleague, draws the line in question between intrinsic 
and ersatz intentionality. Haugeland argues that 
 
animal intentionality is ersatz because (or to the extent that) animals do not (…) submit themselves to 
norms. (Haugeland 1998, p. 303) 
 
A dog cannot, in other words, evaluate its own intentional states according to normative 
standards such as truth or validity. Being intentionally directed at something – e.g. believing 
something – is not tantamount to being bound by norms. Although it makes sense to say that a 
dog believes that a bone is buried in a certain place, and although the dog’s belief might be 
said to be true or false, it is not the dog, but us – the concept users – who apply the normative 
standard of truth. 
The unbreakable circle of intentionality may be seen as the antithesis to a programme 
of analytic naturalism, which in turn may be defined broadly as the thesis that normative 
concepts can be explained in terms of natural properties.145 Jerry Fodor, a well-known 
critique of holism, thus expresses the interest naturalism would have in “breaking the circle”:   
 
                                                 
144 Cf. Tugendhat 1976. Cf. also Carson 2002, p. 60f. on the role of evaluation and normative statements in a 
complete language. 
145 Such attempts are often categorised as examples of naturalistic fallacy. The concept stems from G.E. Moore’s 
Principia Ethica (1903). Moore argues that any attempt to analyse the concept “good” constitutes the 
committing of a naturalistic fallacy. This has later been constructed as the confusion of describing and evaluating 
(see e.g. Hare), and broader with the “is-ought problem” commonly traced back to a section in David Hume’s 
Treatise, and reappearing in numerous versions in post-Humean philosophy. I avoid using the concept 
“naturalistic fallacy” here, since the approach of analytic naturalism, however problematic, does not in itself 
seem to constitute a fallacy (cf. Keil 2004, p. 16). 
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Given any (…) suitable break of the intentional circle, it would be reasonable to claim that the main 
philosophical problem about intentionality had been solved. (Fodor 1990, p. 52) 
 
 If sufficient conditions for an intentional phenomenon could be stated using purely non-
intentional terms this would count as a successful breach of the circle, whereupon the 
naturalist could count upon a veritable domino effect.146 
Against Searle’s attempt, as well as other efforts to “break the circle”, this, I suggest 
that action is irreducibly normative. This implies that normative phenomena cannot be 
naturalised in the analytical sense, i.e. cannot be redefined in non-normative terms. We could 
easily get the impression that a fruitful discussion between analytic naturalism and the 
position defended in this chapter ends here. It is not easy to see how we can move on from 
this point. A naturalistic, and admittedly even a natural response to the claim that the 
intentional circle cannot be broken, is to conclude that it puts a stop to not only this 
discussion, but to explanation in general. From a naturalist perspective, it would seem to 
constitute a case of “apriorism”, i.e. of answering prematurely what should be left to further 
scientific research. If the intentional circle cannot be broken, then how do we analyse 
normativity further? A great part of the philosophical debate on this topic seems to consist of 
the attacks on and defences of different versions of naturalism. Nevertheless, real 
contributions to knowledge may sometimes arise from such apparently dead-locked 
controversies. Geert Keil comments on how a proper critique of naturalism can improve our 
insight into the phenomena in question: 
 
Der Erkenntnisgewinn einer solchen Kritik des Naturalismus (…) besteht in einer verbesserten Einsicht 
in die Größe des intentionalen Zirkels, in die Menge der Phänomene, die sich in ihm verfangen. (Keil 
2000b, p. 202) 
 
Thus, a positive outcome of an anti-naturalistic insistence on the ineliminable dimension of 
normativity is hopefully an “improved insight” into the size and substance of the intentional 
circle. 
 
 
 
                                                 
146 Cf. Keil 2000b, p. 196. 
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 5.3 The Intersubjectivity Thesis 
 
Intersubjective understanding may be seen as the common denominator of the phenomena 
constituting the circle of intentionality, stitching together concepts such as language and 
mind, rationality and normativity. My approach to free agency is based on what we may call 
the Intersubjectivity Thesis,147 which we may tentatively formulate thus: 
  
IT 1: All language is intersubjective. 
 
The Intersubjectivity Thesis can be viewed as an attempt to express the essence of 
Wittgenstein’s so-called Private Language Argument (PLA). Stated plainly, a private 
language is a language that “another person cannot understand”.148 Throughout the 
Philosophical Investigation, Wittgenstein argues that such a language is unthinkable, since it 
would be impossible for the speaker to maintain a “private” meaning of the linguistic 
expressions. 
The content and extent of the PLA has been the source of philosophical controversy 
for half a century. The dividing line is found between proponents of the weaker thesis: “A 
language that in principle cannot be understood by more than one speaker is impossible”, and 
proponents of the stronger thesis: “A language that de facto is not understood by more than 
one speaker is impossible”. Wittgenstein’s own formulations on private languages are 
notoriously ambiguous. In numerous passages he seems to be launching a strong 
Intersubjectivity Thesis;149 however, he never formulates such a thesis explicitly. On the 
contrary, some passages rather seem to point towards a relativisation of the thesis.150  
Many Wittgenstein commentators draw the conclusion that all that the PLA demands 
from a language is that the words refer to something in the world so that other speakers could 
understand them, whether or not such speakers actually exist. This view corresponds to a 
“weak” Intersubjectivity Thesis:151 
 
                                                 
147 Cf. Wellmer 2004, e.g. p. 114. 
148 Cf. Wittgenstein, PU § 243. 
149 Cf. e.g. PU §§ 77 and 560, on the learnability of language.  
150 Cf. e.g. PU § 199: “It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person 
obeyed a rule” is ambiguous, but seems to suggest that an isolated person – a “Mowgli” – possibly can follow a 
rule – as long as he does so more than once.  
151 Cf. Wellmer 2002, p. 109. 
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IT 2: All language is potentially intersubjective, since all language use in principle 
must be interpretable by other language users. 
 
Defenders of IT 2 often emphasise certain passages in Philosophical Investigation that 
pinpoint the importance of external criteria for meaning, such as § 293 on the beetle in the 
box.  
An alternative group of Wittgenstein interpreters, including Kripke and Davidson, 
emphasise paragraphs on rules and the normative aspect of meaning and understanding, such 
as § 202: 
 
And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. 
Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be 
the same thing as obeying it.  
 
Saul Kripke analyses sentences that specify the meaning of linguistic expressions, such as 
“By ‘and’ X means: plus.”152 Basically, he emphasises the normative aspect of linguistic 
meaning: To understand a linguistic expression means to know how to apply it correctly. 
Kripke promotes the interpretation of the PLA that a private language is impossible since in 
order to mean something you must also be able to understand, i.e. to interpret other speakers. 
The reason why a language requires a plurality of speakers is that the speaker of a language 
necessarily is an interpreter of other speakers.  
Arguably, Kripke’s version of the PLA goes well beyond what can be read out of 
Wittgenstein’s own formulations, giving rise to widespread criticism as well as to the 
nickname “Kripkenstein”. Albrecht Wellmer agrees that there are certain problematic aspects 
of Kripke’s Wittgenstein reading. Nevertheless he argues that Kripke’s emphasis on the 
normative aspect of sentences that specify meaning constitutes a decisive reinforcement of the 
PLA, in sound opposition to Wittgenstein’s own hesitation regarding the crucial issue of 
intersubjectivity.153  
Donald Davidson is also a defender of a strong reading of the PLA.154 Basically, like 
Kripke, Davidson investigates the reciprocal structure of language; however, his argument 
takes a different approach. Following on Tarski’s theory of meaning and Quine’s theory of 
radical translation, Davidson arrives at a general theory of linguistic understanding as 
                                                 
152 Cf. Kripke 1982, p. 7ff. 
153 Cf. Wellmer 2004, p. 110f. 
154 Cf. e.g. Davidson 2000/2001a. 
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interpretation. Whereas Wittgenstein emphasises that language is a common practice, 
Davidson focuses on the plurality of perspectives within language. In order to understand 
another language user you must always interpret her expressions, and the perspective of the 
interpreter is always different from that of the speaker. Understanding therefore requires a 
“principle of charity”, i.e. an (implicit) assumption of a maximum of truth of the speaker’s 
beliefs.  
The principle of charity is, we might say, the analytic philosophy’s equivalent to a 
hermeneutic principle à la Gadamer’s, stating that the understanding of another speaker 
requires a normative “anticipation of completeness”.  Davidson, however, moves beyond a 
basic hermeneutic principle and argues that each of us, in order to understand other speakers, 
must “radically translate” their expressions. It is not only the interpretation of utterances in 
foreign languages, but all understanding that ultimately follows the pattern of radical 
translation. According to this account, Wittgenstein’s idea of a common language seems to 
dissolve into a myriad of private languages sharing a common set of interpretation rules.155  
Against this, Wellmer makes it clear that the paradigm of communication is mutual 
understanding within a language, and not the radical translation of two interpreters with 
separate languages. He modifies Davidson’s principle of charity by dismissing the assumption 
of (mostly) true beliefs, and instead embraces an assumption of the rationality and linguistic 
competence of one’s co-speakers. He also generalises Davidson’s approach, in the sense that 
he moves from a theory of the meaning of propositions to a theory of the pragmatic meaning 
of speech acts. On a general level, however, Wellmer endorses the hermeneutic premise that 
serves as the foundation of Davidson’s theory as a safeguard against sceptical arguments. 
Davidson argues that distinctions between “true” and “false”, “right” and “wrong” 
only make sense within a space of mutual interpretation. Thus, like Kripke, he arrives at a 
strong version of the Intersubjectivity Thesis: 
  
IT 3: Language is essentially intersubjective, since communication with other 
language users is a condition for the use of language.156 
                                                 
155 According to Brandom, the Davidsonian approach ultimately displays a Kantian dualism, cf. Brandom 1994, 
p. 615: “Essential elements of Kant’s dualistic conception of concepts are still with us today. They are the basis 
for the suspicion evinced by some (for instance Davidson) that talk of concepts inevitably commits us to a 
picture in which they play the role of epistemological intermediaries, which stand between us and the world we 
conceptualize and forever bring in to question the very possibility of genuine cognitive access to what lies 
beyond them.”   
156 Cf. Davidson 2000, p. 407: “[E]s (kann) keine private Sprache geben (…), d.h. keine Sprache, die nur ein 
einzelnes Wesen versteht. (…) Was (…) erforderlich ist, ist Interaktion zwischen mindestens zwei Sprecher-
Interpreter” (my italics). In Davidson’s version, the PSA explicitly states the necessity of a plurality of speakers, 
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 This strong version of the Intersubjectivity Thesis underlies my approach to action and 
normativity in the last chapter and in this one. According to this approach, reasons are 
conceptually public. Reasons are public both in the sense that 1) the question of what reasons 
the agent should commit to must be determined relative to our experience as agents in the 
world, and 2) in the sense that a reason to believe something represents a commitment to 
rational standards that are in principle sharable.  
Wellmer defends IT 3, and a strong reading of the PLA, stating that the normativity of 
language is conditioned by a social practice: 
 
[D]ie Normativität des Bedeutens (muss) als die Normativität einer sozialen Sprachpraxis mitgedacht 
werden. Durch diese Normativität konstituieren sich Bedeutungen allererst. Wittgenstein verwendet zur 
Kennzeichnung dieser Normativität der sozialen Sprachpraxis auch den Begriff der Regel. (Wellmer 
2004, p. 57)  
 
He argues that there are certain “holistic-normative conditions for the ascription of beliefs”.157 
In the ascribing of beliefs in propositions like “X believes that p”, we recognise a peculiar 
reciprocity: In a strict sense I can only ascribe beliefs to a being that can equally ascribe 
beliefs to me.158 
 Wellmer relates his defence of IT 3 to Brandom’s argument that an intersubjective 
content of beliefs requires a plurality of perspectives. Brandom examines the transitions 
between de dicto and de re ascriptions of beliefs in language, i.e. between attributing the 
belief that a saying (dictum) is true and attributing the belief of or about some thing (res). He 
also examines the role of anaphora, expressions referring to other expressions, such as deictic 
expressions. He argues that the de dicto-de re transitions express the difference between 
various scorekeeping perspectives, whereas anaphoras secure the connection between them. 
These linguistic mechanisms make it possible to refer to the same belief or proposition from 
different perspectives. This is constitutive for intersubjective, situation-independent 
propositional content, as well as for successful communication. In this way, the 
representational dimension of language and the social or communicative dimension reveal 
                                                                                                                                                        
as opposed to Wittgenstein’s more carefully formulated thesis on the impossibility of a language that another 
person “nicht verstehen kann” (cf. PU § 243).   
157 Wellmer 2004, p. 142f. 
158 “In a strict sense” we cannot, in other words, ascribe beliefs or intentions to dogs, cf. above, Ch. 5.2. The 
dog’s intentionality is derived in the sense that it cannot itself apply the normative standards, e.g. of truth. 
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themselves as complementary, and not as two self-sufficient and opposed perspectives. Rather 
they are seen as two sides of the same coin: 
 
The context within which concern with what is thought and talked about arises is the assessment of how 
the judgment of one individual can serve as reasons for another. The representational content of claims 
and the beliefs they express reflect the social dimension of the game of giving and asking for reasons. 
(Brandom 2000a, p. 159, cf. above, Ch. 4.3)  
 
Brandom’s inferentialism illustrates that a plurality of speakers’ situations is what makes 
situation-independent content possible, explicating the intersubjective conditions for “truth 
talk”:159 
 
The representational dimension of propositional contents is explicated in terms of the social-
perspectival character of discursive scorekeeping and the substitutional substructure of its inferential 
articulation. In this way it is possible to understand what is involved in assessments of judgments as 
objectively true or false – as correct or incorrect in a sense that answers to the properties and relations of 
the objects they are about, rather than to the attitudes of any or all of the members of the community of 
concepts users. (Brandom 1994, p. 649) 
 
To Wellmer, Brandom’s approach constitutes a new way of formulating the strong 
Intersubjectivity Thesis: 
 
Brandoms These ist (…) eine neue Version der starken Intersubjektivitätsthese (…). Sie besagt, dass die 
Idee eines von einzelnen Sprechakten unabhängigen propositionalen Gehalts von Äußerungen – 
dasjenige also, was einen Streit über die Wahrheit von Äußerungen erst möglich macht – eine Pluralität 
von Perspektiven voraussetzt, aus denen solche propositionalen Gehalte sich artikulieren lassen. 
(Wellmer 2004, p. 131)  
 
One aspect of the Intersubjectivity Thesis is that objective truth presupposes a plurality of 
perspectives from which a situation-independent propositional content may be articulated.160 
Normative status – truth, rightness, goodness – is based on the intersubjective relations 
between speakers of a common language: 
 
                                                 
159 Cf. Brandom 1994, p. 17: “The business of truth talk is to evaluate the extent to which a state or act has 
fulfilled a certain kind of responsibility”. 
160 In this sense, Tugendhat 1976 may also be viewed as presenting a version of the Intersubjectivity Thesis, cf. 
below, Ch. 6.4. There are strong parallels between Brandom’s inferentialism and Tugendhat’s display of a 
system of interchangable expressions. 
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Die Fähigkeit zur Unterscheidung zwischen richtigen und falschen Wortverwendungen [ist] eine 
Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Unterscheidung zwischen wahren und falschen Äußerungen (…) Das 
heißt, dass die Gemeinsamkeit der Sprache und die mit ihr verbundenen Unterscheidungen zwischen 
’richtig’ und ’falsch’ nur die Voraussetzung bilden für eine normative Unterscheidung anderer Art: die 
Unterscheidung zwischen berechtigten und unberechtigten, zwischen wahren und falschen Äußerungen. 
(Op.cit, p. 123f.) 
 
An intersubjective language, with its necessary distinctions between the “correct” and 
“incorrect” use of words, is a condition for normative judgement as such, including the 
distinction between true and false. A thesis of the intersubjectivity of language is, in other 
words, a necessary element in the explanation of our ability to make normative distinctions. 
The Intersubjectivity Thesis evolves from a linguistic-pragmatic approach to truth and to 
normative statuses in general. The idea that normative statuses are instituted by normative 
attitudes is a thought that Brandom traces back to the Enlightenment:  
 
Enlightenment conceptions of the normative are distinguished by the essential role they take to be 
played by normative attitudes in instituting normative statuses. (Implicit social contract theories of 
political obligation are a case in point.) It does not make sense to talk about commitments and 
entitlements, responsibility and authority, apart from our practices of taking or treating one another as 
committed or entitled, responsible or authoritative. This thought should be understood as another holist, 
reciprocal sense dependence thesis. (Brandom 2002, p. 54)  
 
The “holist, reciprocal sense dependence thesis” may count as a version of the circle of 
intentionality, and provides the basis for a view of language as intersubjective practice. 
Language must thus be conceived of in terms of language use, in other words as a subcategory 
of, as well as a condition for, rational agency. 
 
 
5.4 The second person 
 
The Intersubjectivity Thesis states that language necessarily is a social construct. To Wellmer 
and Brandom, the intersubjectivity of language makes true statements possible. A plurality of 
perspectives is required in order to render possible a propositional content that is independent 
of the prevailing speech situation.161  Brandom criticises the traditional view of 
                                                 
161 Cf. Tugendhat 1976; cf. below, Ch. 6.4. 
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intersubjectivity, which he calls “I-we sociality”.162 This view focuses – misleadingly – on the 
contrast between a limited individual perspective and the privileged perspective of the 
community, the “we”. The approach is defective, Brandom claims, because it excludes the 
possibility that the privileged perspective is wrong. It implies that 
  
what the community takes to be correct is correct. (Brandom 1994, p. 599) 
 
Brandom’s alternative is the “I-thou sociality”, where no single perspective is privileged when 
it comes to truth: 
 
[A]ccording to the I-thou construal of intersubjectivity, each perspective is at most locally privileged, in 
that it incorporates a structural distinction between objectively correct applications of concepts and 
applications that are merely subjectively taken to be correct. (Op.cit., p. 600) 
 
Brandom attempts to re-construe the concept of objectivity: from referring to certain non-
perspectival or cross-perspectival propositional contents to concerning a particular 
perspectival form: 
 
What is shared by all discursive perspectives is that there is a difference between what is objectively 
correct in the way of concept application and what is merely taken to be so, not what it is – the 
structure, not the content. (Loc.cit.) 
 
Brandom’s approach to intersubjectivity and the possibility of objective norms has attracted 
the attention of Jürgen Habermas. In Truth and Justification (2003, German edition 1999), 
Habermas refers to Making it Explicit as    
 
a landmark in theoretical philosophy comparable to that constituted in the early seventies by A Theory 
of Justice in practical philosophy. (Habermas 2003, p. 131) 
 
Habermas emphasises that Brandom’s programme, despite its “new pragmatic vocabulary” 
and “rare combination of speculative impulse and staying power” (Loc.cit.), already has been 
sketched by others, referring specifically to his own universal pragmatics as well as the 
transcendental pragmatics of his colleague Karl-Otto Apel.163 Apart from the divergent 
vocabulary, the parallels to “Apelmasian” pragmatics are striking, although Brandom’s work 
                                                 
162 Cf. Brandom 1994, p. 599. 
163 Cf. Habermas 2003, p. 131 and fn.1. 
 102
contains no references to this tradition.164 They share predecessors like Kant and Hegel (e.g. 
on rationality), Wittgenstein (e.g. on meaning as use) and Frege (e.g. on propositions as the 
basic unit of language and thought). All three relate explicitly to American pragmatism as 
well: Apel is primarily preoccupied with the founder of American pragmatism, C.S.Peirce; 
Habermas refers frequently to G.H. Mead; and Brandom focuses on Wilfred Sellars’ 
combination of elements from American pragmatism with analytic philosophy. In my view, 
Habermas, Apel and Brandom all belong within the framework of what Brandom calls 
rational pragmatism. 
 Despite his approval of the major direction of Brandom’s work, Habermas has 
weighty critical remarks. The main point of Habermas’ critique concerns Brandom’s 
oscillation between idealist and realist ontological commitments. Another problematic aspect, 
according to Habermas, is that despite his good intentions, Brandom fails to establish a 
symmetric I-thou relation as the fundament of an intersubjective language. The reason is that 
he fails to do justice to the grammatical role of a genuine second person perspective: 
 
[Brandom] analyzes the attribution of validity claims, and their evaluation, without taking into 
consideration the complex interconnections of the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives. He 
actually construes what he calls the ‘I-thou relation’ as the relation between a first person who raises 
validity claims and a third person who attributes validity claims to the first. (Habermas 2003, p. 162) 
 
Habermas does not think that Brandom’s “I-thou relation” satisfies the conditions of a truly 
intersubjective communication. Brandom’s “thou” is not an “addressee who is expected to 
reply to the speaker”, but rather someone who merely “assesses the utterance of the speaker” 
(ibid.). In the terminology of Hans Skjervheim,165 Habermas accuses Brandom of adopting an 
objectivist view of communication by representing the “thou” as a spectator to, and not as a 
participant in the discourse. To Habermas, Brandom’s choice of examples is revealing, 
notably the one where a prosecutor and a defence attorney partly debate each other, and partly 
address a court room audience: 
 
Interestingly, Brandom singles out the indirect communication of the speakers with the spectators who 
are listening to them – rather than the communication of those directly involved – as the paradigmatic 
case. (Op.cit., p. 163) 
                                                 
164 In Brandom 2000, p. 3, Brandom mentions how his focus on distinguishing discursive creatures from non-
discursive creatures separates his project from a.o. earlier American pragmatism. This is one of the features, it 
seems to me, that assimilate his project to the “Apelmasian” versions of normative pragmatism. 
165 Cf. Skjervheim 1959 and 1996, cf. also Habermas 1981, p.163f. 
 103
 Habermas argues that the audience in Brandom’s example are listeners, assuming the role of 
third persons waiting to see what happens, and not hearers, directly involved in the discourse. 
As listeners, as opposed to hearers, they do not adopt the performative attitude of a first 
person toward a second person. 
 Habermas assimilates Brandom’s approach with Davidson’s theory of radical 
interpretation, which is contrasted with hermeneutic interpretation. This is in contrast to 
Wellmer, who as we have seen praises Davidson’s (as well as Brandom’s) theory as a 
fundamentally hermeneutic approach, contributing with a necessary radicalisation of 
Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument, cf. above (5.3). However, as mentioned, Wellmer 
argues that Davidson’s theory must be adjusted, so that it becomes clear that the paradigm of 
communication is mutual understanding within a language, and not the radical translation of 
two interpreters with separate languages.166 
Like Brandom, Davidson defends a strong version of the Intersubjectivity Thesis and 
the structural importance of a second person.167 However, it seems to me that both Brandom 
and Davidson portray the second person primarily as an interpreter, i.e. as an assessor of the 
utterances of the first person, rather than as a participating and responding discourse partner. 
In contrast to this tendency, Habermas stresses the “coordinating” aspect of communication: 
 
Communication is not some self-sufficient game in which the interlocutors reciprocally inform each 
other about their beliefs and intentions. It is only the imperative of social integration – the need to 
coordinate the action-plans of independently deciding participants in action – that explains the point of 
linguistic communication. (Habermas 2003, p. 164) 
  
Habermas rightly emphasises mutual understanding and social integration as the key elements 
of language use. However, I find it misleading to speak of this as the “point of 
communication” or to speak of rationally motivated agreement as the “goal of 
communication” (op.cit. p. 165). Thus, I think Brandom is right when he counters in a reply to 
Habermas:  
 
I deny this – not because I think that linguistic communication has some other point, but because I think 
it is a mistake to think of it as having a point at all. (Brandom 2000b, p. 363) 
 
                                                 
166 Cf. Wellmer 2002, p. 206ff. 
167 Cf. Davidson 2001a, p. 107-121: “The second person”.  
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In particular situations, we may use language in order to achieve some goal, but it does not 
make sense to speak of language use in general as instrumental, i.e. as having a goal outside 
of itself; rather it should be conceived of as expressive, i.e. as constitutive of our way of life or 
as a central element of our lifeworld. 
 As I see it, the crucial point in Habermas’s critique of Brandom (which should be 
retained in spite of Brandom’s meta-critique), as well as in his critique of Davidson, is that a 
genuine, participating second person is necessary in order to establish normativity. 
Commitments paradigmatically arise between subjects striving towards coordination of 
action-plans or mutual agreement – not between subjects reciprocally interpreting and 
assessing each other’s speech acts. 
 
  
5.5 Sources of normativity 
 
Following the arguments of Kant, Wittgenstein, Brandom, and Rödl, among others, I have 
placed normativity at the very core of subjectivity and rational agency. But what is at the core 
of normativity? To Kant, the capacity to make normative judgements, and thus to be bound by 
rational reasons, arises from autonomy. The rational subject’s ability to submit to the norms 
she lays down for herself is what constitutes her capability of normative judgement. As 
Brandom puts it: 
 
To be a self, a knower and an agent, is, according to Kant’s original normative insight, to be able to take 
responsibility for what one does, to be able to undertake commitments. It is to be bound by norms. 
According to the autonomy thesis, one is in a strict sense bound only by rules or laws one has laid down 
for oneself, norms one has oneself endorsed. What makes them binding is that one takes them as 
binding. (Brandom 2002, p. 21) 
 
Locating the source of normativity within the subject must not, however, collapse into a 
subjectivistic “whatever seems right to me is right”. As Wittgenstein points out, only an 
intersubjective practice can secure binding rules, otherwise  
 
thinking one was obeying the rule would be the same thing as obeying it (PU § 202), 
 
in which case normativity would break down.  
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The linguistic-pragmatic transformation of philosophy gives a definite form to the 
intersubjective basis of normativity, a form that arguably is missing in Kant’s philosophy of 
mind. Intersubjective language, and the discursive commitments constitutive of it, is a 
condition for normative statuses in general – including the true-false distinction. 
Both Habermas and Brandom seek to formulate the principles of a formal pragmatics 
by making explicit what is implicit in our everyday practices, thus to localise the genesis of 
normativity in the evolution of these practices. Brandom’s conception of normativity is 
thoroughly epistemic, prompting certain critical remarks from Habermas.168 Brandom, 
however, counters that there is a reason for his omission of a specific discussion of moral 
commitments: 
 
[T]he understanding of conceptual normativity has been hampered by the fact that theorists of 
normativity have typically focused on moral norms. (Brandom 2000b, p. 371) 
 
Brandom remains agnostic about the relation between his epistemic normativity and the 
normativity of moral concepts, but claims that it is natural to hope for an enlightenment of 
moral norms on the basis of a clarification of “the more fundamental class of discursive ones” 
(Loc.cit.). 
However, even if we agree that we must trace the origin of normativity to discursive 
norms, i.e. to the development of a community of language users involved in a “web of 
commitments”, we might still ask what the source of normativity is in another sense. What, 
we might ask, is it that ultimately makes norms binding to us? In one sense epistemic 
normativity is most easily displayed as non-circumventable, e.g. by showing in a discursive or 
formal-pragmatic manner that in arguing you are always already caught up in a normative 
commitment regarding the truth of your statements. However, although truth is normative for 
belief, it does not seem to point to an irreducible normative standard for rational agency. It is 
not tautological to say: “You should not lie”. From this it may be argued that we need a more 
fundamental idea of normativity than the one we can derive from epistemology, perhaps one 
relating to agency as “answering the ethical question” in Sebastian Rödl’s sense.  
Karl-Otto Apel argues that “answering the epistemological question” in one sense 
must already be viewed as “answering the ethical question”, as Rödl would put it. In the last 
essay of Transformation der Philosophie (1973), Apel argues that Kant in a certain sense is 
mistaken when he suggests that a “people of devils”– i.e. a group of people co-ordinating their 
                                                 
168 Cf. Habermas 1999, p. 147ff. 
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actions according to instrumental rationality alone – may be capable of acting rationally in the 
sense of establishing a good political order “if only they have intelligence”169: 
 
Zwar lässt sich nicht bestreiten, dass der logisch richtige Verstandesgebrauch als bloßes Mittel von 
einem bösen Willen in Dienst genommen werden kann. Insofern ist die Logik als Theorie des normativ 
richtigen Verstandesgebrauchs eine moralisch wertfreie Technologie (…). Es lässt sich insofern auch 
nicht sagen, dass die Logik eine Ethik logisch impliziert. Dennoch kann auch behauptet werden, dass 
die Logik – und mit ihr zugleich alle Wissenschaften und Technologien – eine Ethik als Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit voraussetzt. (Apel 1973, p. 398f.) 
 
A decisive aspect of Apel’s argument is that, in order to check the validity of arguments, we 
must always already presuppose a community of thinkers capable of reaching understanding 
and agreement. Even a “lone thinker” depends in principle on the possibility of justifying her 
arguments within a community of language users. In such a community, Apel argues 
 
ist die wechselseitige Anerkennung aller Mitglieder als gleichberechtigter Diskussionspartner 
vorausgesetzt. (Op.cit., p. 400) 
 
According to Apel, this mutual recognition is to be conceived of as a fundamentally moral 
demand on all members of a community of language users.170 
The question of the ultimate source of normativity has occupied many philosophers in 
recent decades, among them Christine Korsgaard. Like many Kant-inspired philosophers, she 
looks to the categorical imperative for an answer. Much like Brandom, she stresses the 
Kantian idea of autonomy; that being a free, rational agent consists in the capacity to be 
bound by the norms you lay down for yourself. She argues further that the product of such 
self-legislation is the categorical imperative, commanding us to act only on a maxim that we 
could will to be a law.171  
                                                 
169 Cf. Kants Gesammelte Schriften (Akademienausgabe) Bd. 8; 366 (“Zum ewigen Frieden“). 
170 At this point there is a controversy between Apel and Habermas. According to Habermas, the norms that are 
implicit in all argumentation must be viewed as independent from morality: “[T]he moral principle of according 
the interests of all equal consideration cannot be justified by appealing to the normative content of 
presuppositions of argumentation alone. One can invoke this rational potential implicit in discourses in general 
with this goal only when one already knows what it means to have obligations and to justify actions in moral 
terms. Knowledge of how to participate in argumentation must be joined with knowledge drawn from the 
experience of a moral community” (Habermas 2008, p. 87). Habermas’s motivation for holding back on this 
point is to avoid having to subordinate the principle of democracy to the moral principle. Apel seems to have a 
sound point, however, in that it is hard to see how a “principle of discourse”, stating the equal consideration of 
the interests of all those affected, can be viewed as morally neutral, at least as long as the basic moral principle is 
considered to be an abstract principle of universalisation. 
171 Cf. Korsgaard 1996, p. 98. 
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Although Kant is ambiguous at this point, his concept of a “Fact of reason” seems to 
offer a clue to his position. To repeat one of his key formulations on the relationship between 
freedom and morality:  
 
Freiheit ist (…) die einzige unter allen Ideen der spekulativen Vernunft, wovon wir die Möglichkeit a 
priori wissen, ohne sie doch einzusehen, weil sie die Bedingung des moralischen Gesetzes ist, welches 
wir wissen. (Kant, KpV 5).  
 
As I argued in the introduction, Kant’s point may be extended in the sense that free agency is 
a general condition of rationality. However, it may also be viewed as a clue to a discussion on 
the source of normativity. Kant adds in the famous footnote to this passage that freedom must 
be viewed as the ratio essendi of the moral law in the sense that without it there would be no 
moral law (since “ought implies can”172). On the other hand, Kant writes, the moral law is the 
ratio cognosciendi of freedom, in the sense that were it not for our “clear thought” of the 
moral law, we would have no possibility of justifying the assumption of freedom. That the 
moral law in fact makes a claim on us is what makes us aware of our freedom in the first 
place, viz. our capacity to act according to reason. In the sense that being a free agent is 
equivalent to “playing the normative game of giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom), Kant 
seems to argue that the categorical imperative is the ultimate basis for explicating normativity. 
Normativity and morality are not equivalent terms, and not all norms are moral norms. 
Clearly, however, the terms are closely related, and may in many situations replace one 
another. Is it possible to specify one term as basic in relation to the other? Geert Keil suggests 
that morality is to be viewed as 
  
ein Teilphänomen von Normativität und zugleich deren Explikationsbasis. Der explikative Primat des 
moralischen Sollens kann m.E. in zwei Schritten begründet werden: Erstens ist zu zeigen, dass Normen 
stets direkt oder indirekt auf Handlungsaufforderungen verweisen, zweitens ist zu zeigen, dass sich das 
’Du sollst’ nicht von hypotetischen Imperativen her aufklären lässt, sondern nur vom kategorischen. 
 (Keil 2004, fn. 42) 
 
Like Korsgaard, Keil points to the categorical imperative as an ultimate explicative basis for 
normativity. This is also in line with Marcus Willaschek, who argues that universal ethics 
might be seen as “the ultimate, all-inclusive level of normative standards”, thus as the 
                                                 
172 Cf. e.g. KpV 54. 
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explicatory basis of rationality as such.173 From this perspective, a “people of devils” would 
have to be considered as a borderline case of rationality, made possible only against the 
background of a larger community of rational beings capable of making moral decisions. 
Willaschek points to the “existentialistic” idea that we cannot avoid being 
autonomous. To the degree that we are rational agents, we are condemned to freedom, as 
Sartre phrases it. Given Kant’s “reciprocity thesis”,174 this implies that we cannot act except 
on the basis of a fundamental morality. Hence, the normative evaluation that is crucial to 
instrumental rationality ultimately rests on morality, not – like ethical naturalism would have 
it – the other way around: 
 
If the justification of moral demands was limited by considerations of instrumental rationality, we 
would have to reject as unjustified moral demands that require acting against one’s instrumentally 
defined interest. But in morally wrong action, we often have to admit that a moral demand on ourselves 
in fact was justified, even if we have decided for instrumental reason not to fulfil it. This, I believe, can 
only be understood if we regard moral claims as more fundamental than instrumental ones. (Willaschek 
1998, p. 199) 
 
Willaschek, like Keil, argues that hypothetical imperatives, or instrumental rationality, must 
be explicated by reference to a categorical imperative. Hypothetical imperatives give only 
relative reasons for acting. I may reason: “To achieve a, do b”, but the question remains: Why 
try to achieve a? Every instrumental reason can be challenged – even a reference to the 
maintenance of my life: “But why should I aim at surviving?” In Sebastian Rödl’s words, 
what we stand in need of is a last reference point of action: 
 
[E]in letzter Bezugpunkt der ethischen Frage (…) ist einer, zu dem es keinen übergeordneten gibt.  
(Rödl 1998, p. 50)175 
 
Rödl pinpoints the normativity of action by equating acting with “answering the ethical 
question”. Instrumental rationality is not enough, he argues, in order to explain the 
normativity of action. The last reference point of action is always the ethical dimension, 
namely that by acting I answer the question “What should I do?” In this sense, to the degree 
                                                 
173 Cf. Willaschek 1998, p. 199. 
174 I.e. that freedom and morality are reciprocal concepts, cf. e.g. GMS 446f.; cf. KpV 52, §6. Cf. Allison 1990, 
Ch. 11. 
175 Rödl specifies this further by (in the spirit of Tugendhat) distinguishing between an ethical and a moral sense 
of this last reference point, respectively “happiness” and “the simply good”. It would be too much of a diversion 
to go into this discussion here. 
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that something is a rational action, it is always in principle an attempt to “do the right thing”, 
although such attempts frequently fail.176 
However, in order to steer clear of what Rödl diagnoses as “the Cartesian fallacy”177, 
it is important that the last reference point is not understood in a methodological-solipsistic 
sense, but is given an intersubjective interpretation. Rödl argues that 
 
die Dimension des Sollens, in der ich mich zu mir verhalte, mir nur offen steht, indem ich mich auf 
einen anderen beziehe, der sich in dieser Dimension zu sich verhält. (Op.cit., p. 269) 
 
In other words, in order to view the moral law as the ultimate explication basis of normativity, 
its status as a Kantian “fact of reason” must be linguistic-pragmatically reinterpreted. Apel 
suggests that it should be understood in terms of “the a priori of a community of language 
users”.178 A main aim for me in this thesis is to argue that the approach to free agency must be 
reconstructed on the basis of intersubjective language in order to avoid dualism. In the final 
two chapters I take a closer look at the challenge of dualism with regard to the free agency 
problem. 
                                                 
176 Cf. the Kant-Korsgaard discussion above, Ch. 2.3. 
177 Cf. above, Ch. 4.4. 
178 Cf. Apel 1973, p. 429: “’Faktum der Vernunft’, sofern es als Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft 
begriffen wird”. 
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Chapter 6: Language and world – Two theses of unity 
 
 
[O]ur language of deliberation is continuous with our language of assessment,  
and this with the language in which we explain what people do and feel.  
(Taylor 1989, p. 57) 
 
Die raumzeitliche Welt ist nur einmal da, und verschiedene Disziplinen  
untersuchen verschiedene Aspekte oder Eigenschaften dieser einen Welt.  
(Keil 2007b, p. 46) 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction: Agency, language and world 
 
In Chapter 2, I argued that within a Kantian frame it is impossible to recognise the concrete 
action of any concrete subject as free. Kant’s philosophy is a mentalistic philosophy of mind, 
in the sense that it does not take into account language as a precondition of thought and 
subjectivity. A transition to a pragmatic philosophy of language is needed. However, a 
transformation from a methodical-solipsistic philosophy of mind to a pragmatic philosophy of 
language is not enough. Even within a linguistic-pragmatic idiom, careful steps must be taken 
in order to steer clear of dualism. Not much is gained by replacing the conceptual divide 
between “Naturbegriff” and “Freiheitsbegriff” with a distinction between two languages or 
language games.  
Dualism – in all its varieties – is a threat to any viable theory of free agency. Or, in a 
positive formulation: A robust conception of free agency is the key to avoid a dualist scheme. 
However one tries to make sense of a divide between two worlds, kingdoms, conceptual 
frames, languages, or language games; whether one draws the line between an empirical and 
an intelligible world, a concept of freedom and a concept of nature, or a language game of 
intentionality and a language game of causality, intentional agency seems to belong on both 
sides of the “gulf”. 
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Agency is therefore a starting point from which to explore the connection between 
mind and world. The very existence of intentional agency seems to constitute a strong 
argument against dualism. Searle talked about the mind-world connection as having two 
“directions of fit”: mind-to-world (perceptual experience) and world-to-mind (intentional 
agency).179 If the mental and the physical were to belong to two different worlds or spheres, 
then how could we account for this interaction between mental and bodily events? The causal 
aspect of agency cannot be explained away.180 Thus, intentional agency may be seen as a 
problematic concept, one that must somehow be legitimised within our existing world-view. 
A more promising alternative, however, is to start out from intentional agency as the most 
immediately given, being as it were our access to the world. This is the ingenious move of an 
interventionist theory on causality; a move that has a potential of being generalised.  
In this chapter, I start out from Apel’s identification and criticism of “the alternative 
conception” (6.2), which can be regarded as a form of dualism between the conceptual frames 
– or language games – of explanation and understanding. Apel argues that we must assume a 
hermeneutic dimension “between” these two frames, holding them together in order to avoid a 
dualistic conception of language, or a conception of language as divided into language and 
meta-language. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein shows an acute sense of this problem, but then 
ends up evicting both meta-language and the language of understanding in one and the same 
move. Against this, in 6.3, I defend a thesis of the unity of language – in the sense that a 
complete language functions as its own meta-language, and that indexical expressions are a 
key to this function. Certain systematic features of a “complete” language are examined in 
6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. In 6.7, I look into and criticise Habermas’ theory of a “differentiated world-
view,” and argue further in 6.8 for a unified concept of the world. In 6.9, I sum up the chapter 
and discuss how the concepts of veritative and performative being may be employed in order 
to address some of the sound intuitions behind Habermas’s suggestion of a differentiated 
world-view. 
Against my criticism of Habermas’ “multiple worlds”, it might be countered that it is a 
waste of effort, since these are innocent metaphors used to shed light on the need to 
differentiate between various kinds of relations between subjects and the world. However, 
metaphors are not always innocent. Sometimes they point in the wrong direction and thereby 
lead to epistemic, ontological, or even practical misconceptions. An example I have already 
                                                 
179 Cf. Searle 1983, p. 96f. 
180 Cf. Rödl 1998, who also stresses the causal sense of perceptual experience, cf. p. 130: “Der kausale Sinn von 
‘wahrnehmen’ ist irreduziebel”. 
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discussed is the inner-outer metaphor,181 and as I will show, this image plays a part in 
Habermas’s multiple world allegory as well.  
The important differentiation of relations between language (users) and the world 
easily collapses into a version of dualism. This is a tough balance for any theory of agency, 
given the unavoidable tension between different perspectives on action.182 Dualism should, 
however, be avoided – including any kind of property dualism, aspect dualism, or language 
(game) dualism. A certain kind of “perspective plurality” is necessary, however it is vital to 
display 1) how these perspectives can be integrated in one language, and 2) that these 
perspectives all constitute ways of relating to one world. 
 
 
6.2 A critique of “the alternative conception”  
 
Kant’s attempt to determine the conditions for the possibility of objectively valid experience 
while maintaining the idea of transcendental freedom led him to carefully distinguish the area 
of causal explanation (the phaenomenal realm) from the area of “causality through freedom” 
(the noumenal realm). I argued in Chapter 2 that this amounts to a strict dualism, in the sense 
that Kant excludes any mediation between “Freiheitsbegriff” and “Naturbegriff”. It appears, 
as Karl-Otto Apel writes, 
 
als ob zwischen den Menschen als Adressaten seiner Ethik und den Menschen im Sinne einer 
empirischen Anthropologie überhaupt keine Identität bestünde. (Apel 1988, p. 76) 
 
This conceptual boundary between the areas of “ought” and “is” corresponds to what Apel 
has called “the alternative conception”.183 This is closely related to a “scientistic fallacy” that 
Apel attributes to Kant and subsequent Kant-inspired epistemology, as well as the “unity of 
science” tradition within philosophy of science: 
 
Aus der ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’ (…), d.h. aus der von Kant in ihrem Rahmen kritisch begrenzten 
Gegenstands-Konstitution möglicher objektiv gültiger Erfahrung, konnte – und kann – man nur 
wissenshaftstheoretische Konsequenzen im Sinne eines radikalen Szientismus ziehen, d.h. 
                                                 
181 Cf. above, Ch. 4.4. 
182 Cf. above, Ch. 1.3. 
183 Cf. Apel 1979 p. 204 and 216ff. 
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Konsequenzen im Sinne der Einschränkung der Idee der Erkenntnis auf neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft 
(science) und – allenfalls – auf im Sinne ihrer Kategorien reduzierte Quasi-Naturwissenschaft.  
(Apel 1979, p. 61) 
 
“The alternative conception” may be illustrated with reference to the way we talk about 
actions. Following this conception, there are methodologically speaking only two relevant 
types of “why?” questions to be asked regarding actions: 1) Questions and answers in the first 
and second-person present tense, regarding acts and their legitimacy – where we ask for 
reasons, and 2) Questions and answers in the third person, regarding the explanation of events 
in the objective world – where we ask for causes.  
 
[M]an hätte nur zu unterscheiden zwischen Fragen einer normativen Wissenschaftslogik und Ethik 
(oder deontologischen Logik?) in bezug auf das, was gilt, und Fragen der empirischen (Natur-) 
Wissenschaft in bezug auf das, was ’der Fall ist’. (Op.cit., p. 216) 
 
What is missing from this picture, according to Apel, is the possibility to perceive the 
person(s) we talk about in the third person as contemporaries or historical subjects, i.e. as 
“virtuelle Interaktions- bzw. Kommunikationspartner”184 whose acts we are trying to 
understand, not causally explain. Apel wants to make room for a hermeneutic understanding 
of other people, not as objects for scientific observation, but as “co-subjects”. 
 Apel discusses “the alternative conception” in light of the dispute within theory of 
science known as the “explanation vs. understanding controversy” since Dilthey, or as “the 
reason vs. causes debate (cf. above, Ch. 3.2), with prominent participants such as Karl Popper, 
Carl Hempel, William Dray, Peter Winch, and G. H. von Wright. The scientistic fallacy is 
easily recognised in Popper’s and Hempel’s one-sided emphasis on causal-nomological 
explanation, but Apel points to certain scientistic prejudices even in the opposite camp. These 
prejudices result, according to Apel, from disregarding the hermeneutic dimension of 
understanding. Von Wright, as one example, gives an account of linguistic communication as 
just another case of “hypothetical” and “provisional” verification of the existence of intention. 
He thereby assumes that interlocutors in communication consider the efforts of each other as 
“verbal behaviour”, i.e. as objects of teleological explanation which 
 
does not in principle afford more direct access to the inner states than any other (intentional) behaviour. 
(von Wright 1971, p. 113) 
                                                 
184 Cf. Apel 1979, p. 216. 
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 According to Apel, this is an example of a scientistic fallacy due to its neglect of the 
hermeneutic dimension of understanding. If von Wright was right, Apel argues, it would be 
possible to examine other people’s intentions simply by observing them, without 
presupposing an always already functioning understanding (Verständigung) with them. 
However, this ultimately implies methodological solipsism: The only way towards 
understanding other subjects would be to make them (i.e. in principle all possible 
communication partners) objects of explanatory hypotheses on the basis of observation – but 
in that case the subject of cognition must be able to understand at least her own hypotheses or 
thoughts as pre-linguistic or private-linguistic. 
 The alternative is to assume that my own thoughts – including all my explanatory 
hypotheses about other people’s intentions – are in principle always already linguistically 
mediated. Hence the forming of hypotheses (about natural events as well as the actions of 
other people) presupposes a linguistic communication that in turn is not normally understood 
on the basis of explanatory hypotheses. Apel wants to radicalise von Wright’s own approach 
to action and consciousness. As presented above (Chapter 3.5), von Wright argues that our 
understanding of ourselves as agents intervening in the course of events is a conditions for the 
possibility of causal explanation. Apel now points out that a basic (linguistic) understanding 
with other subjects is a condition for the understanding of actions in general, including our 
own intervening actions: 
 
Das Verstehen der Mitteilungen anderer scheint mir (…) in ähnlicher Weise die Bedingung der 
Möglichkeit der intentionalen Erklärungen zu sein wie das Verstehen der eigenen Interventions-
Handlungen die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Kausalerklärungen ist. (Apel 1979, p. 178f, fn. 112a) 
 
Von Wright seems to be committing a scientistic fallacy by assuming a principally pre-
linguistic consciousness-in-acting. In contrast, the rationalistic-pragmatic approach to 
language and action represented by Apel and Habermas systematically stresses the reflective 
aspect of language, and argues that rational agency must be explicated on the basis of 
specifically communicative action. Cf. e.g. the following passage in Apel 1979:  
 
Durch die Reflexionsperspektive des Gesprächs werden Kommunikationshandlungen im engeren Sinn – 
Sprechakte – und verstehbare menschliche Handlungen überhaupt sowohl unterschieden als auch 
zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt (…) Gäbe es keine Kommunikationshandlungen, für die die Intention 
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des Verstandenwerdensollens und damit die Selbstreflexion konstitutiv ist, so gäbe es überhaupt keine 
verstehbaren menschlichen Handlungen. (Apel 1979, p. 217f.) 
 
Brandom states a similar point in this way: 
  
[R]ational agency, on which instrumental behavior is modeled, depends essentially on specifically 
linguistic practices, including asserting. It follows that simple, non-linguistic, instrumental intentionality 
can not be made fully intelligible apart from considerations of the linguistic practices that make 
available to the interpreter (but not to the interpreted animal) a grasp of the propositional contents 
attributed in such intentional interpretations. (Brandom 1994, p. 155) 
 
Habermas, Apel, and Brandom all view communicative action – where a basic understanding 
with my communication partners is always already anticipated – as a necessary basis for the 
understanding of rational agency in general. 
The Neo-Wittgensteinian tradition that von Wright belongs to has been criticised for 
wanting to replace Cartesian substance dualism with a “new dualism”, distinguishing two 
“language games” or categorical frames that mutually exclude each other: 1) The language 
game under which we talk about things, events, and causes, subsumable under the laws of 
nature, and 2) The language game of people, actions, intentions, reasons, and rules.185 This 
distinction resembles the Kantian distinction between the two categorical frames of 
Naturbegriff and Freiheitsbegriff. However, Apel’s view is that the Neo-Wittgensteinian, 
linguistic-analytical version is more neatly “transcendental-pragmatically transformed” than 
Kant’s transcendental idealism. This means that it is more easily adapted to an idea of 
complementarity. Apel wants to show that the language games of explanation and 
understanding mutually exclude and presuppose each other. Again, he views this as an 
extension of von Wright’s theory. Von Wright’s argument – that the concept of a causal 
necessity of changing states within an adequately isolated system is preconditioned by a 
concept of experimental action – is generalised to an argument regarding the complementarity 
of language games or conceptual frames. 
Through a concept of communicative experience, Apel wants to make room for a 
dimension of hermeneutic understanding “between” objectivated nature and the subjective-
intersubjective conditions for the objectivation of nature. This means an extension of the 
concept of science. It also implies a transformation of Kant’s – and Husserl’s – concept of the 
transcendental subject as a condition of the possibility of objectivated knowledge of nature. 
                                                 
185 Cf. e.g. C. Landemann (1965-66): “The New Dualism in Philosophy of Mind”. 
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The concept of a transcendental subject can no longer be that of a pre-linguistic and pre-
communicative “synthetic unity of self-consciousness”: 
 
Denn es ist davon auszugehen, dass, ebenso wie das intersubjektiv gültige Sinnsverständnis von etwas 
als etwas – auch schon das Selbstverständnis des Ich immer schon sprachlich artikulierbar und insofern 
auch durch die hermeneutische Synthesis der Kommunikation vermittelt sein muss. Der Sinn aller 
Gedanken muss insofern öffentliche Gültigkeit besitzen und kann daher nicht als noematische Leistung 
einer prinzipiell einsamen intentionalen Noesis verstanden werden. (Loc.cit., p. 326f.) 
 
The transcendental subject cannot be understood as a self-sufficient and closed “synthetic 
unity of self-consciousness”; it is always already engaged with other members of a 
communicative community in a “Verständigung über etwas”.186 
 According to Apel, the “understanding vs. explanation controversy” in the theory of 
science can be (dis)solved if it is recognised that not every transition from the first and second 
person to the third person is a transition to an observational standpoint. Apel distinguishes 
between two types of transitions: 1) The transition to an observational standpoint with a 
theoretical relation between the subject and a third-person object (objectivation), and 2) The 
transition from “I-you” communication to communication with virtual co-subjects in the third 
person (secondary objectivation).187 From this perspective, the cognitive interest of 
hermeneutic understanding appears to be complementary to, instead of competing with, the 
cognitive interest of causally explaining natural events. 
  
 
6.3 The unity of language (and meta-language) 
 
“The scientistic alternative conception” is in many cases the outcome of an attempt to secure 
the language of science from the confusions and obscurities of colloquial language. 
Traditionally, many empiristically oriented philosophers have tried to specify the conditions 
under which a language could be a precise means of rendering true, scientific facts. From 
John Locke and onwards, the hope of many empiricists was to overcome difficulties and 
misunderstandings in philosophy and science by precisely defining the meaning of a word by 
                                                 
186 Apel’s phrase “Verständigung über etwas” expresses the complementarity between a purely observational 
subject-object-relation and a communicative subject-co-subject-relation, and covers both the understanding of 
meaning and the agreement on standards of validity (questions of truth and falsity). 
187 Cf. Apel 1979, p. 323 and p. 173. 
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reduction to a “simple idea”. The problem with this endeavour is how to ensure a common 
meaning of words, since the meaning of words had to be traced back to “private ideas” in the 
mind of the language user. How can one speaker know that other speakers – assuming that 
they mean something at all – speak about the same thing, i.e. connect the same private ideas 
with their words as she does herself? 
 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) is an attempt to overcome this 
problem, by connecting Locke’s theory of a reduction to private ideas with Leibniz’s view of 
language as an a priori intersubjective calculus. Wittgenstein’s basic idea is that the perfect 
logical form of a (universal) language is hidden under the rough surface of colloquial 
language. The form of language is for every language user a priori identical with the form of 
the world. Hence, for every state of affairs there is an ideal sentence uniquely corresponding 
to it. To Apel, the Tractatus represents a standard case of “the alternative conception”.188 
However, in this case only one side of the divide is equipped with a language. Every possible 
true proposition belongs to the totality of natural science (cf. TLP 4.11). Anything else – 
including the sentences of the Tractatus itself – is strictly speaking meaningless and 
unspeakable. Philosophy constitutes a “ladder” for us to climb in order to understand the 
relation between language and world. The “ladder” should be thrown away once considered, 
whereafter silence reigns within the realm of freedom (cf. TLP 6.54 and 7). Only the trivial – 
the scientific picturing of the world (everything that is the case) – can meaningfully be said. 
 Wittgenstein analyses sentences of the form “A thinks that p”, “A believes p”, and “A 
says p” as really being of the form “’p’ says p” (TLP 5.542). As such they are meta-linguistic, 
in other words strictly speaking meaningless, since they do not depict a state of affairs in the 
world. This way, Wittgenstein avoids getting mixed up in a hierarchy of meta-languages that 
led some of his predecessors into an unfortunate regress, or into presuming and leading 
everything back to an unexplained, already understandable meta-language or “meta-thought”. 
We cannot go outside of language to explain language. According to Wittgenstein’s 
“showing-saying” doctrine, the logical form that is common to language and the world – and 
that thereby renders possible the logical depiction of facts through utterable sentences – 
cannot itself be depicted. It cannot be said; it can only show itself in our language use: 
  
Der Satz kann die logische Form nicht darstellen, sie spiegelt sich in ihm. 
 Was sich in der Sprache spiegelt, kann sie nicht darstellen. 
 Was sich in der Sprache ausdrückt, können wir nicht durch sie ausdrücken. 
                                                 
188 Cf. Apel 1979, p. 216. 
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 Der Satz zeigt die logische Form der Wirklichkeit. 
 Er weist sie auf. (TLP 4.121) 
 
Wittgenstein’s sound, Kantian point is that the perspective from which experiences are had, 
cannot itself be part of the experience, but is “the limit of experience”. Hence the perspective 
– the “I think”, if you wish – cannot itself be depicted in the act.189 However, a prohibition of 
meta-language cannot take care of this transcendental-philosophical intuition in a satisfactory 
manner. Rather, it paradoxically leads to a kind of logical naturalism that made the Tractatus 
– together with Hume’s Treatise – favourite reading material among logical empiricists. 
Although the point of the saying-showing doctrine is a thoroughly non-naturalistic one, this 
produces no results on the pragmatic level. Hence, on this level, the radical transcendentalism 
of the Tractatus actually coincides with radical empiricism. 
 Wittgenstein’s efforts to protect the transcendental limit of the world from being 
depicted as a fact in the world dramatically limit the scope of language. Only one type of 
sentence is allowed within this system, namely the depiction of facts in propositions, while 
the performance of the subject disappears into the unspeakable realm of logical form. To 
Wittgenstein at this point, it seems that the only way to protect the subject from naturalisation 
is to deny it linguistic articulation altogether. Hence, the actual, hermeneutic understanding 
between subjects becomes unaddressable too. Under the Tractatus construction, a plurality of 
subjects – if conceivable at all – contributes nothing to the logical form of language. 
Wittgenstein reflects upon this himself: 
 
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to 
an extensionless point and there remains the reality coordinated with it. (TLP 5.64) 
 
Strawson elaborates in Individuals: For the solipsist the subject-place in language – the “I” – 
is simply redundant.190 In a logically perfect language as is outlined in the Tractatus, the I 
disappears from language in the sense that it coincides with the world, and hence – logically 
speaking – with language. This means that in language all subjects – if more than one is 
conceivable – must a priori be in total agreement. When the subject vanishes from language, 
                                                 
189 Cf. e.g. Kant, KrV B 132: “Diese Vorstellung aber ist ein Aktus der Spontaneität, d.i. die kann nicht als zur 
Sinnlichkeit gehörig angesehen werden”. 
190 Cf. Strawson 1959, p. 73: “[T]he true solipsist is (…) one who simply has no use for the distinction between 
himself and what is not himself”. In his later writings, Wittgenstein pointed out that “I” – according to its rules 
of use – must have “neighbours”, cf. Tugendhat 1976, p. 94f. 
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so does the possibility of perspectival change within language through indexical shifts.191 
Accordingly, the possibility of ascribing intentions and intentional actions to other subjects in 
the world disappears, and with it the prospect of conceiving possible other subjects as 
subjects. In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein calls himself to account, criticising the solipsistic 
implications of a Tractatus relation between language and world: 
 
When I made my solipsist statement, I pointed, but I robbed the pointing of its sense by inseparably 
connecting that which points and that to which it points. I constructed a clock with all its wheels, etc., 
and in the end fastened the dial to the pointer and made it go round with it. And in this way the 
solipsist’s ‘Only this is really seen’ reminds us of a tautology. (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 71) 
 
The possibilities of perspectival multiplicity and transitions are excluded from the Tractatus 
language. This is, however, attended to by Wittgenstein in his later works. In the 
Philosophical Investigations (PU), Wittgenstein shows that the meaning of predicates 
regarding consciousness and intentional action necessarily arise from two roots:  
 
1) The performative or act constitutive use: The use of mental and action predicates in 
the first-person present tense does not depict, but constitutes the act itself,192 and  
2) The assertoric or act descriptive use: The use of the predicates in other temporal 
and personal forms describes who is doing or has done something, or who is in a 
certain mental state.  
 
The two-rooted meaning of the predicates is – in accordance with the Private Language 
Argument (PLA) – accessible to a plurality of subjects. This is accomplished by the 
possibility of indexical shifts from first to third person, from present to past tense, and so on, 
and makes it possible to ascribe intentions and actions to each other. Act performance and act 
description are in this way displayed as two necessary elements of a complete language. Thus, 
indexicality comes into sight as a core element of a complete language.  
                                                 
191 Cf. Carson 2002, p. 59. 
192 This covers both purely expressive utterances such as “I am in pain” – which do not describe, but replace the 
“natural” pain expression (cf. PU § 244) – and paradigmatic performative utterances in Austin’s sense, e.g. “I 
promise you…” The latter do not replace anything, but are essentially linguistic acts. Thus, only language users 
can make promises, whereas most animals can in some sense express their pain. In the following, I mostly do not 
distinguish between expressive and performative utterances, as they fulfil more or less the same function within 
the view of language I suggest, and since they are in my view overlapping, or constitute a continuum, cf. a 
sentence such as “I beg you”. 
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 Wittgenstein emphasises that the “being in pain” predicate has a uniform meaning, 
even if it serves a different purpose in the first type of sentence (“I am in pain”) than it does in 
the other (“She is in pain”, “I was in pain”). The uniformity of meaning is not least a 
condition for the learnability of these predicates.193 The relation of predicates in the first-
person present tense and in other forms cannot be regarded as one of translation: It is not an 
inter-linguistic, but an intra-linguistic relationship.194 It can, however, be regarded as a meta-
linguistic relationship, in the sense that one of the sentences (“She is in pain”) can function as 
a report of what is expressed in the other (“I am in pain”). This is why colloquial language – 
unlike the ideal language proposed by Wittgenstein in the TLP – does not stand in need of an 
independent meta-language to explicate the meaning of its sentences. This is a characteristic 
mark of colloquial language: Everything that can be done in such a complete language can 
also be described in that same language. 
In “Act Performance and Description” (1985), Audun Øfsti criticises different versions 
of objectivism within the study of human agency. His approach is to show that the scientistic 
ideals of the objectivist programme involve an illegitimate absolutation of the third-person 
perspective: 
 
[M]y criticism of the objective-psychological attempt can be formulated as a criticism of an illegitimate 
reduction: the reduction involved in a reconstruction of our full-blown colloquial language within one of 
its dimensions, namely the descriptive ‘third-person’ dimension. (Øfsti 1985, p. 15)  
 
Against this, Øfsti defends a thesis of the unity of language: 
 
What natural languages allow, but which would be lost through an objective-psychological 
reconstruction of intention-attributions, is the possibility of keeping the different ‘person positions’ 
(first, second and third) within the same language, including the logicality of ‘substituting the first 
person.’ (…) That this unity obtains means that the language of the observed performer/’intender’ and 
the language of the reporting observer do not fall apart in language and metalanguage as separate 
languages. The language of the other and the ‘metalanguage’ in which I describe him – or the other way 
around: my language (in terms of which I express myself and perform the speech acts I perform) and the 
‘metalanguage’ in which I am reported – remain one single language and a common medium. (Op.cit. p. 
16) 
 
                                                 
193 As Wittgenstein stresses – see e.g. PU 244ff. To me, it seems that this argument is closely related to his 
Private Language Argument and to what I have referred to as the Intersubjectivity Thesis, see above, Ch. 5.3. 
194 This against e.g. Quine’s concept of “radical translation” and to a certain degree also against Davidson’s 
concept of “radical interpretation”, cf. above, Ch. 5.3.  
 121
The “glue” holding a complete language together – keeping it from falling apart into language 
and meta-language – is the function of indexicality, making transitions between different 
speaker positions and perspectives possible. 
 
 
6.4 The horizontal and the vertical indexical system 
 
Øfsti distinguishes between two “indexical systems” of a complete language: the horizontal 
system and the vertical system.195 The horizontal indexical system corresponds to Ernst 
Tugendhat’s approach in Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie 
(1976). Tugendhat argues that indexicality is the perspectival basis necessary for having 
perspective-transcending truth. Hence, indexicality is not only consistent with objectivity; 
indexical expressions are rather an indispensable condition for our ability to refer objectively 
to things and states of affairs in the world. Indexical expressions are situation-relative, but 
they are nevertheless needed in order to establish true or false, “eternal” (index-free) 
propositions. Indexicals are an integral part of a system of reciprocal substitution, which 
permits a connection between situations of use – where assertions are made – and situations of 
verification/falsification – where their truth value can be settled.  
In his Vorlesungen, Tugendhat outlines an extensive system of expressions – including 
indexical expressions such as demonstratives, time-and-place adverbs, personal pronouns and 
verb inflections, but also “objective” location descriptions (related to a fixed origo, e.g. 
calendar time, latitude and longitude), and the sign of equation (linking e.g. indexical 
expressions with names, in order to build sentences such as “This = a”). This system allows 
shifts in the speaker’s position to be “compensated for” by altering the indexical expressions 
in the sentence, so that a constant (true or false) propositional content can be maintained from 
different speaker’s perspectives. The system makes it possible to have a meaningful use of 
predicates even in situations where the qualities referred to are not immediately present. This 
is in contradistinction to the more limited signal languages of animals and small children, who 
are only able to use “quasi predicates,” e.g. by making a certain gesture or saying “bow-wow” 
whenever a “dog quality” is present.196 
                                                 
195 Cf. Øfsti 1997, p. 153ff. He emphasises that the two systems cannot be held strictly apart, but are 
interconnected and partly overlapping. 
196 Cf. Tugendhat 1976, p. 208: “Das Charakteristische der Quasiprädikate ist, dass bei ihnen die 
Verwendungssituation und die Erklärungssituation von derselben Art sind.” 
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Tugendhat argues that if language did not carry with it the possibility of preserving the 
same propositional content through different perspectives, we would not be able to transcend 
our own private and momentary perceptual field, and we would have no access to truth. The 
indexical system that he articulates constitutes our very access to the world in terms of 
“veritative being”.197 Øfsti sums up: 
 
Mit diesem System öffnet sich die Welt in emphatischem Sinne, mit ihm ist die Ebene der 
konditionalregulierten Quasiprädikation verlassen. (Øfsti 1997a, p. 157) 
 
The horizontal indexical system allows us to step out of the “here-and-now” perspective and 
gain access to objectivity and truth. However, this is a “horizontal” movement, in the sense 
that we move on the level of describing the world, whereby we grasp the world in the sense of 
“veritative being”. But indexical mechanisms can also be seen as a condition for a complete 
language in another sense, namely in making possible the shifts between use and mention. By 
this I mean the shifts between acts and description of acts – where the latter of course takes 
place in new (speech) acts. This is what Øfsti calls the vertical indexical system, referring to 
the possibility of meta-linguistic statements opened up through this system, with “vertical” 
pointing to the possibility of ascending through “meta-levels” of language.  
This is one more sense in which a system of indexical transitions constitutes our grip 
on the world. The vertical indexical system involves personal pronouns and verb tenses, and 
renders possible the transitions between (linguistic and non-linguistic) expressions and 
illocutionary acts (“I hurt”, “I promise…”), and the mention of these expressions and acts in 
other speech acts (“She is in pain”, “I promised…”). Such transitions are by no means 
disregarded by Tugendhat. On the contrary, they are a central topic in his Selbsbewusstsein 
und Selbstbestimmung (1979). However, there are certain ambiguities connected with his 
treatment of them. Tugendhat’s point of departure is Wittgenstein’s analysis in Philosophical 
Investigations (1953). Wittgenstein points to the fundamental difference between “I am in 
pain” and “He is in pain”. The first sentence is an expressive utterance, where the speaker 
expresses his pain, while the second is a description. Nevertheless, it belongs fundamentally 
                                                 
197 Cf. Tugendhat 1976, p. 60ff. “Veritative being” shows itself in that something (i.e. propositions) can be true 
or false. According to Tugendhat’s linguistic-pragmatic approach, what exists, what is real, is conceivable only 
in terms of what is true. The concept is drawn from the Aristotelian dictum that “to make a true statement is to 
say of what is, that it is, or to say of what is not, that it is not.” 
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to our linguistic understanding that the “being in pain” predicate means the same in both of 
the speech acts: Pain is the same whether I ascribe it to others or express my own pain.198 
Tugendhat describes this relationship between “I am in pain” and “She is in pain” as a 
“veritative symmetry”, which is to say that the first sentence is true whenever the second 
sentence, when uttered by someone who by saying “she” means me, is true.199 In a 
Wittgensteinian spirit, he separates expressions and illocutionary acts from descriptions. He 
emphasises that only the second sentence (of the form “She φ,” where φ designates an 
expressive or performative predicate) implies the identification of something, while the first 
sentence (“I φ”) is expressive, and does not describe or pick out an object at all. However, 
Tugendhat sees no other way to explain the unity of the predicates’ meanings and the 
similarity in structure between the expressions/performances and the descriptive sentences 
than by the phrase “veritative symmetry,” i.e. by assimilating performative acts into the 
prevailing scheme for true and false propositions. In other words, he assembles all sentences 
under the category of assertoric, i.e. true and false, sentences. This may be diagnosed as a 
“semantistic prejudice” in Karl-Otto Apel’s sense, i.e. a reductionistic view of language 
whereby 
 
dasjenige Bedeutungsmoment der performativen Phrase verloren geht, durch das sie, und nur sie, die 
sprachlich explizite effektive Selbstreflexion der menschlichen Sprechhandlungen ermöglicht. (Apel 
1980, p. 47f.) 
 
Tugendhat’s semanticist prejudice consists in his levelling of all utterances, including 
performative and expressive utterances, to the assertoric dimension.  
In the Tractatus, on the other hand, Wittgenstein paradoxically avoids the semantistic 
fallacy by altogether banishing the performative dimension from language. However, as Apel 
points out, this move cannot overcome the problems resulting from “the alternative 
conception”. I have analysed this conception as a kind of linguistic dualism, i.e. as an 
understanding of language as really consisting of two languages: 
 
1) A subject language in the first- and second-person present tense, in which the 
subject expresses itself, intends and performs acts, and relates to the (rules of the) use 
of language.  
2) An object language in the third person, in which the world is described.  
                                                 
198 Cf. PU §§ 244ff. 
199 Cf. Tugendhat 1979, p. 88. 
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 Although the Tractatus forbids the first of these “languages”, the dualism charge is not 
overcome simply by suppressing one of the two realms. The language-silence (saying-
showing) duality of the Tractatus does not solve the fundamental problems of “the scientistic 
alternative conception”. 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, however, counteracts dualism by showing that mental 
predicates have a two-rooted, but unified meaning: The expressive or performative use 
(expressions of “my own case”: “I φ”) and the descriptive use (identification based on outer 
criteria: “She φ”) both attribute to the single meaning of the predicate. In this sense, 
Wittgenstein hints at a vertical indexical system, but in the anti-systematic spirit of the 
Philosophical Investigations he does not move far in the direction of elucidating this aspect of 
language. His decisive break with the language theory of the Tractatus is couched rather in 
the break with the semantistic presupposition that sentences always function in the same way: 
  
Das Paradox verschwindet nur dann, wenn wir radikal mit der Idee brechen, die Sprache funktioniere 
immer auf eine Weise, diene immer dem gleichen Zweck: Gedanken zu übertragen – seien diese nun 
Gedanken über Häuser, Schmerzen, Gut und Böse, oder was immer. (PU, § 304) 
 
In this context, Wittgenstein emphasises that expressive and performative utterances are not 
descriptions of something in the world: 
 
Wenn ich sage ‘ich habe Schmerzten’ weise ich nicht auf eine Person, die die Schmerzten hat, da ich in 
gewissem Sinne garnicht weiß, wer sie hat. (PU, § 404) 
 
Wittgenstein suggests that the use of “I φ”-phrases is nothing but a sign to other people, in 
order for them to know who is in pain. However, in that case, such phrases seem to become 
redundant, since other (more or less “natural”) pain behaviour would be just as efficient for 
signalling “where the pain is”.200  
I think Wittgenstein is right in denying that “I φ”-phrases convey knowledge, since in 
these cases there is no (use for) true-or-false deciding criteria.201 What is underexposed in the 
Philosophical Investigations is, however, that the syntactic form of expressive “I φ”-sentences 
                                                 
200 Cf. Wittgenstein’s own remark in PU § 407. 
201 There may be no harm in calling what is expressed in performative or expressive utterances “agent 
knowledge” (Taylor) or “Handlungswissen” (Øfsti, who refers to Fichte’s wording of it as “das, wodurch ich 
etwas weiss, weil ich es thue” – cf. Fichte 1983, bd.I/4, p. 216f. and Øfsti 1997, p. 161). However, the concept of 
knowledge is strongly tied to the concept of (intersubjectively available) criteria. Hence I prefer to use the term 
consciousness-in-acting, cf. “Handlungsbewusstsein” (Kuhlmann) or “intention-in-action” (Searle). 
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link them together with the descriptive forms (“She φ”, “I φ-ed”), whereby the unified 
meaning of the concepts is secured. Indeed, the common form of “I φ” and “She φ” sentences 
is what led Tugendhat to suggest a “veritative symmetry” between them. I have argued that 
the first kind of sentence does not belong within the category of true-or-false sentences, but is 
strictly expressive or performative. However, the syntactic symmetry between the sentences is 
not a simple coincidence; it ties the expression of one’s own act consciousness to the 
ascription of act consciousness to other subjects (and to oneself, e.g. in the past tense). This 
relation is maintained by the vertical indexical system. Thanks to this system, it is possible for 
us to evaluate (other people’s and our own) claims and expressions, instead of surrendering it 
all to a Tractatus silence. This is constitutive of the intersubjective dimension of language, 
and explains how we are able to speak with each other, as opposed to a Tractatus situation 
where each individual stares at the world – “parallel” as it were – describing it in a private 
language which a priori is shared by all.202 According to (a strong version of) the Private 
Language Argument, the possibility of intersubjectively shared meaning is a necessary 
condition for language as such.203 
  
 
6.5 The formal criteria of a complete language 
 
The “anti-systematic spirit” of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations reinforces his 
break with the Tractatus theory of language. What is left underexposed, however, is that our 
access to the world is made possible by certain systematic features of a complete language. 
Wittgenstein’s ambiguous use of the key term “language games” is a point in question. 
Mainly, it seems that the term refers to limited functions within a complete language (like the 
tools of a toolbox, cf. § 11). Sometimes, however, he seems to imply that a single language 
game can constitute a language in itself. In PU §§ 18-19, Wittgenstein argues that a language 
far more limited than our own is easily imaginable: 
 
Man kann sich leicht eine Sprache vorstellen, die nur aus Befehlen und Meldungen in der Schlacht 
besteht. (…) Und eine Sprache vorstellen heißt, sich eine Lebensform vorstellen. (PU § 19, cf. also §§ 2 
and 6) 
  
                                                 
202 Cf. Øfsti 2008, p. 75. 
203 Cf. above, Ch. 5.3. 
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The question is whether such a meagre language really is imaginable, or if certain features or 
constituents of a complete language are missing in such a case. Wittgenstein’s thesis is that 
the unlimited amount of “language games” does not necessarily have anything else in 
common than certain “family resemblances” (PU § 66-67). However, one could argue that 
there must be something in common for all “language games” in the sense of complete 
languages. A crucial feature seems to be the possibility of translation between whole 
languages, whereas this is certainly not possible between language games in the sense of the 
“tools in language”, e.g. between giving orders and guessing riddles (cf. PU § 23). In the 
following quote, Apel seem to understand “language games” in the sense of complete 
languages: 
 
In der Tat liegt die Gemeinsamkeit aller ‘Sprachspiele’ m.E. darin, dass mit der Erlernung einer Sprache 
– und d.h. mit der erfolgreichen Sozialisation im Sinne einer mit dem Sprachgebrauch ’verwobenen’ 
Lebensform – zugleich so etwas wie das Sprachspiel – bzw. die menschliche Lebensform – erlernt wird: 
es wird nämlich prinzipiell die Kompetenz zur Reflexion der eigenen Sprache bzw. Lebensform und zur 
Kommunikation mit allen anderen Sprachspielen miterworben. (Apel 1973, p. 347) 
  
Apel indicates here that certain formal criteria must be met in order for something to 
constitute a language in the usual sense, what we may term a “complete language”. But Apel 
gets into trouble when he attempts to formulate the element common to all languages as a 
separate, “transcendental language game”.204 While the metaphor of a transcendental 
language game is unfortunate, it seems to me that Apel’s basic point is quite sound, namely 
that mastering a language implies the constant ability to reflect upon and criticise the moves 
of any language game – in short, what Brandom refers to as participating in “the normative 
game of giving and asking for reasons”. Thus, in a certain sense, to learn one language is to 
learn “language as such”. 
The concept of a “complete language” is more or less excluded by Wittgenstein205 – 
he prefers the image of a “juxtaposition” of smaller language games, like houses in a town (cf. 
§ 18). But in doing so, he leaves the common syntactic form of “I φ” and “She φ” sentences 
more or less unexplained. Øfsti addresses this problem when he asks whether the mentioning 
of moves in a language game belongs to that very game, or whether – as Wittgenstein seems 
to indicate – it should be understood as a separate, self-contained language game.206 Øfsti 
                                                 
204 Cf. Øfsti 1994, p. 801f. 
205 Cf. PU § 18: “[F]rage dich, ob unsere Sprache vollständig ist …” 
206 Cf. Øfsti 1995, p. 803f.; cf. PU § 23. 
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argues that the descriptions of moves in a game are typically not moves in the game, and in 
this sense do not belong to the game:  
 
Eine Partie Schach zu beschreiben ist nicht, Schach zu spielen. (Øfsti 1994c, p. 803f.) 
 
However, we could argue that the possibility of describing the moves is a necessary part of 
any game in the sense that it is essential to games that we are able to formulate their rules. In 
general, Øfsti argues, we could formulate the following formal principle for a complete 
language: 
 
Alles, was mittels der Sprache getan werden kann, kann auch in ihr beschrieben (gesagt) werden.  
(Op.cit., p. 804) 
 
Replacing the “saying-showing doctrine” of the Tractatus, Øfsti introduces a “doing-saying 
doctrine,” emphasising the linguistic unity of “use” and “mention”. In a more general version, 
the doctrine says that anything that can be done – in the sense that it counts as an intentional 
action – can also be said – in the sense that it can be described (and ascribed): 
 
Es kann zuweilen den Anschein haben (zumal, wenn man an die primitiven Sprachspielen in PU denkt), 
dass es ausreicht, die relevanten Äußerungen sozusagen ‘in der ersten Person Präsens’ zu beherrschen, 
um in dem Sprachspiel (des Versprechens, Wettens, Befehlens usw.) agieren oder ‘ziehen’ zu können. 
Aber der Schein trügt. Um im vollen Sinne als intentional Handelnder gelten zu können, der in einer 
Situation weiß, was er tut,207 genügt es nicht, eine gleichsam auf die erste Person Präsens beschränkte 
Akteursprache zu haben, in deren Termini das aktuelle Handlungsbewusstsein geformt werden kann 
bzw. Sprechhandlungen ausgeführt werden können. Offenbar muss diese Sprache zugleich auch eine 
‘Metasprache’ umfassen, in der diese Handlungen beschrieben werden können. (Loc.cit.) 
 
This is one way of specifying what it means to be a rational agent: Consciousness-in-acting 
means in principle always being able to put one’s action “under a description” (Davidson). 
  
 
6.6 The performative-propositional double structure of speech 
 
An attempt to grasp the formal requirements of a complete language is delivered by Apel and 
Habermas with their respective “transcendental” and “universal” pragmatics. In a 1980 article, 
                                                 
207 Or rather: is conscious-in-acting, cf. above, fn. 23. (My italics and footnote) 
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Apel displays how the pragmatic turn in twentieth century philosophy of language generated 
new answers to what distinguishes human language.208 In the beginning of the article, Apel 
refers to a piece of advice he once got from Karl Popper. The advice was not to attach so 
much importance to communication – after all we have that in common with animals. 
Propositions, on the other hand, distinguish man alone as capable of rendering truths about 
the world. Apel lets this statement represent a philosophical paradigm for language which can 
be traced all the way back to Aristotle. Traditional philosophy of language is proposition-
oriented: The possibility of true and false propositions is decisive, while the pragmatic 
dimension of language is left for the empirical sciences. The pragmatic turn reverses this: 
Speech acts, not propositions, are now seen as the basic unit of language – since propositions 
can only occur within the frames of speech acts. This challenges yet another basic assumption 
of the traditional paradigm: The view that the descriptive and the communicative dimension 
can be examined independently of each other.209 A correct understanding of the pragmatic 
dimension is necessary in order to understand the “logos-distinction” of human language, and 
the pragmatic dimension can be properly understood only in relation to the way language 
functions in the rendering of facts. 
 In spite of certain historic attacks on the proposition-oriented paradigm – Apel 
mentions a.o. Vico as an early challenger210 – the first real blow against it was dealt by mid-
twentieth century’s “ordinary language philosophy”, represented by the later works of 
Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin and John Searle. The traditional view did not award the pragmatic 
dimension of language a constitutive cognitive or “logical” role. The Private Language 
Argument of Wittgenstein challenges this view by showing that the possibility of a successful 
mediation of intentions is constitutive for linguistic meaning. Austin’s concept of 
performative expressions as the linguistic carriers of illocutionary acts is also decisive. By 
uttering such expressions, Austin argued, we do not (only or primarily) state something about 
a state of affairs, we moreover actually perform an action. John Searle’s speech act theory 
picks up on this, adding the principle of expressibility: Everything that can be meant, can be 
said, i.e. every genuine intention of meaning can in principle be expressed in an explicit 
performative sentence. The principle of expressibility is a decisive argument for a pragmatic 
philosophy of language, showing that questions concerning the meaning of a sentence and 
                                                 
208 Cf. K.-O. Apel (1980): “Zwei paradigmatische Antworten auf die Frage nach der Logos-Auszeichnung der 
menschlichen Sprache”.  
209 Apel quotes the Aristotle pupil and successor Theophrast (and the German psychologist Karl Bühler) in order 
to illustrate this view of language, cf. op.cit. p. 16. 
210 Op.cit., p. 17. 
 129
questions concerning the performance of speech acts do not belong to two different fields of 
study. Rather, that uttering a sentence in a given context constitutes the performance of a 
particular speech act, belongs to our very concept of linguistic meaning.  
Searle distinguishes between the illocutionary act and its propositional content. He 
argues that the propositional content cannot occur independently, but only within the frames 
of questions, assertions, promises, or other speech acts. Grammatically, the propositional 
content can be isolated in subordinate “that” clauses, whereas the illocutionary act can always 
be made explicit in a dominating performative sentence (“I wonder…,” “I claim…,” “I 
promise…”). This points to a unified structure of all speech acts,211 which Habermas later 
terms the performative-propositional double structure of speech: 
 
In der Standardform zeigt sich die charakteristische Doppelstruktur jeder Sprachhandlung. Darin treten 
zwei Sätze auf: der mit einem performativen Verb in der ersten Person Präsens gebildete Satz und ein 
abhängiger Satz propositionalen Gehalts. (Habermas 1976a, p. 334) 
 
Habermas’s “universal pragmatics” aims at a further development and formalisation of the 
pragmatic turn, by constructing a comprehensive system of rules for the standard form of 
speech acts. His point of departure is Searle’s principle of expressibility, which implies that 
any possible speech act can be uniquely determined by one (or several) sentence(s), if the 
speaker expresses her intention accurately, explicitly and literally.  
 Following Austin, Habermas assumes that every speech act has a certain illocutionary 
force determining the communicative function of the utterance by establishing a connection 
between speaker and hearer: 
 
Mit dem gelungenen Vollzug eines Sprechaktes wird eine interpersonelle Beziehung zwischen 
mindestens zwei sprach- und handlungsfähigen Subjekten zugleich hergestellt und dargestellt. 
(Habermas 1976a, p. 333) 
 
A speech act succeeds when the intended connection is established, i.e. when the hearer 
understands and accepts the speaker’s utterance as e.g. a question, a promise, or a claim. This 
depends on the right context, as well as on whether the speaker is ready to guarantee that he 
will fulfil certain commitments, e.g. withdraw the claim in case it turns out to be false.212 
                                                 
211 The exceptions are “pure expressions” such as “Ouch!” or “Yuk!” which lack propositional content. 
212 We see here that Habermas’s universal pragmatics points in the direction of an inferentialist theory in 
Brandom’s sense, cf. above, Ch. 4.3. 
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 The partition of the speech act into an illocutionary and a propositional component – 
explicated in a performative sentence in the first person present tense and a dependent 
proposition – is consistent with the division between two levels of communication:  
 
a) der Ebene der Intersubjektivität, auf der Sprecher und Hörer durch illokutive Akte die Beziehungen 
herstellen, die ihnen erlauben, sich miteinander zu verständigen, und b) der Ebene der Gegenstände in 
der Welt, über die sie sich in der durch (a) festgelegten kommunikativen Funktion verständigen 
möchten. Ein Sprechakt kann nur gelingen, wenn die Beteiligten die Doppeltstruktur der Rede ausfüllen 
und ihre Kommunikation auf beide Ebenen gleichzeitig führen: sie müssen die Kommunikation eines 
Inhalts mit der Metakommunikation über den Verwendungssinn des kommunizierten Inhalts vereinigen. 
(Op.cit. p. 334)213 
 
Habermas’s theory seems to involve the understanding that every speech act has a 
performative-expressive element. Obviously, though, we constantly use – and understand – 
sentences such as “A right angle is 90˚” and “World War II broke out in 1939”, which are 
third-person sentences with no apparent trace of the act performance or the self-consciousness 
of the expressing subject. This, according to Habermas, is due to the fact that the performative 
part of the speech act is not always verbalised: 
 
Auch wenn die performativen Bestandteile nicht ausdrücklich verbalisiert werden, sind sie im 
Sprechvorgang stets impliziert: sie müssen daher in der Tiefenstruktur eines jeden Satzes auftreten. 
(Habermas 1971, p. 104) 
 
The “deep structure” of the above sentence is thus something like “I claim that a right angle is 
90˚.” The often non-verbalised performative part of a speech act tends to be made explicit in 
reports of the act of the type “She claims that World War II broke out in 1939”.214 In this 
way, the universal pragmatics of Habermas sheds light on the relation between use and 
mention, what Øfsti refers to as the vertical indexical system: That a complete language 
necessarily involves the possibility of ascending through meta-levels of language. 
 This is one way of emphasising the pragmatic aspect of meaning. Another way is 
Tugendhat’s analysis of the role of situation-relative indexical expressions in securing a 
situation-independent meaning of propositions. This corresponds to what Øfsti calls the 
                                                 
213 The speaker may, however, focus on one or the other of the levels. In cognitive use of language the focus is 
on the content of the utterance as a proposition about something being the case, whereas in interactive use of 
language, the focus is put on the connection established between speaker and hearer through warnings, promises 
etc. 
214 The “deep structure” of this sentence would then e.g. be “I claim that she claims that World War II broke out 
in 1939˚.” 
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horizontal indexical system. With his distinction of two (interrelated) indexical systems of a 
complete language, Øfsti points out two aspects of the performative-propositional double 
structure of speech: Through the horizontal indexical system, the possibility of referring 
objectively to the world in true statements is constituted, whereas the vertical indexical 
system makes it possible to express one’s own subjectivity in a language shared with other 
subjects. Thus, Øfsti speaks about a “double double structure”: 
 
Die eine Hälfte dieser Doppeltstruktur wäre dann die Searle-Apel-Habermassche, die besagt, dass 
Propositionen – die nach Tugendhat durch das ’horizontale’ deiktische System ermöglicht werden – 
immer in Sprechakte eingebettet sind (…). Die zweite Hälfte wäre nun wieder eine Art performativ-
propositionale Doppeltstruktur, aber diesmal nicht im Sinne der Einbettung von Propositionen in mit 
performativen oder expressiven Verben geäußerten Sprechakten, sondern im Sinne der möglichen 
propositionalen Abbildung (Beschreibung) jener Sprechhandlungen – die durch die genannten 
Verbalphrasen in der ersten Person Präsens konstituiert sind. (Øfsti 1997a, p. 164f.) 
 
This structure is a key to a meaningful distinction between subjective, intersubjective and 
objective, a distinction that can only be made sense of in a language that both (through Searle-
Habermas’s double structure) separates and (through indexical transitions) connects the 
performative and the propositional. Wellmer comments on the uniqueness of this system: 
 
The peculiar relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity, between the ‘transcendental’ and 
the ‘empirical,’ which for transcendental idealism remains an insurmountable obstacle, becomes 
comprehensible once we recognize it in the unique structure of ordinary language. (Wellmer 1976, p. 
251) 
  
 
6.7 The worlds of Habermas  
 
To Habermas, language constitutes a system of “I-demarcation” by which a subject delimits 
herself, from the outer world, from society, and from her own subjectivity. This is a process 
of “decentralising” (in the sense of Piaget and Mead) whereby the subject achieves a 
differentiated world-view: 
 
[L]anguage can be conceived as the medium of interrelating three worlds; for every successful 
communicative action there exists a threefold relation between the utterance and (1) ‘the external world’ 
as the totality of existing states of affairs, (2) ‘our social world’ as the totality of all normatively 
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regulated interpersonal relations that count as legitimate in a given society, and (3) ‘a particular inner 
world’ (of the speaker) as the totality of his intentional experiences. (Habermas 1976c, p. 128f.) 
 
This view of language is a basic element of Habermas’s theory of communicative action: 
 
Allein das kommunikative Handlungsmodell setzt Sprache als ein Medium unverkürtzter Verständigung 
voraus, wobei sich Sprecher und Hörer aus dem Horizont ihrer vorinterpretierten Lebenswelt 
gleichzeitig auf etwas in der objektiven, sozialen und subjektiven Welt beziehen, um gemeinsame 
Situationsdefinitionen auszuhandeln. (Habermas 1981, p. 142) 
 
In his Theory of Communicative Action (1981), Habermas explicates the demarcation process 
of the subject, as part of his continuation and correction of Max Weber’s theory of the 
rationalisation process of society. A differentiated world-view is a distinctive mark of 
modernity. In the first place, our world-view is distinguishable from the world itself, 
rendering possible a constant revision of our world-view. The world is further differentiated 
into the objective world (what is) and the social world (what counts). These two together 
constitute the outer world, which can be distinguished from the inner world of subjective 
experience. Habermas admits that the concept of different worlds is easily misread as spheres 
that can exist independently of each other, and stresses the complementarity of the worlds: 
 
Der Bereich der Subjektivität verhält sich komplementär zu der Außenwelt, die dadurch definiert ist, 
dass sie mit anderen geteilt wird. Die objektive Welt wird gemeinsam als die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen 
unterstellt (…) Und eine soziale Welt wird gemeinsam als die Gesamtheit aller interpersonalen 
Beziehungen unterstellt, die von den Angehörigen als legitim anerkannt werden. Demgegenüber gilt die 
subjektive Welt als die Gesamtheit der Erlebnisse, zu denen jeweils nur ein Individuum einen 
privilegierten Zugang hat. (Op.cit., p. 84) 
 
The different worlds are related to different ways of claiming the validity of a statement. 
Habermas here shows himself as a kind of inferentialist in Brandom’s sense: He emphasises 
that using language means entering into a web of commitments and entitlements, and uses the 
term validity claims in order to specify the nature of these commitments: 
 
[J]eder kommunikativ Handelnde [muss] im Vollzug einer beliebigen Sprechhandlung universale 
Geltungsansprüche erheben und ihre Einlösbarkeit unterstellen (…). Sofern er überhaupt an einem 
Verständigungsprozess teilnehmen will, kann er nicht umhin, die folgenden, und zwar genau diese 
universalen Ansprüche zu erheben:  
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- sich verständlich auszudrücken, 
- etwas zu verstehen zu geben, 
- sich dabei verständlich zu machen, 
- und sich miteinander zu verständigen. 
 (Habermas 1976b, p. 176) 
 
The speaker makes four validity claims: Trivially, she claims the intelligibility of her 
utterance; furthermore she commits herself to the truth of the propositional content; to the 
truthfulness of how she expresses her intentions; and to the rightness (or appropriateness) for 
the norms governing the interpersonal relations that are established through the speech act.  
All validity claims are in play in all language use, but one of the claims is typically 
accentuated, all according to which world the speaker primarily relates to. If this is the 
objective world, truth is at stake: “(It is true that) all swans are white”. If it is the social world, 
prominence is given to the normative rightness of the utterance: “(Our relationship is such 
that I am entitled to direct you to) close the door!” When the speaker relates to her subjective 
world, her truthfulness is the main concern: “(I honestly tell you that) I am sad.” Which 
validity claim the speaker emphasises is decisive for what kind of relation between speaker 
and hearer the illocutionary act establishes. A negative reply from the hearer will thus 
respectively mean “No (that is not true)!”, “No (you are not entitled to direct me)!” or “No 
(you are not being sincere)!”215   
 Habermas’s theory of communicative action and the differentiation of worlds amounts 
to a critique of a scientistic absolutation of a value-neutral, causal-nomological explanation. 
Communicative action is a kind of action that is not result-oriented, but oriented towards 
understanding and agreement [Verständigung]. Habermas argues that communicative action is 
a basic concept needed to explain the rationalisation process of society – which cannot be 
made sense of from the perspective of instrumental and strategic action alone. His approach 
has, in his own words, 
 
the aim of clarifying the presuppositions of the rationality of processes of reaching understanding, 
which may be presumed to be universal because they are unavoidable. (...) The most important 
achievement of such an approach is the possibility of clarifying a concept of communicative rationality 
that escapes the snares of Western logocentrism. Instead of following Nietzsche’s path of a totalizing 
and self-referential critique of reason, whether it be via Heidegger to Derrida, or via Bataille to 
Foucault, and throwing the baby out with the bathwater, it is more promising to seek this end through 
                                                 
215 We may thereby distinguish between assertoric, regulative and representative use of language, cf. e.g. 
Habermas 1976a, p. 334ff. 
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the analysis of the already operative potential for rationality contained in the everyday practices of 
communication. Here the validity dimensions of propositional truth, normative rightness, and subjective 
truthfulness or authenticity are intermeshed with each other. From this network of a bodily and 
interactively shaped, historically situated reason, our philosophical tradition selected out only the single 
thread of propositional truth and theoretical reason and stylized it into the monopoly of humanity. The 
common ground that unites both von Humboldt and pragmatism with the later Wittgenstein and Austin 
is the opposition to the ontological privileging of the world of beings, the epistemological privileging of 
contact with objects or the existing state of affairs, and the semantic privileging of assertoric sentences 
and propositional truth. Logocentrism means neglecting the complexity of reason effectively 
operating in the life-world, and restricting reason to its cognitive-instrumental dimension (a dimension, 
we might add, that has been noticeably privileged and selectively utilized in processes of capitalist 
modernization). (Habermas 1985, p. l96f.) 
 
Like Apel, Habermas seeks to point out a dimension “between” objectivated nature and the 
subjective and intersubjective conditions for the objectivation of nature. The aim of Apel’s 
criticism of “the alternative conception” is to show the possibility – and necessity – of a 
hermeneutic understanding of other persons, which cannot be reduced, neither to direct “I-
You”-communication nor to the description of others in scientific explanation. A genuine 
hermeneutic understanding means recognising others as “virtual” communication partners or 
“possible” co-subjects. Describing intentional actions does not involve an objectivation in the 
same way that a description of natural phenomena does. Apel speaks about “secondary 
objectivation”, as opposed to the primary objectivation of nature.216 Habermas’s 
differentiation of worlds can be regarded as an attempt to make room for such a secondary 
objectivation and hermeneutic understanding of virtual communication partners. However, as 
I will attempt to show, his solution is in a certain sense problematic. 
In A Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas presents a table in order to display 
the different possible “formal-pragmatic relations” between the different worlds and the basic 
attitudes a speaker can take towards the respective worlds:217 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
216 Cf. Apel 1979, p. 173; cf. above, Ch. 6.2. 
217 Habermas 1981, p. 324 (my italics in table). 
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                        Worlds 
 
 
Basic attitudes 
 
1. objective 
 
2. social 
 
3. subjective  
 
 
1. objectivating 
 
 
 
cognitive- 
instrumental  
relation 
 
  
cognitive-strategic 
relation 
 
objectivistic 
self-relation 
 
 
2. performative 
 
 
Moral- 
aesthetic 
relation 
  
obligational 
relation  
 
  
judging 
self-relation 
 
 
 
3. expressive 
 
 
To non-objectivated 
Surroundings 
 
self- 
engineering 
 
perceptive-
spontaneous 
self-relation 
 
 
The combination of the speaker’s attitudes and the worlds towards which she directs them 
decides what sort of rational relation is established through the statement. This suggests a 
differentiated view of rationality; however, some of these relations have a rather dubious 
status. 
Habermas assumes that it is possible to identify different worlds independently of the 
speaker’s attitudes. When we speak about the objective world, it seems intuitively 
unproblematic to assume that the world is somehow “there”, independent of speakers’ 
attitudes. However, this is not so easy when we are talking about the subjective and the social 
worlds, since they in a certain sense are established through our performative and expressive 
attitudes. The table shows that Habermas thinks it possible to relate in an objectivating 
manner to the social world (column 2.1, “cognitive-strategic relation”), as well as to the 
subjective world (column 3.1, “objectivistic self-relation”).218 As I will attempt to show in the 
following section (6.8), Habermas’s definitions of the different worlds are ambiguous and 
unfit to attain the diversification Habermas seeks.219 
 
 
                                                 
218 Although he does indicate the limits of – and warns against – this kind of objectivation of the subjective and 
the social, cf. e.g. Habermas 1981, p. 137. 
219 Cf. also Granum (Carson) 2000, p. 244ff. 
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 6.8 One world  
 
In the second paragraph of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
The world is the totality of facts, not of things. (TLP 1.1) 
 
He thereby chooses sides in a modern version of the medieval debate between realists and 
nominalists. The basic, conceptual decision to conceive of the world as having objects or facts 
as its component parts has considerable philosophical consequences, not least for the 
conception of truth.220 Habermas, however, refuses to commit himself to either side in this 
matter. Instead, he argues that the two views are complementary: 
 
[D]ie objektive Welt [muss] als Korrelat zur Gesamtheit wahrer Aussagen verstanden werden; nur 
dieser Begriff behält die im strengen Sinne ontologische Bedeutung einer Gesamtheit von Entitäten. 
(Habermas 1981, p. 125f.) 
 
Clearly, both ways of defining the world have advantages. Defining the world as a “totality of 
objects”, or as nature in Kant’s sense,221 has the immediate advantage that it represents a 
clear-cut alternative to relativism or contextualism. The problem is how this concept of an 
objective world can encompass cultural, societal, or political entities, such as acts or 
statements. Obviously, such entities can be made objects of (true) statements, descriptions, 
and explanations. But the “totality of objects” definition seems to imply that the only way to 
objectivate subjective and social entities is by scientistically reducing them to objects among 
others within a “Kantian nature”. In that case, however, Habermas is unsuccessful in 
establishing a hermeneutic dimension as an alternative to scientism. 
 Understanding the objective world as a correlate to the totality of true statements is 
equivalent to the “totality of facts” definition. This one seems more promising when it comes 
to encompassing cultural, societal, and political entities. But the definition implies that as 
soon as I make a (true) statement, I am already referring to the objective world. That would, 
however, overturn Habermas’s attempt to establish a differentiated world-view through the 
matching of worlds and attitudes in the table above. According to the correlation definition, 
                                                 
220 Cf. e.g. the debate between Habermas and Brandom: Habermas 1999 p. 138ff. and Brandom 2000b. 
221 Cf. Habermas 1981, p. 83: “…die äußere Natur oder die objektive Welt…” 
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an objectivating attitude (i.e. the trying to say something true about something) per definition 
means relating to the objective world of describable facts. In this case an objectivating attitude 
to the social and subjective world is impossible: I can only relate to the social and subjective 
world in the first-person present tense, in performative or expressive (parts of) speech acts.222 
 In other words, each definition of the objective world seems to invalidate the 
diversification Habermas was striving for with his table (cf. above, 6.7). The result is in either 
case “the alternative conception” all over again: no mediation between a performative-
expressive attitude in the first-person present tense and an objectivating attitude seems 
possible. The social and subjective world thus becomes, in the words of Tractatus, something 
that cannot be “said,” in the sense of being depicted in statements, but can only “show itself” 
in the actualisation of acts. Of course, as opposed to the early Wittgenstein, Habermas 
certainly does not leave the expressive and performing subject “speechless”; only “third 
person-less”. However, the correct account should explain the possibility of transitions within 
the same language between objectivated and non-objectivated, propositional and 
performative. The question is whether such an account can be achieved by explicating how 
the two definitions of the objective world relate to each other. 
In Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung (1999), Habermas attempts to combine his universal 
pragmatics with a pragmatic theory of action and learning. In this context, he further specifies 
the need to view the world both as a “totality of things” and as a “totality of facts”. The 
background is an attempt to amend certain weaknesses connected to his earlier proposed 
theory of truth. His 1973 article “Wahrheitstheorien” criticises both coherence and 
correspondence theories of truth, leading him to introduce the so-called consensus theory, 
later developed into the discursive theory of truth. In Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung he calls 
himself to account, and argues that the discursive theory creates the false impression that a 
sentence is true if the involved parties are able to reach an agreement about it. What must be 
                                                 
222 The first-person present tense is of course not enough in order to establish a relation to the social or subjective 
worlds. Even if verbs for emotions, attitudes etc. are used (in contradistinction to sentences such as “I am 180 cm 
tall”, “I live in Trondheim”, etc.), we must further evaluate the speech situation and the mode of the speech act to 
find out to what world the speaker relates. If I refer to my condition in a propositional manner – “I hope he will 
come” as a true report about my state of mind – this may be seen as a reference to the objective world. Cf. 
Wittgenstein, PU § 585: “Wenn Einer sagt ‘Ich hoffe, er wird kommen’ – ist das ein Bericht über seinen 
Seelenzustand, oder eine Äußerung seiner Hoffnung? – Ich kann es z.B. zu mir selbst sagen. Und mir mache ich 
doch keinen Bericht. Es kann ein Seufzer sein; aber muss kein Seufzer sein. Sage ich jemandem ’Ich kann heute 
meine Gedanken nicht bei der Arbeit halten; ich denke immer an sein Kommen’ – so wird man das eine 
Beschreibung meines Seelenzustands nennen”. In this sense, as soon as I assert something, I am already 
referring to the objective world. Correspondingly, “(It is the case that) q is forbidden” – rendered as a social fact 
– is an assertion about the objective world. 
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emphasised is that we should come to agreement about a sentence because it is true – not the 
other way around. According to Habermas, the discursive truth theory suffers from   
 
einer Überverallgemeinerung des speziellen Falls der Geltung moralischer Urteile und Normen.    
(Habermas 1999, p. 16) 
 
Habermas here implies that the validity of moral norms rests on the ideal assumption that we 
can reach an agreement about them in a discourse where all parties have been heard – and this 
assumption cannot simply be applied to the case of scientific knowledge of nature. Although 
all parties have spoken and agreement is reached, we can nevertheless not be sure that the 
theory about the Sun’s orbit around the Earth agrees with reality. In order to take care of our 
realistic intuitions in epistemology (the objective world exists independently of our ability to 
know it), without having to pay the price of moral realism (moral norms exist independently 
of our ability to acknowledge them), Habermas now distinguishes more clearly between truth 
and rightness, and emphasises that a sentence being true is not the same as it being rationally 
grounded.  
 Habermas now accentuates fallibilism: Epistemological realism implies that the 
objects we refer to may not satisfy our descriptions. Even given close to ideal communicative 
conditions, the truth may be something other than what we – with the best of reasons – 
believe it to be. Habermas does not, however, ditch the idea of nominalism all together. He 
sticks with his previous view of realism and nominalism as complementary, suggesting a 
“division of labour” between them: 
 
In den Grundbegrifflichkeiten von Realismus und Nominalismus spiegelt sich der methodische 
Unterschied zwischen dem hermeneutischen Zugang des Teilnehmers zur intersubjektiv geteilten 
Lebenswelt einerseits und der objektivierenden Einstellung des Hypothesen prüfenden Beobachters in 
der Interaktion mit dem, was ihm in der Welt begegnet, anderseits. Der grammatische Begriffsrealismus 
ist auf eine Lebenswelt zugeschnitten, an deren Praktiken wir teilnehmen und aus deren Horizont wir 
nicht heraustreten können. Demgegenüber trägt die nominalistische Begriffsfassung der objektiven Welt 
der Einsicht Rechnung, dass wir die Struktur der Aussage, mit der wir etwas in der Welt beschreiben, 
nicht zur Struktur des Seienden selbst reifizieren dürfen. Zugleich erklärt die Konzeptualisierung der 
Welt als ’Gesamtheit der Dinge, nicht der Tatsachen’, wie die Sprache mit der Welt in Kontakt tritt. Der 
Begriff der ’Referenz’ muss erklären, wie der ontologische Vorrang einer nominalistisch begriffenen 
objektiven Welt mit dem epistemischen Vorrang der sprachlich artikulierten Lebenswelt in Einklang zu 
bringen ist. (Op.cit., p. 44) 
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Habermas gives ontological priority to a nominalistically explicated objective world, and 
epistemological priority to a linguistically articulated lifeworld. Through this distinction, 
Habermas wants to have his cake and eat it too, in the sense of tending to both his realist and 
his nominalist intuitions. His point is that a concept of objective reality must be secured after 
the linguistic turn, while retaining the thesis that intersubjective language is our access to the 
world in the sense of “veritative being”. The concept of an objective world is thus put forward 
as defence against the contextualism of Rorty and others. However, the concept of an 
intersubjectively shared life world is the basic concept of world in the sense that it is the 
fundament of the objective world of things, the social world of norms, and an inner world of 
subjective experience. 
In Chapter 3.5, I suggested a distinction between epistemological and ontological 
priority as a way of explicating the complementarity of intentional agency and causality. 
However, I would not follow Habermas in using this as a method of distinguishing worlds. 
The reason is that I cannot see how Habermas can resolve the ambiguity of his concept of the 
objective world in order to make it strong enough to carry the weight of his arguments. In a 
review of Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, Albrecht Wellmer calls attention to similar problems 
concerning Habermas’s concepts of world and reality, and especially to the ambiguous 
concept of the objective world:  
 
Entweder […] bezeichnet die objektive Welt den Bereich des wissenschaftlich Objektivierbaren – dann 
wird er unbrauchbar, um den ganzen Bereich der wahrheits- und diskursfähigen Aussagen abzustecken; 
oder dieser umfasst auch noch die geschichtlich-kulturelle Wirklichkeit – dann ist das Wort ’objektiv’ 
nicht viel mehr als eine bloße Wortschleuder gegen den Kontextualismus. (Wellmer 2007, p. 211f.) 
 
The concept of an objective world brings Habermas “one step too far back to Kant”, 
according to Wellmer.223  
The sound point behind Habermas’s differentiation of worlds is his attempt to show 
that the relations between subject and world cannot be just a matter of the subject’s shifting 
attitudes – in that case we would have no safeguard against contextualism and pure relativism. 
There is “something” being objectivated, or resisting objectivation, viz. only allowing for 
“secondary objectivation” (Apel), or being a condition for the possibility of objectivation – 
diverse “somethings” that Habermas classifies in different concepts of world. However, the 
classification does not turn out in a good way. The concept of an objective world is in my 
                                                 
223 Cf. Wellmer 2007, p. 212. 
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view systematically ambiguous because I cannot see how it can be defined independently of 
the concept of truth. This leaves Habermas with two equally unsatisfying alternatives: Either 
truth value is reserved for the area of natural science, in which case we cannot ascribe truth 
value to e.g. “historic” sentences (“A said/thought/promised that p”); or the objective world 
includes e.g. historical and cultural facts, in which case it cannot carry the burden that 
Habermas lays on it as a safeguard against contextualism. 
 If the multiple world concepts are unfit to make the distinctions Habermas is aiming 
for, the concepts seem to be redundant. If social and subjective facts enter into the objective 
world, we have no longer any use for the concepts of social and subjective worlds. The first-
person present tense is all that remains, and this should be adequately covered by 
performative and expressive attitudes. Without the concepts of social and subjective world, 
the contrasting concept of objective world loses its raison d’être as well. Thus we are left with 
a single concept: The concept of world.224 
 
 
6.9 Veritative and performative being 
 
Habermas seeks to develop a differentiated view of the world as containing nature (in a 
Kantian sense) as well as society and subjective experience. In my view, this differentiation 
must be explicated grammatically, in order to avoid the ontological ambiguities of the 
“multiple world” allegory.  Habermas’s own theory about the performative-propositional 
double structure of speech points us in the right direction. By indicating a universal structure 
for all intentional acts, Habermas sheds light on the relation between the performative-
expressive aspect of language and the propositional aspect. Both aspects can be further 
elucidated by differentiating the indexical systems of ordinary language:  
 
1) The propositional aspect can be explored by looking at how the horizontal 
indexical system of language renders possible the maintenance of the same 
propositional content through different speaker’s positions, thus opening up 
the world to us in the sense of “veritative being” (cf. Tugendhat). 
                                                 
224 Which would maybe be equivalent to Habermas’s undifferentiated (or predifferentiated) concept of lifeworld. 
However, whereas the concept of world is methologically “neutral”, the concept of lifeworld emphasises the 
primacy of our “living” experience with the world (the world as “erlebt”) over the world-view resulting from 
objectivation or theoretical analysis. 
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2) The performative aspect can be explored by examining the vertical indexical 
system, the transitions between use and mention in language, opening up the 
world to us in the sense of “performative being” – i.e. being in the sense of 
being conscious-in-acting. 
 
Instead of differentiating worlds, we may differentiate between primary and secondary 
objectivation, as Apel does, or between different versions of the third-person mode, as Øfsti 
does. A sentence in the “absolute third person” deals with entities that are not language users, 
i.e. that can only be referred to in the third person, not be addressees (in the second person) or 
speakers (in the first person)225, while a sentence in the “relative third person” is about 
persons and actions. In line with Apel’s “secondary objectivation”, Øfsti’s concept of 
“relative third person” is employed in order to point out the hermeneutic dimension 
“between” objectified nature and I-you-communication, a dimension that is disregarded 
within “the scientistic alternative conception”: 
 
The failure to assess correctly this category of the relative third person is, I believe, closely related to 
what K.-O. Apel deplores as the ‘scientistic fallacy’ of assuming that the transition from speech in the 
first and second person to speech in the third person mode must necessarily be a transition to the 
standpoint of pure observation and theoretical explanation in the Hempelian sense. (Øfsti 1985, p. 47, 
note 16) 
 
In the Hempelian approach, the relative third person is, one could say, assigned the dubious 
function of a “turntable” in the scientistic objectivation of persons and actions: 
 
Die ’dritte Person’ kann sozusagen innerhalb von zwei ’Sprachspielen’ (…) gehandhabt werden, als 
’relativ’ dritte Person im ’Person-Handlung-Verantwortung’-Spiel, und als ’absolut’ dritte Person im 
’naturalistischen’ Sprachspiel. Die alltagssprachlichen Formulierungen in der dritten Person (über 
Personen und Handlungen) funktionieren beim szientistischen Fehlschluss als eine Art Drehscheibe. 
Personen und ihre Handlungen werden durch diese Form in das naturalistische Sprachspiel 
eingeschleust und den dort üblichen Bedingungen der Begriffs- und Theoriebildung unterworfen. Was 
übersehen wird ist, dass in ihrer normalen Funktion im Person-Handlung-Verantwortung-Spiel (das 
essentiell umgangssprachlich ist) der Sinn der Handlungsverben essentiell von ihrer 
handlungskonstitutiven Verwendung in der ersten Person Präsens, überhaupt von ihrer Rolle in der 
unmittelbaren Kommunikation und Interaktion, lebt. (Øfsti 1994a, p. 182)  
 
                                                 
225 Cf. Øfsti 1985, p. 26f. 
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The possibility of describing persons and actions in the third person may lead to ignoring the 
decisive distinction between the objectivated “absolute third person” and the secondary 
objectivated “relative third person”. The relative 3p turns unnoticeably into absolute 3p, 
reaching towards a scientistic ideal (à la Hempel) of replacing all “colloquial”, “prescientific” 
phrases with well-defined, precise, experimentally testable, “scientific” predicates. The 
problem is that the new, “scientific” phrases cannot be conjugated back to the first-person 
present tense without absurdities: The performative consciousness-in-acting is lost on the way 
to a scientific language. If we remain within colloquial language, the transition from the 
consciousness-in-acting expressed in I-you-communication to a report in the third person is 
not a transition to a theoretical perspective. The verbs that constitute or express 
consciousness-in-acting in the first person are adequate in the third person as well in order to 
achieve the desired understanding of (and virtually with) the agent mentioned in the sentence. 
This is because – as Wittgenstein demonstrates in PU – the meaning of expressive-
performative predicates necessarily has two roots: the act-/consciousness-constitutive use (“I 
promise you that…”) and the descriptive use (“I promised/she promises that…”). 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action is a good point of departure from which 
to look at the relationship between agency, language, and world. Habermas sheds light on the 
connection between linguistic meaning and action by connecting the sense of utterances to our 
interest in reaching understanding for the sake of orienting action.226 His approach has the 
advantage of showing how the idea of a world existing independently of us actually evolves 
through our practical dealings with the world, where we encounter objects offering resistance 
to our actions. This may be viewed as a generalisation of the idea behind an interventionist 
theory of causality. Making explicit the practical dimension that underlies our ability to have 
representational knowledge forms the rational basis of the double structure of speech, where 
true or false propositions are placed within the frame of intentional agency. Habermas’s 
universal pragmatics and the theory of communicative action carry on the pragmatic-linguistic 
turn of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Austin, and others. His concepts of validity claims, classes of 
speech acts, speakers’ attitudes and so forth contribute to a systematic theory of language 
based on a view of reason as communicative competence. Further, by combining this 
normative pragmatics with a pragmatic theory of action and learning, he generates strong 
arguments against relativism and contextualism. However, in my view the differentiation of 
                                                 
226 An aspect that may be regarded as underplayed in Brandom’s theory, cf. above, Ch. 5.4. 
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worlds contains the remainders of an “alternative conception”, however contrary this is to 
what Habermas aims at. 
The problem with Habermas’s concept of the objective world is that it cannot both 
function as a defence against Rortian contextualism while at the same time encompass the 
historic and cultural reality. The problem with his concept of a social world is that it remains 
ambiguous whether objectivated action still belongs to this world, or whether action at the 
moment of objectivation is “sluiced” out of it and into the objective world. The same problem 
arises in the case of the subjective world: If subjective experience is objectivated, i.e. 
subjected to the objectivating attitude, is it not thereby already transferred to the objective 
world? 
A further problem with the concept of an inner world of subjective experience is that it 
inevitably suggests a “something” that can be (truthfully or not) expressed, and to which I 
myself have a “privileged access”.227 Undoubtedly it is important to point out the special case 
of the first person present tense as “the limit of experience”, but when doing this we must be 
careful not to postulate a “something” to which only I have access, in which case we end up 
with a paralogism in Kant’s sense (cf. KrV A 348ff./B 376ff.) or a Wittgensteinian “beetle in 
a box” (cf. PU § 293). Characterising the subjective as “inner” (vs. what is “outer”) conceals 
the fact that the subjective essentially is expressible, i.e. has outer criteria (cf. PU § 580).228 
 A general problem with Habermas’s worlds is that the concepts suggest a certain 
constancy regarding what kinds of entities belong within the different categories. However, as 
the systems of indexicality display, what is from one perspective an expression of the 
subjective experience of the speaker, is from another perspective the object of assessment or 
description. The concept of worlds lacks the necessary flexibility to address such transitions. 
A grammatical division seems in that sense more promising than the ontologically charged 
concept of world. However, we should maintain Habermas’s anti-contextualist point: 
Objectivity, truth, validity, etc. are not only a question of the subject’s attitudes – the world 
exists independently of us, and offers resistance to our attempts. This can be complemented 
                                                 
227 Cf. e.g. Habermas 1981 p. 84. Against this formulation however, consider p. 137, where Habermas stresses 
that subjective experience must not be perceived as mental episodes or inner episodes; “damit würden wir sie an 
Entitäten, an Bestandteile der objektiven Welt angleichen”. The ambiguities of Habermas’s position is, I suggest, 
due to the difficult balance of his position, as well as to an inherent problem in the use of the inner-outer 
metaphors, cf. next fn. 
228 Of course, Habermas’s intention is to avoid such implication, but as I have argued above, I find the use of the 
inner-outer metaphor to be a continuous source of misconceptions in the philosophical debate on free 
will/agency, cf. above, Ch. 1.3. Cf. also my critique of Sebastian Rödl, Ch. 4.4. 
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with an anti-naturalist229 point: Not everything that exists can be objectivated in the scientistic 
sense that we can turn it into an object for natural science. On the contrary, “something” must 
be considered as epistemologically prior to the objectivated world, and thus as a condition for 
us having knowledge at all. This is a Kantian motive that is constantly reinvented in 
philosophy, and that Wellmer – commenting on Adorno’s theory of the sublime – gives a 
striking version of: 
 
In gewissem Sinne (…) hatte Adorno recht, wenn er für das Absolute, wenn er für das intelligible Ich 
einen Ort zwischen Sein und nicht-Sein suchte. Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik aber ließ hier als ein 
Drittes nur die Idee eines künftiges Seins zu. Schon Kant aber hatte, und zwar vor jeder kritischen 
Metaphysik, jenen Ort zwischen Sein und Nicht-Sein überzeugender als den eines praktischen Seins 
bestimmt: Es ’gibt’ Freiheit in der Welt, sofern wir nur unter der Idee der Freiheit handeln können. Dies 
Sein der Freiheit bezeichnet keinen Zustand der Versöhnung, es bezeichnet vielmehr einen Seinsmodus 
der Welt sprachlich erschlossenen Sinns, durch welchen diese objektivierender Erkenntnis im strikten 
Sinne unzugänglich bleiben muss, ihr als ein Nicht-Sein erscheinen muss.230 Bei Kant bleibt dieser 
fruchtbare Gedanke freilich noch eingehüllt in ein Gewebe bewusstseinsphilosophischer 
Voraussetzungen; erst die neuere Philosophie – ich denke vor allem an Heidegger, Wittgenstein und die 
amerikanischen Pragmatisten – hat die Voraussetzungen dafür geschaffen, den Kantischen Gedanken 
sprachphilosophisch zu reformulieren und hierdurch zu verallgemeinern. Der Gedanke besagt dann – so 
findet er sich in besonders klarer Form bei Habermas –, dass das Sein der sprachlichen Sinns, der 
Freiheit, der Wahrheit, der Vernunft ein performatives Sein ist, ein Sein, das sich erst in der 
performativen Einstellung sprachlich kommunizierender Subjekte konstituiert und nur in ihr sich erhält. 
(Wellmer 1991, p. 183f.)  
 
In Wellmer’s wording, “being” has more than one sense. Wellmer points to Habermas’s 
universal pragmatics and the double structure of speech as a way of explicating this point. In 
this spirit, I suggest distinguishing between: 
 
1) Veritative being: Being in the sense that something (i.e. propositions) can be true or 
false. This mode of being is opened up to us by help of the horizontal indexical 
system, enabling us to maintain a propositional content throughout different speech 
                                                 
229 I.e. naturalism in the sense discussed above, Ch. 5.2; not in the sense of Habermas’s own concept of “weak 
naturalism”. 
230 [fn SGC] I understand Wellmer here as pointing to objectivating knowledge in the sense of 
scientisticobjectivation (by which the link to the 1pp-case is cut), not the secondary objectivation in Apel’s 
sense, by which we are able to hermeneutically describe actions. Otherwise his formulation would be leaning 
towards an “alternative conception” in the sense that free agency can only be recognised in the first-person 
present tense, and must emerge as a “non-being” from the perspective of an observer. 
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situations, thus gaining access to a context-transcending truth and a “logical space of 
reasons”. 
2) Performative being: Being in the sense of consciousness-in-acting. This mode of being 
is opened up to us by help of the vertical indexical system, making the transitions 
between use and mention possible, thus distinguishing and connecting “the limit of the 
world” (the self-consciousness of the subject) and the world (what can be 
described/said). 
 
In accordance with the performative-propositional double structure of speech, performative 
being is the superior mode in the sense that the veritative being that is expressed in 
propositions can occur only within the limits of performances, i.e. speech acts. If we look at 
the different grammatical modes of tenses and persons, we see that these categories have the 
necessary flexibility missing in Habermas’s account of different worlds. First-person present 
tense typically relates to the world in sense 2.231 “Absolute third person” typically refers to the 
world in sense 1.232 “Relative third person” essentially involves relating to the world in both 
senses: A sentence in the relative third person proposes to say something true, e.g. about a 
performed action, but at the same time, in dealing with the irreducibly normative, it relates to 
the performative being expressed in the corresponding first-person present form. In short: 
Veritative being is asserted in propositions, while performative being is expressed in the 
performative parts of speech acts, or (normatively) ascribed in propositions in the relative 
third person. These are not mutually exclusive, but overlapping modes of being. This account 
emphasises that free agency does not belong in a separate world, realm, kingdom, or language 
game. Free actions exist, and take place in the very same world as everything else. 
 This distinction is based on the performative-propositional double structure, and aims 
to shows the complementarity between the performative and the propositional dimension of 
speech and reason, as well as between consciousness-in-acting and consciousness of objects. 
Øfsti gives an account of this positive connection in Abwandlungen: 
 
Alle meine Handlungen bedürfen einer Art des Selbstbewusstseins, das eben nicht die Form eines 
Bewusstseins von mir als Objekt hat (…), sondern eher mit dem ‘Ich denke’ der transzendentalen 
                                                 
231 It is, of course, possible to describe oneself in 1pp, thus relating to oneself in the sense of “veritative being”, 
e.g. in sentences such as “(It is true that) I have blue eyes”, or even “(It is true that) I am in pain” when this 
sentence is used to inform my doctor, cf. above. The mode of an utterance is, in other words, not given by 
grammatical criteria alone. 
232 Exceptions to this could be what Habermas calls “moral-aesthetic relation to non-objectivated surroundings”, 
cf. his table above, Ch. 6.7. 
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Apperzeption zu vergleichen ist. (…) Das Handlungsbewusstsein des Akteurs ist (…) konstitutiver 
Bestandteil der Handlung selbst und insofern Bedingung der Möglichkeit ihrer späteren (oder aktuellen) 
Beschreibung/Zuscreibung zum Akteur als eine bestimmte intentionale Handlung. (Øfsti 1994a, p. 135) 
 
But at the same time: 
 
Es kann das performative Handlungswissen in der ersten Person Präsens des Aktes auch nicht geben 
ohne die mögliche Abwandlung in die anderen Formen (Präteritum, dritte und zweite Person), die ja 
tatsächlich Beschreibungen der Handlung (bzw. ihre Zuschreibung zu einer Substanz/Person) sind. 
Dieses Moment hat z.B. Kant vernachlässigt, als er sich nicht klar machte, dass auch das ’Ich denke’ 
des aktualen Erkenntnisaktes bodenlos wird, wenn die Verbindung mit einer möglichen späteren 
Selbstbeschreibung oder Selbstzuschreibung (’Ich habe gedacht’, ’Ich habe behauptet’ usw.) 
beziehungsweise mit der möglichen Einnahme der Perspektive der anderen (…) fehlt. (Loc.cit.) 
 
This complementarity cannot be recognised within a mentalistic philosophy of mind, but is 
explicable within a pragmatic philosophy of language. This, however, demands that we 
manage to avoid getting trapped in an “alternative conception”. In the next and final chapter 
of my dissertation, I look at how this decisive point is taken care of within the philosophical 
debate on free will/agency, specifically with regards to the debate between compatibilists and 
libertarians. 
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Chapter 7: Freedom and first-person priority 
 
 
[D]as Bewusstsein meines eigenen Daseins ist zugleich ein  
unmittelbares Bewusstsein des Daseins anderer Dinge außer mir.  
(Kant, KrV B276) 
 
Beobachten ist selbst ein Fall der Teilnahme.  
(Seel 2005, p. 145) 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction: The limits to self-objectivation 
 
Methodological naturalism rests on the conviction that all knowledge – including the 
knowledge we have of ourselves – is revisable in light of new scientific progress. In one sense 
this is nothing more than sound, epistemological prudence. Any attempt to say otherwise, i.e 
by pointing out epistemological conditions for the process of gaining knowledge itself – must 
take care not to recede into infallabilistic apriorism. Habermas warns against this: 
 
Die erkenntnistheoretische Wendung darf nicht den starken transzendentalen Sinn haben, die 
intersubjektiven Bedingungen des Zugangs zur objektiven Welt gegen weiter empirisch informierte 
Nachforschung zu immunisieren. (Habermas 2006, p. 695) 
 
At the same time, any attempt to objectivate self-consciousness threatens to cross a 
“performative” limit in the sense of draining our everyday and scientific practices of their 
meaning. Thomas Nagel talks about an opposition, not between two views about how matters 
stand in the world (e.g. one according to which it is up to me what I do and one according to 
which my actions are the results of strict laws of nature), but 
 
between a theory about how things are and a practice that would be impossible if this was how things 
were. (Nagel 1997, p. 116f.) 
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Suppose I am taught, and become convinced, that all my actions happen as the result of 
psychological mechanisms, neuro-processes, or external manipulation. I will have no rational 
way of reacting to such information. I would have to reckon my belief in it among the results 
of the causal forces influencing me, thus it cannot count as a reason on the basis of which I 
could make a decision or draw a conclusion. Furthermore, even to think this would be a 
rational argument that I would no longer be in a position to draw a conclusion from:  
 
Doubt about your own rationality is unstable; it leaves you really with nothing to think.  
(Nagel 1997, p. 116)233 
 
Thus, it is practically impossible for me not to conceive of myself as a rationally thinking 
being. 
According to Habermas, the continuing expansion of the area of knowledge about 
ourselves – e.g. through Darwin’s theory of evolution or even Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious – may be fruitful and may function as liberating right up to the point where I 
attempt to view myself as subjected to strict laws of nature. Paradoxically, once the limit of 
self-objectivation is crossed, there is no longer anyone whose self-knowledge can expand, or 
who may be liberated. The subject of ever-expanding knowledge and continuous self-
liberation dissolves: 
 
Die Grenze naturalistischer Selbstobjektivierung wird mit Beschreibungen überschritten, unter denen 
sich Personen nicht mehr als Personen wiedererkennen können. (Habermas 2006, p. 681) 
 
The practical impossibility of going beyond the view of myself as a freely acting subject is 
what Kant refers to as a “Fact of Reason”.234 The fact of reason is not a theoretically thought-
out concept, but something that reveals itself in my capacity to make decisions in the sense of 
acting according to reasons, thereby answering the question “What should I do?” To the 
extent that scientific discovery is a human activity, it seems that the “fact of reason” must be 
primary to the principles of science: 
 
                                                 
233 In The Last Word (1997), Nagel carries on his critique of “the external standpoint” from The View from 
Nowhere (1986). In general I agree with the critical side of his endeavour, but will avoid at this point going into 
a discussion of Nagel’s own approach to the problem of self-objectivation, which is in my view problematic 
(problematic, as Habermas comments as well, because of his mentalist understanding of the distinction between 
first- and third-person perspectives, cf. below, fn 25 and above, Ch. 1.3). 
234 Cf. KpV, e.g. 9; 56; 72. 
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The Scientific World View is a description of the world which serves the purposes of explanation and 
prediction. When its concepts are applied correctly it tells us that things are true. But it is not a 
substitute for human life. And nothing in human life is more real than the fact that we must make our 
decisions and choices ‘under the idea of freedom’. (Korsgaard 1996, p. 97) 
 
The performer of scientific activity cannot – any more than any other agent – objectivate her 
own perspective without at the same time suspending the claims she is making. Thus, the 
carrying out of a self-objectivating scheme paradoxically dissolves itself. This is because the 
attitudes we take up against states of affairs or other persons are not experiences that the 
subject can have or not have, but acts that the subject performs or carries out. In other words 
they have a normative character; they constitute rule-governed behaviour and may as such 
fail or succeed.235 This normative character is inaccessible from the perspective of pure 
scientific objectivation: 
 
Unter einer objektivierenden Beschreibung, die aus begrifflichen Gründen die Differenz zwischen dem 
Gelingen- und Misslingenkönnen einer Operation zu Gunsten eines faktischen Geschehens – das ist, wie 
es ist – einziehen muss, kann sich eine Person nicht als solche wiedererkennen. (Habermas 2006, p. 
683)  
 
In ways similar to this, many have argued the practical impossibility – or pragmatic 
inconsistency – of arguing against a human capacity for free agency. Given an interventionist 
theory of the interdependence between causality and agency, it seems moreover possible to 
argue that it is not only practically, but also epistemologically speaking impossible to get 
beyond the presumption of free agency. If causal statements, e.g. about the functions of the 
brain, conceptually point back to an idea of intentional agency, then this sets a limit as to what 
can be objectivated. In other words, it is not only impossible to act except under the idea of 
freedom, but furthermore also to think if not for a presupposition of free agency.  
In Chapter 3.5 above, I argued that the concept of intentional action may be seen as 
epistemologically primary and the concept of causality as ontologically primary. From this it 
is understandable that the naturalistic branch of philosophy focuses on ontological questions, 
as Habermas comments: 
 
Für den Naturalisten empfiehlt es sich, die epistemische, auf das Bewusstsein von Akteuren bezogene 
Betrachtungsweise aufzugeben, um stattdessen ontologisch zu untersuchen, welchen Platz geistige 
                                                 
235 Cf. above, Ch. 4. 
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Zustände in einer materialistisch begriffenen und kausal geschlossenen Welt einnehmen. (Habermas 
2006, p. 688) 
 
Kantian and/or pragmatically minded philosophers, on the other hand, argue that since there is 
no such thing as a “pure” ontology, since there can be no “view from nowhere” from which 
such a “pure” insight into the world is attainable, even our most objective knowledge of the 
world is rendered possible by, thus subjected to, certain epistemological conditions of 
possibility. One such condition, already suggested by Kant, and developed further by among 
others Peirce and von Wright – is our ability to actively intervene with the ways of the world.  
A one-sided focus on the epistemological conditions of our access to the world, 
however, threatens to end in relativism or contextualism, reducing all truth to “true for me” or 
“true for us”. Hence, we must rush to add that the ontologically primary idea of a world 
existing independently of – and offering resistance towards – the acting and knowing subject 
(or community) is an equally decisive condition for the possibility of knowledge as the 
epistemologically primary conception of ourselves as agents actively engaged with the world. 
Further in this chapter I will look at the debate between compatibilistic and libertarian 
defences of human freedom, regarding the question of whether action can meaningfully be 
called free independently of how matters stand in nature, i.e. whether natural events are the 
result of deterministic laws of nature or not (7.2). In 7.3 I critically analyse compatibilism by 
setting this view in connection with scientism and the above analysed “alternative 
conception”.236 I discuss whether a compatibilistic position is defensible given a rejection of 
the scientific fallacy (which is Habermas’ position), or whether a rejection of the scientific 
fallacy equals a defeat of compatibilism. In the final section, 7.4, I give a few concluding 
remarks, both to this chapter and to the thesis as such. 
 
 
7.2 Doing otherwise: The debate between compatibilists and libertarians 
 
Throughout this thesis I have with a few exceptions stayed away from the traditional 
philosophical debate on free will. Instead I have directed my efforts towards establishing 
arguments against what I consider to be an underlying and misleading assumption in great 
parts of the debate. This assumption is that our “observational” view of the world – a world of 
                                                 
236 Cf. above, Ch. 6.2. 
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scientifically predictable events – is a primary and relatively unproblematic view, into which 
we must try to fit a conception of free agency. Against this I have argued that our primary 
access to the world is formed by our condition of being free, in the sense of being rational, 
communicating agents.  
At this point I turn briefly towards the debate on free will in order to look at how my 
approach fits into some central issues there. Specifically, I consider some versions of 
compatibilistic or libertarian positions that I consider to be closest to my own position. 
Compatibilists and libertarians share an “optimistic” view on the possibility of freedom,237 i.e. 
both view free agency as possible. But while compatibilists claim that the idea that we are free 
is consistent with the possibility of determinism, libertarians claim that the falsity of 
determinism is presupposed in the way we speak about free actions, choices, and decisions. 
 Both sides of the debate between compatibilism and libertarianism plead for intuitions 
supporting their view. And to me it seems that there truly are strong intuitions that support 
both sides. At face value, common sense backs a libertarian view: Our actions cannot 
reasonably be both free and governed by deterministic laws of nature.238 Trying to combine 
these two seems like an attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too, or at least like a position for 
which one would have to be a professional philosopher to even try to uphold. Furthermore, at 
first glance, compatibilism would seem to require some form of dualism.  
Nevertheless, an “agnostic compatibilism”,239 according to which the topic of 
determinism is irrelevant for the question of freedom, has an intuitively sound point as well: 
It seems somewhat strange that the matter of free agency should depend upon the outcome of 
a controversy within the theory of science over whether or not the laws of nature are 
exceptionless. In Gary Watson’s words: 
 
[T]he difference between free and unfree actions – as we normally discern it – has nothing at all to do 
with the truth or falsity of determinism. (Watson 2003, p. 338) 
 
After all, we are not speaking about the possibility of non-governed, accidental behaviour (in 
which case we would not even apply the term agency), but of free agency in the Kantian sense 
                                                 
237 On freedom “optimism” vs. “pessimism”, cf. e.g. P.F Strawson 1974 and G. Strawson 1989/2004. The 
vocabulary points out the fact that we somehow want it to be true that we are free, since we otherwise apparently 
base our life on a giant self-deception. 
238 J.M. Fisher’s “Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness” might be seen as a formal preparation of this 
intuition (Cf. Fisher 1994, p. 8). 
239 The alternative to agnostic compatibilism is “deterministic compatibilism”, according to which freedom is not 
only compatible with determinism, but that it even demands the truth of determinism, cf. Keil 2007b, e.g.  p. 8. I 
do not discuss this position further here. 
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that we act according to reasons and are responsible for our actions. From this perspective it 
hardly seems implausible to accept our capacity to act freely prior to even taking a stand 
towards the status of laws of nature. 
From a non-philosophical view, the debate between compatibilists and libertarians 
may seem hopelessly academic. A strict, Laplacean determinism is a rare position, and at that 
a purely theoretical one that cannot be empirically tested. And even for weaker forms of 
determinism (e.g. psychological or logical determinism) there is (and can be) no empirical 
evidence.240 The compatibilistic claim is that even if determinism is true, this would not rule 
out our actions being free. It may seem futile to discuss such a hypothetical question, since 
compatibilists and libertarians agree on the important matter of recognising the possibility of 
free agency. The two ways of arguing reveals, however, substantial differences in the 
understanding of the concept of free agency. These differences may turn out to be decisive 
when it comes to putting up a defence against “freedom pessimists”, i.e. against opposing 
views denying the possibility of freedom.241  
A famous defence for compatibilism is to be found in P.F. Strawson’s article 
“Freedom and Resentment”. Strawson’s move is to view moral attitudes such as approval and 
condemnation as generalised forms of emotional reactions such as resentment, gratitude, and 
love. These attitudes are “suspended” under certain conditions, namely when the person who 
is acting in a way that we normally would resent or praise, is someone who we do not reckon 
as responsible (notably a child or a mentally ill person). Normal emotional reactions and 
moral attitudes are those we have towards persons with whom we reciprocally interact – our 
co-subjects. In certain extra-ordinary cases, however, we take on an “objective attitude”.242 
Decisive for Strawson’s compatibilistic argument is that for conceptual reasons we must view 
such cases of objective attitudes as exceptions. As opposed to these exceptional cases, the 
determinist’s claim that her being late to the appointment was an unavoidable result of 
preceding causes would contribute nothing to our moral judgement of her lateness. In other 
words, whether determinism is true or not is simply irrelevant to the question of whether we 
ought to consider each other as free and responsible agents.  
Marcus Willaschek sees the advantage of Strawson’s approach in that by 
understanding approval and condemnation as generalised forms of natural emotional attitudes, 
                                                 
240 Although empirical evidence may support or weaken a deterministic thesis, cf. Keil 2007b, p. 38. 
241 Although “freedom pessimism” is a relatively rare view within philosophical circles, it is more widespread in 
other academic areas. The debate on free will is very much alive and has not least been fuelled as a result of 
progress within the neurosciences, cf. below, Ch. 7.4. 
242 Cf. Strawson 1974, p. 81. 
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he avoids having to reinterpret them instrumentally the way many previous compatibilists, 
e.g. Hume and Moore, did: 
 
Er [Strawson] kann daher anerkennen, dass der Grund dafür, dass wir Menschen loben und tadeln, in 
erster Linie in dem liegt, was sie getan haben, und nicht darin, dass wir ihr zukünftiges Verhaltens 
beeinflussen wollen. (Willaschek 2003, p. 200) 
 
Willaschek does, however, agree with certain critical objections to Strawson’s argument:243 
Strawson argues that morally speaking, the incompatibilist’s claim is irrelevant. However, 
incompatibilists make a moral claim when they say that it is unfair to hold people responsible 
for their actions if determinism is true. We cannot simply brush aside this claim by saying that 
it is irrelevant in a moral discussion. 
Willaschek argues that it is possible to reconstruct Strawson’s argument in a way that 
meets this criticism. He attempts to accomplish this by liberating the argument from the 
discussion of whether a compatibilistic interpretation of punishment and reward is fair or not, 
and to see it as a conclusion based on two premises: 
 
(P1) That an action is not free counts as an extenuation. 
(P2) The (real or presumed) fact that all our actions are causally determined does not count as 
an extenuation. 
(K) Freedom and determinism are compatible.244 
 
The first premise is relatively unproblematic, and may be viewed as a conceptual truth: 
Freedom is a necessary condition for responsibility. The second premise is the decisive one 
here. Willaschek defends it by showing that neither our colloquial nor our legal use of the 
concept of responsibility implies a strong, incompatibilistic concept of freedom, but only a 
weaker one that is compatible with determinism. An incompatibilist would have to argue that 
our general use of the concept is wrong, an argument that according to Willaschek would be 
futile: 
 
                                                 
243 He refers to U. Pothast and J. Wallace regarding this criticism cf. Loc.cit. 
244 Cf. Willaschek 2003, p. 201. In fn. 2 he formalises the argument thus: 
(P1) Non-freedom => Non-responsibility 
(P2) Determinism ≠> Non-responsibility 
(K) Determinism ≠> Non-freedom 
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Eine Begriffsanalyse, nach der sich herausstellt, dass der analysierte Begriff bisher immer falsch 
verwendet wurde, kann einfach nicht stimmen. (Op.cit., p. 204) 
 
In other words, the incompatibilists in fact discuss a different concept of responsibility than 
the regular one, one of no practical concern. Thus, our normal concept of freedom as 
responsibility is shown to be compatible with determinism, since determinism has nothing to 
say regarding our essentially “local” references to cases of unfreedom. Willaschek admits, 
however, that nothing is thereby said as to how causally determined actions can be free. 
 To Geert Keil, this solution is unsatisfactory. What Strawson and Willaschek rightly 
argue is that we in everyday and legal practice hold each other responsible with no thought of 
determinism. But between this sound argument and their conclusion, that such a practice 
would be justified even in a deterministic world, there is a loophole. What Strawson and 
Willaschek fail to consider, is how to make sense of a concept of human agency and decision 
making which does not include the existence of alternative possibilities. According to Keil, a 
robust concept of freedom presupposes a space of freedom that the existence of deterministic 
laws of nature would exclude. If the outcome of the-event-which-under-some-description-is-
my-intentional-action is predetermined by strict laws of nature, then – however unaware I 
may be of the outcome – there is really literally nothing left for me to decide, and nothing left 
for me to reason about:245 
 
Unterlassbarkeit [ist] eine analytische Komponente des Handlungsbegriffs und libertarische 
Willensfreiheit ein integraler Bestandteil der Handlungsfreiheit (…) Unsere gewöhnliche Rede über 
Handlungen, Überlegungen und Entscheidungen ist im Rahmen der selbstverständlichen 
vortheoretichen Annahme entstanden, dass die Zukunft offen und beeinflussbar ist, und dass wir im 
Handeln eine dieser offenen Möglichkeiten ergreifen. Wer diese Annahme zurückzieht, weil er den 
Weltlauf für alternativlos fixiert hält, sollte besser von Quasi-Entscheidungen, Quasi-Handlungen, 
Quasi-Überlegungen, Quasi-Fähigheiten und Quasi-Freiheiten sprechen. (Keil 2007b, p. 79) 
 
Keil argues that compatibilists underestimate the degree to which determinism undermines 
our ordinary conception of agency. If we remove the actual possibility of “doing otherwise” 
from the concept of free agency, there is no freedom left that deserves the name. 
                                                 
245 For a similar critique of compatibilism, cf. Searle 2001, p. 277ff. Keil argues that, although this reductio 
argument does not count as a proof against determinism, it shows that it cannot be reasonably claimed (“dass 
man ihn nicht begründet vertreten kann”, cf. Keil 2007b, p. 77), since the determinist must view the result of any 
reasoning of his own – including the one leading to his advocacy of the determinist thesis – as determined. 
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This critique constitutes an argument against determinism, but not yet, it seems, a 
positive argument for the existence of a “robust” freedom of agency. Keil defends a “natural 
libertarianism”, i.e. he does not refer to any supernatural entity in order to account for free 
will. Instead he assumes that the universe must be indeterministic to make room for free 
decision making. A common objection to this view is that it seems powerless when it comes 
to accounting for why an agent makes the decisions she makes. David Hume argued that a 
choice that is not determined is simply a random event, in other words something that cannot 
count as a rational choice. Natural libertarianism often points to quantum mechanics as a 
support for the claim that determinism is false, thus that freedom is possible.246 However, as 
Roy C. Weatherford writes in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy: 
[T]he random behavior of atoms certainly does not by itself make for the freedom and moral 
responsibility asserted by libertarians. (Weatherford 1995; “Libertarianism”) 
The quantum mechanical argument in a sense “proves too much”, since the indeterminism it 
suggests applies everywhere in the universe, and thus amounts to nothing more than “the 
freedom of a roasting jack”.247 In other words, “natural libertarians” must follow up the 
rejection of determinism with a positive account of how rational choice is possible in an 
indeterministic world. If my decisions are not determined, they seem to be a result of 
coincidence. In what sense can such “sheer accidents” support the assumption that I am a free 
and responsible agent? 
Indeterminism might be said to constitute the negative or defensive side of 
libertarianism, namely the one that guarantees that nothing stands in the way of freedom. It 
must, however, be supplemented with a positive account of what constitutes freedom. We 
could say that the concept of freedom consists both of a “freedom from” and a “freedom to”: 
Zum einen muss Freiheit positiv als Vermögen erläutert werden, beispielsweise als das Vermögen, 
praktische Überlegungen anzustellen und diese Überlegungen handlungswirksam werden zu lassen  
(…) Zum anderen muss dieses Vermögen in die Welt passen. (Keil 2007b, p. 106) 
 
                                                 
246 It is worth noticing that quantum mechanics does not surrender the category of causality, which seems to 
suggest that the principle of causality is independent of determinism, cf. Keil 2007b, p. 42: “Der Determinismus 
gilt in der modernen Physik als weithin diskreditiert, während die Kausalität quicklebendig ist”. 
247 Cf. Kant, KpV 174; cf. above, Ch. 2.4. 
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A negative side of libertarianism that is common to its different versions is indeterminism. 
This secures the “space” needed in order to establish a strong conception of freedom on the 
positive side: In Keil’s version an “ability to do otherwise under given circumstances”.248   
I have largely left out the “negative side” of this discussion and focused on giving a 
positive account in support of the concept of free agency. As I see it, this implies an “ability 
to do otherwise under given circumstances”. What I have not done in my thesis, however, is 
to move into a discussion of how the world would have to be so that this ability could “fit in”, 
over and above a rejection of a dualist view of the world. Given a monistic world-view, a 
strict, Laplacean determinism cannot in my view be combined with free agency. In the next 
section, I will take a closer look at the problems connected with a compatibilistic concept of 
action. However, I remain agnostic as to what exact status laws of nature could have or would 
have to have in order for them to answer to the demands of a robust conception of free 
agency. 
 
 
7.3 Compatibilism and Scientism 
 
In contrast to the mainstream philosophical debate, I have hardly mentioned the concept of 
free will, and have instead investigated the concept of free agency. As I argued in Chapter 1, I 
see no strict lines between the two concepts. The reason I have focused on agency is that I 
disagree with the view that free will is a stronger concept than free agency; rather, the reverse 
is the case. In my view, actions are what can be referred to as free, fundamentally speaking, in 
the sense that they are what we are held responsible for. Other uses of the predicate “free” are 
derivative from this: Free (building of the) will is a part of or itself an instance of freedom of 
agency, while a person may be called free to the degree that she has an ability to act freely. I 
take free will to mean the freedom to “build one’s will” in the sense of forming an intention 
and/or making a decision. An intention-in-action is part of the action itself, whereas the 
process of forming an intention prior to an action is a separate act, viz. a mental action: 
 
‘[E]ntscheiden können’ ist ja selbst ein Fall von ‘handeln können’: Plausiblerweise sind Entscheidungen 
selbst zurechenbare Handlungen, wenn auch mentale. (Keil 2007b, p. 58) 
 
                                                 
248 “Anderskönnen unter gegebene Bedingungen”, cf. e.g. Keil 2007b, p. 87ff. 
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Although Geert Keil speaks of Willensfreiheit in his book by this name, it is worth noticing 
that he defines freedom, not as a property, an attribute or a condition (“the condition of being 
free”), but as a capability, viz. the ability to do otherwise under given circumstances. In 
support of this definition, Keil refers to Kant and von Wright, as well as to Aristotle’s 
breaking down of the concept of agency to “that which is in our power to do or not to do”249: 
 
Aristoteles’ Feststellung, wo das Tun unserer Gewalt sei, sei es auch das Unterlassen, verschiebt das 
Gehalt des ’starken’ Freiheitsbegriffs auf den Begriff des Tuns, Vollziehens oder Handelns. Wenn das 
Anderskönnen analytisch zum Handlungsbegriff gehört, implizieren schon unsere gewöhnlichen 
Handlungsbeschreibungen eine massive Freiheitsmetaphysik. Es gäbe keinen Grund, das Vokabular des 
Handelns oder Vollziehens in Anschlag zu bringen, wenn in meinem Körper nur etwas 
Prädeterminiertes, Unausweichliches geschähe. (Keil 2007b, p. 89) 
 
As Keil emphasises, the “massive metaphysics of freedom” involved in our ordinary language 
of agency can hardly count as a proof of freedom. Further, the existence of a possibility to “do 
otherwise under given circumstances” cannot be empirically tested, since our world is such 
that an identical situation of decision making can never reoccur.250 However, this argument 
seems to shift the burden of evidence to those who claim that free agency does not involve 
alternative possibilities. A common critique against compatibilism is that it does not allow for 
alternative possibilities, thus that it ultimately conceives of the course of events describable 
by reference to laws of nature as the superior mode. Many compatibilistic strategies seem 
(explicitly or implicitly) to adjust to the demands of naturalism by subordinating “the 
perspective of participation” under “the perspective of observation”. However, some versions 
of compatibilism call such underlying scientistic prejudices to account. The question is 
whether these positions steer clear of Keil’s criticism. 
The goal of compatibilistic arguments is to show that the idea of a causally closed 
universe is simply irrelevant to us to the degree that we regard ourselves as free agents. In 
Freedom Evolves, Daniel Dennett pushes this argument to its limits:  
 
There are those who don’t believe in free will and thereby don’t have free will, and there are those who 
believe in free will and thereby actually have free will. (Dennett 2004, p. 13)  
 
This view, however, severely limits the range and meaning of the concept of free agency. 
Against it, other compatibilists might argue that being a free agent is not about assuming a 
                                                 
249 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Book III. 1, 1110a10. 
250 Cf. Keil 2007b, p. 90. 
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certain belief in particular, but is implied in the act of believing (or disbelieving) in general, 
as well as in any other act. In this sense, mistrusting that one is a free agent is to already be 
one. 
Compatibilistic arguments generally rest on the possibility of changing your 
perspective: What an acting person, as a participant, conceives of as something she can do or 
refrain from doing, she may simultaneously – qua scientifically minded observer – conceive 
of as a determinated state of the world.251 Thus, Peter Bieri writes: 
 
Solange ich überlege und mir verschiedene Möglichkeiten vorstelle, ist die Willensbildung nicht 
abgeschlossen, und es ist wahr, wenn ich denke: Jetzt, während ich an die Alternativen denke, ist noch 
nicht alles festgelegt. Doch das Nachdenken über die Alternativen ist insgesamt ein Geschehen, das 
mich, zusammen mit meiner Geschichte, am Ende auf einen ganz bestimmten Willen festlegen wird. 
Das weiß ich, und es stört mich nicht, im Gegenteil: Genau darin besteht die Freiheit der Entscheidung. 
(Bieri 2003, p. 287.f) 
 
That Bieri is “not bothered by” the double thought of his own act as simultaneously open for 
further consideration and determined as to a certain outcome, may simply be viewed as 
reflecting his own psychological make-up. Habermas, on the other hand, admits that he would 
easily be bothered if his decision was represented to him as a neuronal event: 
 
Es wäre nicht mehr meine Entscheidung. Nur der unbemerkte Wechsel von der Teilnehmer- zur 
Beobachterperspektive kann den Eindruck hervorrufen, dass die Handlungsmotivation durch 
verständliche Gründe eine Brücke zur Handlungsdetermination durch beobachtbare Ursachen baut. 
(Habermas 2004, p. 876) 
 
Aspect dualism, according to which reasons and causes are two aspects of the same thing, is 
not in itself sufficient in order to ease the tension between the two perspectives. Even if we 
only presume a token-token identity between reason and cause, we would still have to specify 
further the relationship between the levels or aspects. A “crude” epiphenomenalism is blind to 
the special characteristics of the participating perspective and to the impossibility of getting 
beyond it: 
 
                                                 
251 A common way to make sense of this relation is by assuming Davidson’s theory of a token-token identity 
between mental and physical events: Mental events (tokens) are identical with physical events (tokens). This is a 
non-reductive theory, and he denies the possibility of “translating” between the mental and the physical. Type-
type identity theories, on the other hand, rely on the existence of psychophysical laws, and say that for every 
mental event of type a, there is a physical event of type b to which it is identical, cf. above, Ch. 3.6. 
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Um den Widerspruch zwischen dem naturalistischen Weltbild und dem Selbstverständnis handelnder 
Personen auszuräumen, genügt es daher nicht, aus der Vogelperspektive des Wissenschaftlers 
festzustellen, dass solche Alternativen und Freiheitsgrade nur aus der Perspektive von Beteiligten 
bestehen. Denn die handelnden Personen sind trotz der Endlichkeit eines situierten Verstandes, der den 
Weltlauf nur in engen Grenzen vorauszusagen vermag, mit den Personen, die gleichsam von außen oder 
oben auf die Welt im Ganzen schauen, identisch. Was die eine weiß, kann die andere nicht einfach 
ignorieren. (Habermas 2006, p. 688) 
 
Martin Seel supports Habermas on the implausibility of seeing the participation and the 
observing perspective as mutually exclusive: 
 
Zwishen Teilnahme und Beobachtung besteht (…) keine strikte Alternative. Auch Beobachter sind 
Teilnehmer – potensielle Teilnehmer an einer Praxis der Rechtfertigung oder Vergegenwärtigung des 
Beobachteten. Beobachten ist selbst ein Fall der Teilnahme. (Seel 2005, p. 145) 
 
What Habermas and Seel call attention to is that mainstream compatibilistic theories are based 
on a fundamentally scientistic assumption; namely, that a superior, scientifically objectivating 
observer’s perspective outranges the more limited participant’s perspective. This implies the 
danger of an “alternative conception”, where the language game of scientifically predictable 
events is seen as independent from and superior to the language game of action, freedom and 
responsibility.  
Martin Seel argues that many compatibilists see the participating perspective as 
subjected to the authority of a naturalistic observer’s perspective. Thus freedom is degraded to 
an “epiphenomenon” in the sense of a “necessary illusion”. However, it is rather the 
assumption that this perspective can be viewed as independent and superior that should be 
seen as illusory, since it implies a fictive “view from nowhere” in the sense of a “pure” 
observation beyond participation: 
 
Es ist gerade die Idee einer absoluten, letztgültigen, ultimaten Beschreibung ‘des Universums’, die 
inkonsistent ist. Sie ist die Fiktion, aus der – und aus der allein – sich ergibt, dass unser 
Freiheitsbewusstsein von außen betrachtet fiktiv ist. Sobald man sieht, dass die Fähigkeit zur Teilnahme 
an Praktiken der Rechtfertigung für alles Erkennen – und jeden verständlichen Begriff des Erkennens – 
grundlegend ist, bricht diese Konstruktion zusammen. (Seel 2005, p. 151)  
 
In the pragmatic philosophy of language, the order of elements is reversed in such a way that 
the participating perspective is seen as superior. In this sense, to borrow a pun from Audun 
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Øfsti, the “view from now, here” is seen as a necessary, and in a sense primary, supplement to 
a “view from nowhere” in order to gain understanding.252 That the participating perspective is 
superior does not mean that it is independent or self-sufficient, but that it is the necessary 
“framing” of the subordinate perspective. Even scientific observation is – at least virtually –
participation in an intersubjective practice. If we didn’t have the possibility of objectivating 
experience, though, we would remain within an undifferentiated “view from now, here” (like 
a bat, to adhere to the vocabulary of Thomas Nagel). It is the possibility of perspectival 
change that constitutes the multiplicity necessary for gaining access to the “space of reasons”. 
As Tugendhat shows, a perspectival basis is necessary for our possibility to formulate non-
perspectival truth in “eternal” propositions.253 
The formal-pragmatic theory of speech acts points to a mutual dependency between 
the participating and the observational perspectives, each of them conditioning the other. 
Habermas elaborates on Hans Skjervheim’s “simple opposition” between participator and 
observer,254 turning it into a dynamic relation. It is this relation that Habermas refers to as a 
“complementary restriction of the perspectives of knowledge”,255 while Martin Seel speaks 
about an “asymmetric interdependence” between participation and observation: 
  
Teilnehmer sind potentielle Beobachter, Beobachter sind virtuelle Teilnehmer. (Seel 2005, p. 145) 
 
The asymmetry of the relationship allows us to speak of a first-person priority – or (to adhere 
to Skjervheim/Habermas/Seel’s vocabulary) the superiority of the participant’s over the 
observer’s perspective – without losing sight of the mutual dependency between the 
perspectives. 
This line of argument traditionally makes little impression on methodological 
naturalists. From a naturalistic point of view, the priority of the observational perspective is 
justified in:  
 
1) The unquestionable progress and prosperity of the methods of modern science. No other 
method of approach has had an even remotely comparable success when it comes to gaining 
new knowledge, as among others Hilary Kornblith argues: 
 
                                                 
252 Cf. Øfsti 2000, p. 116. 
253 Cf. above, Ch. 5.4. 
254 Cf. Skjervheim 1959 and 1996, cf. also Habermas 1981, p.163f. 
255 Habermas 2006, p. 700. 
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What does have priority over both metaphysics and epistemology, from the naturalistic perspective, is 
successful scientific theory, and not because there is some a priori reason to trust science over 
philosophy, but rather because there is a body of scientific theory which has proven its value in 
prediction, explanation, and technological application. This gives scientific work a kind of grounding 
which no philosophical theory has thus far enjoyed. (Kornblith 1994, p. 49) 
 
Related to this, a further justification arises: 
 
2) Sound scientific prudence and the rejection of apriorism. From this perspective it is always 
possible to continue research, thus gaining an ever-increasing overview over human 
consciousness and agency. Nothing is principally beyond reach for this scientific endeavour, 
not even the participatory, first-person perspective of the scientist herself.  
 
As argued above, in 7.1., naturalism tends to give predominance to ontological questions 
about the existence of mental states as integral parts of the world over and above 
epistemological questions about what kind of access acting subjects have to the world. That 
these two methods of approach lead to different results should not surprise us, Habermas says. 
He argues that although an ontological dualism is out of the question, a “methodological” or 
“epistemic” dualism is inevitable:256 
 
Der Widerstand des personalen Selbstverständnisses gegen eine naturalistische Selbstbescreibung 
erklärt sich aus der Nichthintergehbarkeit eines Dualismus von Wissenperspektiven, die sich 
miteinander verschränken müssen, um dem in der Welt situierten Geist einen orientierenden Überblick 
über seine Situation zu ermöglichen (Habermas 2006, p. 688).   
 
Habermas traces the two “complementary restricting” perspectives of knowledge back to two, 
simultaneously originating perspectives of the world: 
 
Die pragmatischen Universalien der Umgangssprache stiften für Sprecher und Hörer, die sich ihrer 
bedienen, um miteinander über etwas zu kommunizieren, einen doppelte Weltbezug: Indem sich die 
Teilnehmer im Horizont einer gemeinsamen Lebenswelt als Erste und Zweite Personen aufeinander 
beziehen, nehmen sie zugleich in der objektivierenden Einstellung einer Dritten Person auf Gegenstände 
in der Welt Bezug, von denen etwas ausgesagt werden kann. Die Teilnehmer an einer solchen 
                                                 
256 Cf. Habermas 2004, p. 878: ”Der methodologische Dualismus der Erklärungsperspektiven von Teilnehmern 
und Beobachtern darf nicht zu einem Dualismus von Geist und Natur ontologisiert werden”. Cf. also the subtitle 
of Habermas 2006: “Wie lässt sich der epistemische Dualismus mit einem ontologischen Monismus versöhnen?” 
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Verständigungspraxis verstehen sich als Personen, die einander für ihre Äußerungen Gründe schulden. 
(Op.cit, p. 693) 
 
Habermas’s methodological dualism shows itself in his suggestion for a “division of labour” 
between an epistemologically primary lifeworld and an ontologically primary objective 
world. According to him, these two dimensions of our involvement with the world are both 
expressions of the same rationalisation process, and do not come into conflict until the 
demand arises that scientifically objectivating self-description replace our “manifest” 
understanding of ourselves from within the lifeworld.257 
 “The alternative conception”, as Apel defines it, is a variant of methodological 
dualism.258 However, Habermas seeks to avoid the negative consequences of this conception 
by rejecting the strict opposition between the participant’s and the observer’s perspectives that 
is presupposed by Dennett and Bieri, and by suggesting a dynamic relation between the 
perspectives. By introducing a historic dimension into the relation, Habermas is able to argue 
in favour of a relative priority of the participant’s perspective. Based on G.M. Mead, among 
others, Habermas introduces an evolutionary view of the non-circumventability of a 
“complementary restriction of the perspectives of knowledge”:  
 
Aus einer pragmatischen Sicht, die Kant mit Darwin versöhnen möchte, spricht die These der Nicht-
Hintergehbarkeit dafür, dass die komplementäre Verschränkung anthropologisch tief sitzender 
Wissensperspektiven gleichseitig mit der kulturellen Lebensform selbst entstanden ist. Die 
Hilfsbedürftigkeit des organisch ’unfertigen’ Neugeborenen und eine entsprechend lange 
Aufzuchtsperiode machen den Menschen vom ersten Augenblick an von sozialen Interaktionen 
abhängig, die bei ihm tiefer in die Organisation und Ausprägung der kognitiven Fähigkeiten eingreifen 
als bei irgendeiner anderen Spezies. (Habermas 2004, p. 884)259 
 
Habermas argues that the evolutionary approach shared by many compatibilists – e.g. Daniel 
Dennett – seems itself to undermine the scientistic assumption of the priority of a third-person 
perspective understood as a self-sufficient “view from nowhere”260: 
                                                 
257 Cf. Habermas 2006, p. 694. 
258 Cf. above, Ch. 6.2. 
259 Cf. Habermas 2006, p. 700: “Offensichtlich markieren die Fähigkeit zu gegenseitiger Perspektivenübernahme 
und die Beherrschung einer propositional ausdifferenzierten Sprache einen tiefen evolutionären Einschnitt.” 
260 Habermas quotes Thomas Nagel’s The view from nowhere (1986) in a footnote in the English version of this 
essay: “If we push the claims of objective detachment to their logical conclusion, and survey the world from a 
standpoint completely detached from all interests, we discover that there is nothing – no values left of any kind: 
things can be said to matter at all only to individuals within the world” (Nagel 1986, 146). However, Habermas 
adds: “Since Nagel sticks to the mentalist opposition of first- and third-person perspectives, I won’t go into his 
otherwise quite compelling critique of objectivism” (cf. Habermas 2007, p. 46). 
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 Die Endlichkeit eines aus der natürlichen Evolution hervorgegangenen und in der Welt situieren Geistes 
spricht vielmehr gegen die fraglose Unterordnung der teilnehmenden Perspektive, aus der uns die 
objektive Welt zunächst im praktischen Umgang mit unbeherrschten Kontingenzen begegnet, unter 
einen transzendenten Standpunkt jenseits der Welt, der kein bloßer ’Standpunkt’ mehr sein darf. 
(Habermas 2006, p. 688) 
 
The problem, however, with the idea of methodological dualism, is that it to a certain degree 
blurs the (necessary) possibility of transitions between different perspectives of knowledge. 
There is a hermeneutic inflexibility to Habermas’s system, which seems to be reflected in 
formulations such as this one:   
 
Willensfreiheit ist eine zum Sprachspiel verantwortlicher Urheberschaft gehörende Voraussetzung. Der 
Inhalt dieser Präsupposition erschließt sich nur Teilnehmern, die als Hörer oder Sprecher eine 
performative Einstellung gegenüber Zweiten Personen einnehmen, während er für Beobachter, also aus 
der Sicht einer unbeteiligten Dritten Person, unzugänglich bleibt. (Habermas 2006, p. 671) 
 
The presupposition of freedom is inaccessible from an observer’s perspective; hence, the 
question of whether a person “could have done otherwise” has no application from this 
perspective: 
 
Für den Beobachter ist die Frage, ob die Person auch anders hätte handeln können, kein Thema.  
(Op.cit. p. 684)  
 
In these sequences, Habermas seems to suggest – “alternative-conceptually” so to speak – that 
we can only recognise or acknowledge each other as free agents in a direct “I-you”-
communication, not in e.g. “historic” sentences in the relative third person. This seems to 
undermine a sound, hermeneutic point that Habermas otherwise seeks to defend, as in the 
following quote: 
 
[Die] aus performativen Zusammenhängen bekannten Eigenschäften werden Personen auch dann 
zugeschrieben, wenn sie selber, zusammen mit ihren Praktiken und lebensweltlichen Kontexten, als 
’etwas in der Welt Vorkommendes’ beobachtet und beschrieben werden. (Op.cit. p. 693) 
 
Here, the “secondary objectivated” (Apel), or “relative third person” (Øfsti) seems to be well 
taken care of.  
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To me, the question arises whether the ambiguity of Habermas’s position is inherent in 
all versions of compatibilism. In that case, the same scientistic presupposition that Habermas 
diagnoses as underlying in many compatibilistic positions, is bound to pop up in his own 
version as well. In a footnote to his article on “the language game of responsible agency”, 
Habermas accounts for the difference between his own position and that of mainstream 
compatibilism: 
 
Auch meine Position zielt auf die Einbeziehung des menschlichen Geistes und seiner komplementär 
verschränkten Wissensperspektiven in das wissenschaftlich erforschbare Universum der Natur; zugleich 
unterscheidet sie sich jedoch von dem ’kompatabilistisch’ genannten Mainstream durch die Ablehnung 
der szientistischen These, dass dieses Universum als Gegenstandsbereich nomologisch verfahrender 
Naturwissenschaften (nach dem Normalvorbild der heutigen Physik) hinreichend bestimmt ist.      
(Op.cit. p. 704, fn 40) 
 
This is an attempt to chisel out a modified version of compatibilism, a version free of 
scientific prejudice. However, I think there is an inherent problem in compatibilism in that the 
presupposition of freedom in the full sense – viz. in the sense of assuming that the agent could 
have done otherwise – only reveals itself as necessary and non-circumventable from within a 
participant’s perspective. This seems to rule out what Apel calls secondary objectivation, i.e. 
the possibility of recognising the persons we are not directly involved with, but whom we 
speak about in the third person, as full-fledged, free agents.261  
Compatibilism – no matter how carefully formulated – allows for viewing the physical 
substrate of actions as determined. Arguably, though, a robust conception of free agency 
should preclude the possibility to relativise actions as the results of determined laws of nature 
from any perspective, or under any description. Otherwise, it seems unable to support the 
strong interpretation of free agency, namely that the agent – as observed from a (relative) 
third-person perspective – could have done otherwise.  
To be sure, if we assume only a token-token identity between the action and its 
physical substrate, this excludes the possibility of formulating a strict law by which the action 
can be foreseen. Even given full knowledge of every psycho-physical detail preceding it, we 
could still not draw a conclusion as to what type of action would follow. Nevertheless, given 
                                                 
261 Obviously, a possible ”Letztbegründung” of freedom – in Apel’s sense – is only attainable from within a first-
person perspective, from which a pragmatic inconsistency reveals itself when I try to deny that my acts are free. 
However, my point is that the right approach to free agency should support our ability to acknowledge other 
persons – who we speak about, not with – as conscious-in-action, viz. as subjects acting freely. Cf. above, Ch. 
6.2. 
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the presupposition of strict causal laws at the physical level on one hand and the 
supervenience thesis262 on the other, the outcome of (the substrate of) my decision making 
process would still from a certain perspective be determined. This might be compatible with 
my performative statement (in the first person present tense) that I can do otherwise, as well 
as with my appeal to you that you should do otherwise – after all this participating perspective 
is the superior one from which to view agency. I am still not convinced, however, that it is 
also compatible with statements concerning the ability of other agents – the people I talk 
about – to do otherwise (or even concerning my own actions in the past tense). 
 Not even the most carefully formulated versions of compatibilism steer clear of this 
dilemma, one that Habermas himself is aware of, of course, and which leads him to conclude 
that there are limits to what we can hope to achieve when it comes to understanding the 
interplay of freedom and determinism. To a certain degree it will remain an enigma: 
 
Rätselhaft bleibt einerseits die ‘mentale Verursachung’ von neurologisch erklärbaren 
Körperbewegungen durch verstehbare Intentionen (…). Aber in der umgekehrten Blickrichtung ist der 
Preis nicht geringer. Der Determinismus muss das Selbstverständnis rational Stellung nehmender 
Subjekte zur Selbsttäuschung erklären. (Habermas 2004, p. 886) 
 
I agree with Habermas to the degree that our “double view” of ourselves as simultaneously 
free agents and as part of a natural course of events inevitably is an area of philosophical 
tension, as among others Kant, Nagel and Wellmer have pointed out.263 However, if 
Habermas is right when he assumes that determinism forces the agent to view her own self-
consciousness as an illusion – even if only from a certain perspective – then a scientistic 
prejudice seems to be built into the compatibilistic position itself. 
 
 
7.4 Concluding remarks: Freedom as consciousness-in-acting  
 
My main argument in Chapter 7 is that a robust concept of free agency rests on an argument 
of the priority of the first person, in other words the relative superiority of a participating 
perspective. A fundament for such a concept is the interventionist account of the relationship 
                                                 
262 “[T]here cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect” (Davidson 
1980, p. 214). In other words: If there is a change at the mental level (an action is carried out), there is 
necessarily a change at the physical level (an event takes place in space-time). 
263 Cf. above, Ch. 1.2 and 1.3. 
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between agency and causality. The problem with many compatibilistic theories of freedom is 
an underlying assumption that the scientific, observational perspective is superior. Habermas 
points out this scientistic fallacy; however, his position is marked by similar problems. 
Although Habermas explicitly dissociates himself from the scientistic way of giving 
prominence to the observational perspective, his modified compatibilism still threatens to 
collapse into an “alternative conception”. By this I mean that his position does not seem to 
fully support a concept of free agency as a part of the world. Although (free) agency comes 
into being from a participant’s perspective, it should be clear that it can also be recognised 
and ascribed from an observer’s perspective as rational, free action, and not as behaviour 
determined by the laws of nature. Distinguishing the participating and the observational 
perspective is necessary in order to uncover the priority of the first-person perspective. 
However, such a distinction cannot justify a limitation of the scope of free agency, in the 
sense that it can only be recognised from certain perspectives. 
Geert Keil argues that a robust conception of free action involves “the ability to do 
otherwise under given circumstances”. This seems to exclude a strict, Laplacean determinism, 
according to which the total course of events in the world is fixed once and for all. The 
question is if it also excludes any form of determinism in the sense of nominalistic 
conceptions of causality, i.e. whether it excludes all versions of compatibilism. I do not try to 
give a final answer to this question, but restrict myself to pointing at certain inherent tensions 
and ambiguities, even in Habermas’s attempted “non-scientistic” compatibilism. 
The core of this thesis is not a negative limitation of the “metaphysical space” within 
which freedom is possible, however, or a theory of what the world would have to be like in 
order for us to be able to act freely. Rather, I have aimed for a positive account of what the 
concept of free agency implies, and of its central position in our relation to the world. In this 
last chapter I have argued an “asymmetric interdependence” between the participating and the 
observing perspective. This is based on the argument that freedom of action is a “non-
circumventable” condition for rational argumentation in the sense that no proof against 
freedom is thinkable without running into pragmatic self-contradictions. 
I have tried to avoid the implication that freedom is a purely “practical idea”, viz. 
something that has a reference “only” to the degree to which we must act under this idea. 
Rather, I have argued that, given a linguistic-pragmatic view of knowledge, a concept of free 
agency is an epistemological condition, in the sense that it constitutes our access to objective 
knowledge about the world. According to the view I defend, free actions exist in the world. 
This primarily means that they have a performative being in Wellmer’s sense. Furthermore, 
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however, it means that the free actions I perform – via indexical transitions – can be 
“conjugated into” the “logical space of reasons”, i.e. into a space of true-or-false statements, 
and in this sense belong to veritative being in Tugendhat’s sense.264 
As I warned in the first chapter of my thesis, I am not conducting a systematic or 
historic tour through different positions within the philosophical debate on freedom. More 
specifically, I have made no excursions into the current debate which has risen as a 
consequence of the continuing progress within the neurosciences. I fully agree with Geert 
Keil’s demarcation of the freedom problem as a “typical philosophical question”, and a 
particularly tricky one at that: 
 
Das Problem der Willensfreiheit ist wie das Geist/Körper-Problem vielsichtig und tückish. Denkfehler, 
Verwechslungen, Kurzschlüsse und Kategorienfehler lauern an jeder Ecke. Ist man dem einen Fallstrick 
entgangen, droht der nächste, und allen zugleich zu entgehen erfordert enorme Umsicht. Kurz: Das 
Freiheitsproblem ist ein typisches philosophisches Problem. (Keil 2007b, p. 190) 
 
Keil argues that the “neuro-debate” says little or nothing about what is relevant for this 
problem, namely whether we have an ability to do otherwise in normal cases of agency. He 
stresses that this is not to say that the findings of neuro-science cannot contribute to questions 
about freedom of agency. Specifically, these findings may be useful in practical matters, e.g. 
regarding the legal delimitation of pathological cases.265 
What this thesis does attempt, is to clarify the concept of free agency through an 
alternative route, differing from both the traditional and the current debate. I have tried to 
display how deep-rooted the concept is, and thus, by implication, the cost of having to do 
without it. The route of my argumentation, chapter by chapter, has been such: 
 
1) The introduction is an attempt to accentuate some basics about the thesis, among 
other things the fact that I discuss the concept of free agency, not free will. Another 
fundamental issue raised by the introduction is that, while retaining the sense of a 
tension between the different perspectives from which we may view agency, I aim to 
avoid dualism in my approach to the problem. 
 
                                                 
264 Cf. above, Ch. 6.9. 
265 Cf. Strawson 1974: Concerns about the possibility that an action was not performed freely make sense 
regarding the exceptions, not the normal cases of agency. 
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2) In the second chapter, I look into Kant’s theory of freedom. I approve of Kant’s 
view that the relevant kind of freedom (the one worth having) is not a “Pinocchio 
freedom”, viz. having “no strings attached”, but rather the ability to be bound by 
reasons or norms. However, I criticise Kantian dualism, i.e. the divide between the 
realms of nature and freedom, making it in principle impossible to acknowledge the 
actions of other subjects, or even my own concrete acts, as free. 
3) In the third chapter I defend an interventionist account of the relation between 
causality and action. This theory is a decisive element of an argument going through 
the thesis: That free agency is not only a practically “non-circumventable” idea, but an 
epistemological one, in the sense that it constitutes our access to the world in terms of 
knowing as well as of acting. 
4) The forth chapter contains the outline of a normative theory of action, regarded as a 
generalisation of a rational-pragmatic theory of language.  
5) In the fifth chapter I argue that normativity is based in intersubjective language. I 
also include the outline of an argument that this normativity ultimately must be 
explicated by reference to a categorical imperative, thus that it is based in practical 
reason. 
6) Chapter 6 constitutes the core argument of the thesis: That given the right (unified) 
view of language and world respectively, a non-dualist account of human freedom is 
within reach. Thus, free agency is to be regarded not as an unknown x for which we 
must find a place within the existing world, but as the necessary starting point from 
which we can get to know the world. 
7) Wrapping up my case in Chapter 7, I argue that a robust concept of free agency 
must rest on a non-scientistic assumption of first-person priority, but at the same time 
on the possibility to ascribe freedom to other agents. We cannot in my view settle this 
matter by means of a “duck-rabbit” freedom (“now you see it, now you don’t”). 
 
I have argued that freedom cannot be analysed independently, but must be seen as an 
analytical component of the concept of action. To act is to act freely, i.e. we are not ascribing 
anything new to an action when we say that it is free. Free action is a pleonasm, since the 
concept action already contains a “massive metaphysics of freedom”.266 This begs for 
misunderstandings, since it is perfectly possible to say, e.g. “I was forced to do it”. This 
                                                 
266 Cf. above, Ch. 3.7.  
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would count as an extenuation, i.e. it would reduce or lift my moral responsibility. If I can be 
(politically, violently, or psychologically) forced to act, then some acts are clearly unfree – 
but then how can “free action” be a pleonasm? This is because freedom of action under 
normal circumstances is a transcendental-pragmatic condition in the cases of exception and 
extenuation. The idea of forced action derives its meaning only on the basis that actions 
normally are free. This is in line with Wittgenstein’s argument in Philosophische 
Untersuchungen: 
 
‘What sometimes happens might always happen.’ – What kind of proposition is that? It is like the following: 
If ‘F (a)’ makes sense ‘(x) F(x)’ makes sense. 
‘If it is possible for someone to make a false move in some game, then it might be possible for 
everybody to make nothing but false moves in every game.’ – Thus we are under a temptation to 
misunderstand the logic of our expressions here, to give an incorrect account of the use of our words. 
Orders are sometimes not obeyed. But what would it be like if no orders were ever obeyed? The concept 
‘order’ would have lost its purpose. (PU § 345) 
 
Strawson makes a similar move against the attempt to represent actions as determined; it is 
only meaningful to assume this in the case of exceptions. If actions in general are seen as 
determined, then the meaning of our concept of agency and everything that goes with it 
dissolves. In this thesis I have tried to give good (practical and epistemological) reasons for 
maintaining a robust concept of (free) agency.  
However, as I have argued, the reality of freedom is not something we can prove 
theoretically. In a sense, we cannot even reasonably view it as an intelligible belief among the 
other things we believe about the world and about ourselves. Rather, it must be recognised as 
a condition for the possibility of reasoning, thus as something that “shows itself” in the 
performance of acts. This is the idea behind Kant’s characterisation of freedom as a “fact of 
reason”. At the same time this “fact” should not be viewed as a pure practical idea or simply 
as “the limit of experience”. Vital to a non-dualistic epistemology is that the actions we 
conceive of as free from the first-person perspective are the very same actions as the ones we 
experience as entering into the natural course of events. One way to avoid the dualistic 
implications of many attempts at clarifying this relation is, I have argued, to exchange the 
inner-outer distinction with a dynamic relation between a performative (participating) and an 
objectivating (observing) perspective. This way, the misleading mentalistic connotations of 
the inner-outer metaphor are avoided, and we can accentuate the necessary possibility of 
transitions between the perspectives. 
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What is then the fundamental meaning of characterising actions as free? In one 
sentence, it means that a consciousness-in-acting that is in principle always explicable in a 
performative 1pp-sentence (hence always declinable/ascribable to “relative third persons”) is 
constitutive of agency. 
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